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Preface 
Since the spring of 1997, the Forestry Project at IIASA has been engaged in a study 
called “Institutions and the Emergence of Markets ― Transition in the Russian Forest 
Sector.” The IIASA research group has looked at problems related to the forest sector 
institutions in eight Russian regions. In order to share the results of the study with the 
people it most concerns, the people living in the case study regions and working in the 
regional forest sector, IIASA decided to return to Russia to present the study results and 
invite regional forest stakeholders to discuss the findings and initiate a process with the 
aim of generating recommendations for improving the regional forest policy. The policy 
exercise was chosen as the tool for achieving these goals.  
This report discusses the experiences gained through three policy exercises organized 
by IIASA in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk between October 2000 
and March 2001. A pilot exercise conducted in Tomsk in June 2000 provided important 
experiences for use in the subsequent exercises. (The Tomsk exercise was discussed in 
IIASA Interim Report IR-01-061.)  
The present report should be possible to read independent of earlier published reports 
from the IIASA study of Russian forest institutions. It provides a summary of the 
findings previously reported in the case studies of the forest sector institutions in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. (All of the reports produced in the previous 
IIASA study are listed in Appendix A.) It is hoped that the report will be of interest to 
researchers and politicians engaged in the planning of similar participatory policy 
development initiatives in Russia or elsewhere in the world.  
Finally, on behalf of Sten Nilsson, IIASA Deputy Director and Leader of the Forestry 
Project, I would like to express our gratitude to the local study coordinators in the 
Russian regions we studied, Vigdis Nygaard and Lyudmila Ivanova in Murmansk, 
Minna Piipponen, Svetlana A. Gurova, and Nadezhda B. Polevshchikova in Karelia, and 
Mikhail Yu. Varakin in Arkhangelsk. Without their dedicated work neither the previous 
case studies of these regions nor the policy exercises would have been possible.  
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Institutional Change in the Russian 
Forest Sector: Stakeholder Participation 
in Forest Policy Formulation in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
Mats-Olov Olsson 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The management of natural resources has always been a high priority area for 
government control. The operative management activities have often been entrusted 
special government agencies ― in the case of forests this agency was typically the state 
forest service (variously named in different countries). Governments have kept a 
decisive say in the management of important natural resources even if they have not 
always been the lawful owner of the resource. In countries where the resources have 
been (primarily) privately owned, governments have typically embedded the use and 
management of the resources with detailed regulations. The Swedish forests are a good 
example of a largely privately owned natural resource embedded in an institutional 
framework that gives the state a decisive say in its management and use. In Russia, 
forests were always owned by the state and there are no clear signs of any fundamental 
changes in this situation, even if the form of public ownership of the forest lands ― 
federal, regional or municipal ― is nowadays frequently being discussed.1  
It would seem that public ownership would give the state excellent control over the 
management and use of the natural resources found on the territory under its 
jurisdiction. The degree of popular influence over the management and use of such 
resources would then be determined by the degree to which people are able to influence 
political processes, that is, it would be decided by the workings of democracy. 
However, during the last decade or so governments have been meeting increasing 
                                                 
1
 However, recent articles in the press indicate that some changes in forest land property rights might be 
contemplated by the government. For instance, according to The Moscow Times (June 19, 2002) President 
Putin, in a speech to the State Council (a group of regional leaders), called for the introduction of long-
term leases of forest lands. The Ministry of Natural Resources (which is responsible for Russia’s forestry) 
is said to propose an increase in lease terms from 1–5 years to a minimum of 49 years or up to 100 years 
if lease holders agree to take care of reforestation. It could be noted that the discussion about privatizing 
agricultural land has reached further (see, e.g., Skyner, 2001). As ITAR-TASS reported on July 25, 2002, 
President Putin recently signed a bill legalizing the sale and purchase of agricultural land. A Land Code 
allowing free purchase and sale of non-agricultural land was already adopted last year. 
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difficulties in their natural resource management, at least this seems to be the case for 
forest resources. A fundamental reason for these difficulties is of course that a number 
of independent actors (state authorities, government agencies, enterprises (both state 
owned and private), civic organizations, private citizens) are engaged in various ways in 
the actual management and use of a nation’s forests. These actors have (at least partly) 
different objectives and different “cultures” of natural resource utilization causing 
conflicts and (often) an inefficient and unsustainable resource use. 
While, for a long time, these inbuilt causes of conflict and inefficiencies did not upset 
traditional state controlled resource management systems, there are other factors that 
have gained an increasing importance during the past decade and today these factors are 
causing a profound rethinking of forest management policies and practices all over the 
world. So, for instance, have property rights patterns shifted in some regions of the 
world (notably in Central and Eastern Europe), political power has become more 
decentralized (giving regional and municipal authorities increasing influence), 
democratization and multi-party politics have emerged with the decline of centrally 
planned one-party states, demographic transitions have shifted the population structure 
towards higher urbanization (with changing perceptions, interests and objectives in 
forest management), governments are being down-sized due to financial restrictions 
making them only hold on to basic functions (such as policymaking, planning, 
legislation, etc.), functions earlier belonging to a single natural resource management 
institution have become increasingly contradictory (cf. conservation and production) 
and sometimes various functions have eventually been separated through institutional 
reform and the breakup of organizations (Anderson et al., 1998).  
These developments have made people engaged in forest sector issues ― forest 
managers, users, and researchers ― start thinking about how to improve forest 
management performance and avoid conflicts that are detrimental for the efficiency and 
sustainability of forest use. Suggestions for improvements have often included calls for 
an increased “pluralism” in forest management2 and collaborative or participatory 
approaches for engaging stakeholders in the development of efficient forest policies 
have frequently been suggested (see, e.g., Carter, 1999; Warburton, 1997; Buchy and 
Hoverman, 2000; Burley et al., 2001; Kennedy et al., 2001). 
Reforming policy-making procedures in Russia and other transition countries was, as 
one should have expected, no simple and fast process. It was assumed that the transition 
would somehow automatically, through the workings of the emerging market forces, 
lead to an economy characterized by a greater allocative efficiency and an increase in 
the population’s living standards (see, e.g., Kolodko, 2000). However, after more than 
ten years of transition, evidence of unambiguously positive effects of the changes is still 
scarce. During Soviet times, resource allocation and the redistribution of income used to 
be entirely in the hands of the Communist Party elite. Here, there were no market forces 
in operation and very little influence was left with the political representation system. 
                                                 
2
 For instance, the FAO journal Unasylva, No. 194 (1998) contains a number of articles presented at a 
FAO hosted workshop in December 1997 on “Pluralism and Sustainable Forestry and Rural 
Development”.  
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Thus, expectations were high for this situation to change rapidly as transition started to 
make an impact.  
However, as is now clear for everyone to see, the transition only brought efficiency and 
profits to a few sectors and enterprises in the economy ― here, the new free market 
allocative efficiency might indeed have made an impact ― while leaving the majority 
of enterprises with small chances of survival.3 It also brought personal wealth to a few 
citizens while an increasing number of people were left with very little to share. Thus, 
the market reforms failed on two major goals (see, Kolodko, 1999).  
Since transition did not often bring about a change of (or in) the people in charge of 
important social functions, such as, in our case, Russian forest managers and forest 
users, reform measures proposed by such circles are sure to be viewed with suspicion 
not only by the general public, but also by the new emerging group of business 
managers with a modern outlook and (often western) economic training. Efforts to 
reform the Russian forest policy through participatory processes engaging broad 
stakeholder groups (business managers, politicians, citizen initiative groups, etc.) should 
therefore be both welcome for its democratic content and efficient in the sense that it 
would stimulate profound institutional changes.  
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The general purpose of this study is (a) to assess the need for institutional changes in the 
Russian forest sector and (b) to discuss possibilities to improve the regional forest sector 
institutions through the use of participatory policy formulation methods engaging 
Russian regional forest stakeholders.  
The research on which this report is largely based was conducted between April 1997 
and December 2001, when the author was a member of a small team of researchers in 
IIASA’s Forestry Project.4 The main aim of this IIASA study called “Institutions and 
the Emergence of Markets ― Transition in the Russian Forest Sector” was to try to 
understand the institutional framework governing the Russian forest sector and the 
changes in this framework that have taken place since the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.5 To this end a series of case studies were conducted in eight Russian 
                                                 
3
 It is this division of the economy that has been labeled the virtual economy. The concept is further 
discussed in Section 3.1.  
4
 Information about IIASA can be obtained from the institute’s web presentation on the Internet at URL: 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at.  
5
 The IIASA in-house research team that worked with the IIASA institutional framework study consisted 
of four people. Lars Carlsson (Luleå University of Technology, Sweden) worked full time in the project 
between September 1997 and June 1998. After that he worked on a part-time basis (50%) until the end of 
2000. Nils-Gustav Lundgren (Luleå University of Technology, Sweden) spent a total of about three 
months working for the project during various visits to IIASA in 1997–2000. Mats-Olov Olsson (Umeå 
University, Sweden) worked full time for the project at IIASA between April 1997 and June 2000, after 
which he continued his work at IIASA on a part-time (50%) basis until the end of 2001. Soili Nysten-
Haarala (University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland) worked full time at IIASA between January and 
August 2000 focusing on the legal aspects of the transition in the Russian forest sector; between 
September and December 2000 she was affiliated with the project on a part-time basis. 
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regions, among them the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk (cf. Figure 
1).6  
Murmansk 
Oblast Republic of 
Karelia 
Arkhangelsk 
Oblast 
Moscow 
Oblast Tomsk Oblast 
Irkutsk 
Oblast 
Krasnoyarsk 
Krai 
Khabarovsk 
Krai 
The Russian Federation
 
Figure 1: The eight Russian regions studied in the IIASA project.  
When the eight case studies were completed the IIASA team initiated a series of so-
called policy exercises with the purpose of disseminating the results of the case studies 
to forest stakeholders in the respective regions and to generate a discussion among these 
stakeholders about possible ways of improving the institutional framework in the 
regional forest sector.7 The current report provides a theoretical background to these 
policy exercises and assesses the practical experiences gained in IIASA’s policy 
exercises in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk against the theoretical findings.8  
The kind of assessment that we attempt here entails an analysis that hopefully will be 
able to shed light on a number of more specific issues, such as:  
                                                 
6
 The five other regions included in the study were Moscow, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and 
Khabarovsk. Several of the case studies performed in these regions were conducted by Ph.D. students 
participating in IIASA’s Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) in the summers of 1997–2000. The 
results of these studies have been reported in IIASA’s Interim Report series. A summary and digestion of 
the results of the eight case studies was published in the September 2001 issue of Europe-Asia Studies (cf. 
Carlsson et al., 2001). A complete listing of the publications produced by the “institutional framework 
study” can be found in Appendix A. 
7
 So far (by the summer of 2003), four such policy exercises have been conducted; the first in Tomsk in 
June 2000, the second in Murmansk in October the same year, the third in Karelia (Petrozavodsk) in late 
November 2000, and the fourth in Arkhangelsk in March 2001. 
8
 A report detailing the performance and outcome of the policy exercise in Tomsk was published in 
December 2001 (see Olsson, 2001).  
 5
• What are the general prerequisites for participatory policy processes and for 
initiating (creating) such processes?  
• What are the specific prerequisites for the successful establishment of a 
participatory policy process in the Russian forest sector?  
• To what extent are these prerequisites in place? (Are participatory/emancipatory 
systemic interventions at all possible in today’s Russian society, a society that quite 
recently was entirely governed by the Soviet command system?)  
• To what extent can the necessary prerequisites be created, imposed or “fostered” 
from “the outside”? (To what extent are trust/legitimacy issues important in this 
context?)  
• What lessons can be learned from our policy exercises in Murmansk, Karelia, and 
Arkhangelsk (and from the previous IIASA studies on Russian regional forest sector 
institutions) for initiating and conducting successful policy processes in the Russian 
forest sector (and elsewhere)?  
Obviously, answering such questions would in principle require a discussion of broader 
political and economic issues, such as issues concerning the nature of the former Soviet 
and the present Russian society, the development of democratic institutions and 
institutions governing the emerging Russian market economy, the nature of institutional 
change, etc. Here, we will have to focus on what we believe to be the most important 
aspects of theory for our purpose. The “shortcuts” we take in this discussion are 
indicated in the next section.  
1.3 Methodological Considerations 
The policy exercises with forest stakeholders in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and 
Arkhangelsk (that are discussed in the current report) were actually part of a second 
series of IIASA case studies concerning institutional problems hampering the 
development of the Russian forest sector. Four of the eight Russian regions that were 
included in the first series of case studies conducted in 1997–2000 by the IIASA 
research team were also included in this new series. While the focus in the first series of 
case studies was mainly on contextual factors determining the rules (institutions) 
governing actors’ behavior in the regional forest sector and on the character of those 
rules, the second series of case studies was undertaken with the purpose of assessing the 
possibilities of initiating participatory policy formulation processes through the use of 
policy exercises.  
Methodologically the study reported here ― a study dealing with an externally initiated 
activity aiming at influencing the performance of an economic sector in a region of a 
foreign country ― might be characterized as a systemic intervention with the purpose of 
improving on an existing problem situation. The approach is compatible with (and 
inspired by) modern systems thinking, especially recent developments in “Critical 
Systems Thinking” as elaborated, for instance, in Flood and Jackson (1991) and 
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Midgley (2000).9 However, while we are inspired by and in fact using various aspects of 
these methodological approaches, the purpose here is not to assess the value of various 
methods of systemic intervention. It is rather to see if the method we have chosen ― the 
“policy exercise method” ― really can accomplish what we intended or hoped for. 
Thus, in our context the policy exercise was seen as a method for stakeholders in the 
Russian forest sector to identify ― or rather to establish a consensus on ― the 
institutional problems existing in the regional forest sector and for facilitating a 
discursive elaboration of adequate and implementable designs (policies) for institutional 
change with the purpose of eliminating the observed problems. In fact, everything that 
is said in this report one way or another relates to the use of policy exercises in this 
capacity, i.e., as a method (or even a tool) for elaborating functional policies for 
improving the workings of the Russian forest sector through adequate institutional 
changes. Thus, the purpose of this report might be said to be to assess the value of the 
“policy exercise tool” in the Russian forest sector context.  
Turning now to a motivation of the “methods” used in this study we will primarily focus 
on two things:  
(a) the way in which we have approached the task that we have set ourselves (which 
was stated in Section 1.2 above), i.e., the study design, and  
(b) the choice and use of theories, analytical methods, and empirical data, with the help 
of which we have performed our analysis. 
The choice and use of theories, analytical methods and empirical data ― as in (b) above 
― should be determined on the basis of an assessment of their quality and applicability 
for a particular analysis.  
More will presently be said about our reasoning concerning these factors. However, 
before entering that discussion, we should at least note the rather long “series” of 
assumptions that lie behind the specification of the particular purpose of this report. 
These assumptions should be seen as part of the method used in the study, since they 
framed the selection of questions to be discussed.  
1.3.1 Assumptions Behind the Purpose of This Study 
The task that the stated purpose of this study (cf. Section 1.2) requires us to solve is not 
entirely simple and straightforward. In fact, a number of assumptions have to be made 
in order set the stage for our analysis. A basic assumption behind the whole issue is that 
a fundamental systemic change has been taking place in Russia after 1991 in the sense 
that the old Soviet “command economy” has been abandoned in favor of a transition to 
a market-like system. The statement that Russia is currently in transition toward a 
market-like system is indeed an assumption, but it is an assumption that most people ― 
both laymen and experts in the field of economic systems ― today consider viable. We 
                                                 
9
 For an overview of systems thinking see, e.g., Olsson (2004). In the last 10–20 years a lot of literature 
has emerged on “participatory processes”, or “participatory development”, “action research”, etc. Recent 
examples and theoretical elaborations of such approaches can be found, for instance, in Nelson and 
Wright (1995); Stringer (1999); and Clarke (2000).  
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also assume (and this is likewise commonly considered to be a viable assumption) that 
the situation in the Russian forest sector is dismal in the sense that resource allocation is 
highly inefficient judged from a market economic point of view. In practice, this means 
that the sector is not contributing as much as it could do to the country’s economic 
development. A third assumption is that it is crucial to learn more about the functioning 
of the Russian forest sector at the local and regional levels in order to understand how 
the efficiency of the sector’s performance might be improved. Behind this assumption 
lie a set of other assumptions. So, for instance, we assume that the suboptimal (in the 
market sense) performance of the Russian forest sector is the result of (a) an obsolete 
sector structure (both the administrative and company structure is largely incompatible 
with the requirements of a modern market economy) and of (b) an inadequate behavior 
on the part of the actors in the system. 
Consequently, since both the structure of the forest sector and the specific behavior of 
its actors are, at a specific point in time, a result of the set of rules that has governed 
actors’ behavior prior to that moment, we assume that understanding how changes are 
introduced in this set of rules ― the “rules-in-use,” or institutions ― is of central 
importance both for our understanding of the problem situation and for our ability to 
actually improve on this situation. In this sense, then, one could claim that the current 
problems of the Russian forest sector are fundamentally related to the institutions 
governing the actors’ behavior and that changing inefficient institutions is crucial for the 
possibilities to improve the situation (efficiency) in the sector.  
On the basis of these assumptions we hypothesize that it is possible to learn about the 
prerequisites for institutional change in the Russian forest sector by studying the 
behavior of its actors at the local and regional levels.  
The theoretical underpinning and the viability of some of these assumptions are further 
discussed in Section 3.  
Together these considerations form the “point of departure” for the task that was 
specified in the purpose of this study (cf. Section 1.2).  
1.3.2 The Approach Used to Solve the Task ― Study Design 
We try to solve our task by looking at three separate but related approaches to 
institutional change in the Russian forest sector. First (in Section 2), in order to frame 
our analysis in the context of existing knowledge, we look at some theories, which we 
believe can contribute to an understanding of the problem of institutional change in 
transition countries, especially Russia. Second (in Section 3), we give an account of 
three previous case studies (in which the author participated) of the institutional 
problems hampering the development of the forest sector in the regions of Murmansk, 
Karelia, and Arkhangelsk belonging to Russia’s North economic region. Third (in 
Section 4), against the background of the discussion of the two previous approaches, we 
look at the implementation of a certain participatory policy formulation method, a so-
called Policy Exercise, that was first tested with forest stakeholders in Tomsk in June 
2000, and subsequently used by IIASA in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk.  
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It is the first and the third of these approaches to institutional change that are especially 
focused in this report. The second approach ― the previous case studies of institutional 
problems in the forest sectors of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk that are recounted 
in Section 3 ― is included primarily as background to the policy exercises that are 
analyzed in Section 4. (The results of the earlier case studies of the forest sector 
institutions in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhagnelsk have been reported elsewhere. See 
Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999; Jacobsen, 1999; Piipponen, 1999; Carlsson et al., 1999; 
Kotova, 2001.) In order to make sense of the discussions that took place during these 
policy exercises, it is, however, essential to have some understanding of the situation in 
the regional forest sector and the institutional problems hampering the improvement of 
the sector’s performance. This is the reason for including an account of the methods and 
results of the previous case studies in this report.  
Based on the discussion and analysis concerning the three approaches to institutional 
change that we consider in this report some conclusions will be ventured (in Section 5) 
concerning the general purpose of this study as well as the more specific issues listed in 
Section 1.2.  
1.3.3 The Choice and Use of Theories, Analytical Methods, and Empirical 
Data 
Assuming, as we do, that Russia is a country in transition from a “command economy” 
to a more market-like system, and also assuming that this transition mainly consists in 
achieving profound institutional changes in the current Russian system (where the 
institutional framework still preserves many features from the old Soviet system) we 
obviously have to consider recent theoretical developments relating to (a) the transition 
process and (b) institutional change.  
In so doing we have become convinced that it is possible to achieve institutional change 
by design, i.e., existing “rules-in-use” can be deliberately changed through citizens’ 
collective action with the purpose of achieving specific changes in the rules. A feature 
of the old Soviet system, of which there seems to be an almost universal agreement, was 
its fundamentally undemocratic nature. The lack of democracy is also believed to be one 
of the root causes of the failure of the system to survive. The ongoing transition is 
therefore required to improve the functioning of the new Russian market-like system 
while simultaneously improving democracy. Looking for ways to achieve institutional 
improvements through democratic means also urges us to review some of the recent 
developments in the theory of democracy.  
This is the reasoning behind the choice of theories that we believe can inform our study. 
These theories are dealt with in Section 2.  
The methodology employed in the studies of forest sector institutional problems in eight 
Russian regions that IIASA conducted was based on the so-called the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed during many years of 
collaborative research by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University in 
Bloomington, USA. As already stated above, the account of the previous case studies 
given here should mainly be seen as background to the subsequent discussion about the 
policy exercises in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk that are at the center of interest 
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in Section 4. Even so, it seems motivated to include a brief account of the methods 
employed in the case studies that eventually led to identifying a number of institutional 
shortcomings and some conclusions concerning what measures might be required to 
improve the situation in the forest sectors of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. This 
brief overview of the IAD framework is given at the outset of Section 3, in which the 
results of the three case studies are summarized.  
The case studies conducted in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, like the other five 
studies performed in the first IIASA case study series, also made surveys among 
managers of forest enterprises in the three regions. Many of our conclusions were 
derived on the basis of information obtained through these surveys. The surveys 
consisted of interviews conducted with about 25–35 forest enterprise managers in each 
of the eight regions that were part of our case study set. Questions in the survey mainly 
related to the behavior of the respondents in their capacity of managers working in a 
new and unfamiliar market context. The surveys were conducted with the help of local 
Russian study coordinators. The answers were reported in writing (in both Russian and 
English) and delivered to IIASA where the answers were analyzed. In the present 
context there is no need to further expand on the results of these earlier studies. 
(Interested readers are referred to Carlsson et al., 2001.)  
1.4 Structure of the Report 
In Section 2, in order to fit the discussion that follows into the modern discourse on the 
recent developments in Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe, an overview is 
provided of the emerging thinking about transition, theories of institutional change and 
relevant extensions of theories of democracy. This discussion provides the background 
to the approach used in the IIASA study to try to improve the institutional framework 
governing the behavior of the Russian regional forest stakeholders through the 
organization of policy exercises.  
In Section 3, as background to what follows in Section 4, an overview is given of the 
methods and results of IIASA’s previous study of the forest sector institutions in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk.  
In Section 4, the focus is on the actual policy exercises conducted by IIASA in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk in the period October 2000–March 2001. Here we 
have a closer look at the specific regional conditions that shaped the performance and 
outcomes of the policy exercises. This is done against the account of the situation in the 
forest sector of the respective three regions given in Section 3. The purpose is to see if it 
is possible to make sense of the relation between the preconditions of the exercise and 
its outcome, to try to understand ― against the previous theoretical discussion ― what 
contextual features determine the performance of such an exercise.  
In the final section (Section 5) some tentative conclusions are drawn on the basis of the 
previous discussion about the possibilities to influence institutions in the Russian 
regional forest sector through the use of the policy exercise tool. A reconnection is 
made to the questions formulated at the beginning of the report.  
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2 Transition, Institutional Change and Democratization 
in Russia ― A Note on Theory 
2.1 Background  
With Perestroika and, especially, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, life in 
Russia ― normal habits and ways of conducting business ― suddenly and drastically 
changed. Market economic features (like market set prices) started to emerge. However, 
the change was not smooth and uniform. It proceeded unevenly in time as well as in 
space. Since what happened to price formation, even if it was not a simultaneous and 
uniform change all over Russia, affected the basic functioning of the economy ― 
producers started to react on “real” income-cost relations ― its impact was profound 
and immediately noticeable. The “driving force” in the economy was no longer the plan 
but rather the potential of making profits. The subsequent privatization only added 
further momentum to this fundamental transformation process (for recent overviews of 
what has happened so far during the Russian transition process, see, e.g., Colton, 2000; 
White, 2000; Glinski and Reddaway, 1999; Ellman, 2000; Lane, 2000; Lavigne, 2000; 
Randall, 2001).  
However, as soon became evident, such a profound system change was no fast and easy 
process. A multitude of basic characteristics of the old system had to be radically 
changed or discarded altogether. In the twelve-year period since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union quite a lot has indeed happened. Radical reform measures (such as the 
much debated privatization process) were heavily subsidized by the western world. But 
it is equally clear that much of the highly raised expectations of those directly or 
indirectly promoting and supporting these changes have not yet been met. Still, a large 
number of Russian business firms operate under rules that have little or nothing to do 
with conditions prevailing in a “normal” market environment. The question is: why? 
Here we do not find much useful knowledge in the literature. 
In general, it seems that, while a lot has been written about what constitutes an efficient 
market economy and what might make it work even more efficiently, we do not know 
very much about how to build such an economy from scratch or how to transform a 
non-market economy into an efficient market system (North, 1997). While the existing 
literature on transition mainly deals with changes of non-democratic states into 
democratic states (which is also of course relevant for the Russian transformation), there 
has not (yet) been so much written about the transition from a Soviet type of command 
economy to a market oriented economy, i.e., about the institutional changes needed to 
“convert” the Soviet society to a well-functioning market system. A factor complicating 
such writings has to do with the difficulty to understand exactly what changes in 
Russian reality the transition is aiming to achieve and what it is able to accomplish. 
Furthermore, as for instance Kolodko (2000) has pointed out, in order to be able to say 
something about where the transition is going one also has to know from where it is 
coming. In order to decide where to go you must understand from where you are 
coming and where you currently are, since this limits your choice of future directions, at 
least in the short term. This is the idea that social changes are path-dependent, as 
suggested in the post-socialist context by, for instance, Nielsen et al. (1995) and North 
(1997).  
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As stated in Section 1.3.1, a central assumption in this study is that Russia is currently 
in a transition from its old Soviet “command economy” system to a more market-like 
system. This assumption is of course not taken out of the blue. It is, in fact, based on our 
assessment of a great amount of theoretical and empirical work already made by 
scientists around the world. This is work concerned with the quality of the Soviet 
system (both its political and its economic aspects) as well as the causes of and 
mechanisms through which the Soviet system ultimately disintegrated.  
While we will not give much attention in this report to issues concerning the reasons for 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, or to ideological issues related to the nature and 
direction of the transition process, these intensively debated issues nevertheless deserve 
serious attention, especially since the views that an observer of transitional Russia holds 
on these issues intriguingly affect the selection and interpretation of facts that are 
deemed important for explaining past and forecasting future developments in the 
country. Past ideological cleavages undoubtedly still affect the way current Russian 
reality is understood.10 Let us, therefore, start this “note on theory” by having a brief 
look at the theories underpinning some of the fundamental assumptions on which this 
study is based. The purpose is just to emphasize the significance of these theories and 
state the position adopted by the IIASA research team on certain issues of basic 
importance for the present study.  
2.2 Theoretical Foundations of Our Basic Assumptions 
More specifically, in the IIASA study, “transition” was taken to represent a shift in 
Russian institutions (both in the sense of modified existing and newly installed “rules-
in-use”) and in the “mind-set” of the country’s citizens that would contribute to a more 
efficiently functioning forest sector (and economy in general). The “baseline” criteria 
used to assess the progress of the transition in the forest sector describe some basic 
functions effectively in operation in any western market economic system. In effect, this 
imposes a normative restriction on what could be considered, in the context of the 
IIASA study, a positive institutional change in the Russian forest sector. Thus, in 
characterizing the changes we simply assume that the goal of the transition in the 
Russian forest sector is to make it function the way the sector functions in Western 
Europe and North America.  
This view on transition is in a sense related to the understanding of the reasons for the 
Soviet disintegration, which is still a hotly debated issue. Very briefly, the view (more 
or less implicitly) adopted in the IIASA study of Russian forest sector institutions puts 
the main blame for the Soviet disintegration on the allocative inefficiency of the 
command economy. The system was wasteful and could eventually not satisfy the needs 
                                                 
10
 Many examples might be provided to illustrate the often radically differing views on these issues that 
are held by various observers of the drastic changes that have taken place in Russia and Eastern Europe 
during the last decade. But since we are not pursuing this topic further in the present paper only a few 
references to interesting observations on the importance of ideology for the interpretation of current 
Russian developments will be made. See, e.g., Robinson (1995) who discusses the role of ideology in the 
development and failure of Gorbachev’s reforms, and a Marxist analysis offered by Ticktin (1992; 1999), 
who interprets the reform movement that started with perestroika as a vain attempt by the old 
nomenklatura to remain in power.  
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of its citizens. Productivity was increasingly lagging behind the standards of the market 
economies. The main bottlenecks in the Russian economy was not the availability of 
natural resources, rather it lay in the inability to produce (and use) modern advanced 
technology (ultimately, thus, the scarce resource being good-quality labor).11 This 
development put an increasing pressure on the Soviet government to reform in order to 
improve the functioning of the economy. Eventually, however, it was clear for everyone 
to see that the fundamentally undemocratic political system ― economic policy reforms 
in the Soviet Union were designed and instituted by the political sphere ― could not 
come up with a working solution to the economic insufficiency problems. This 
development paved the way for Gorbachev and his perestroika attempts, which opened 
the door to new initiatives in Russian political and economic life. The relatively short 
Gorbachev era (1985–1991), when efforts were still (at least initially) aimed at 
reforming the old Soviet system,12 ended even before it was clear what effects the 
reforms might have been able to produce (see, e.g., Cox, 1996; Kotz and Weir, 1997).  
With Yeltsin’s takeover (in 1991) the development took a different direction, now under 
a strong influence of foreign actors, notably the World Bank, IMF, and US development 
aid. A strong case can be made for the view that the events that finally triggered the 
actual overthrow of the Soviet Union were the result of manipulations of a rather small 
group in the Russian elite, which was (mainly) supported by U.S. financial aid and 
advisors (cf., for instance, Wedel, 1998). After its initial success, when several profound 
reforms in principle transformed the Soviet command economy into a rudimentary 
market system, the “Washington Consensus” (as “shock therapy” came to be officially 
known) has been the target of an increasing criticism for not taking into account the 
social costs of the reform process and the fact that profound social changes actually 
cannot be introduced and expected to work smoothly in a short period of time. Perhaps 
the most important criticism was (somewhat unexpectedly) mounted from the (then) 
chief economist of the World Bank and (later) Nobel Laureate, Joseph Stiglitz (see, e.g., 
Stiglitz, 1999), but many other prominent western researchers also contributed to this 
criticism (cf., for instance, Desai, 1995; Nielsen et al., 1995; Ellman, 1997; North, 
1997; Raiser, 1997; Kolodko, 1999, 2000; Hedlund, 2000).  
This interpretation of the background to, and the immediate reasons for, the Soviet 
disintegration helps to explain the general hesitation on the part of Russian citizens 
about all “reform proposals” affecting Russian political and economic life. Russians in 
general seem to be extremely skeptical to any reforms proposed by their political 
representatives, even if these representatives nowadays have been appointed through 
legitimate elections.13 In such a situation ― and this was in fact one hypothesis behind 
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 This was early suggested by Ticktin (1992).  
12
 We should note here (cf. Brown, 2001; Fish, 1995) that the final disintegration of the USSR (in 
December 1991) was preceded by the “transition from communism”, i.e., the fact that the Communist 
Party had to abandon its monopoly of power. In 1990, the Party’s “leading role” in society was formally 
abandoned through a change in the Soviet Constitution. In reality it had disappeared earlier with the rise 
of numerous sociopolitical movements. See also Sergeyev and Biryukov (1993).  
13
 See, e.g., Solnick (1998) who explains the main causes of this popular skepticism of political reforms in 
the Soviet Union and why this skepticism remained prominent during the first decade of transition, 
showing how officials in the political and economic sphere were able to pursue their own self interests at 
the expense of public good. Brown (2001:38) describes how the Russian political elite regularly has “put 
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IIASA’s policy exercises with Russian forest stakeholders ― all endeavors to engage 
citizens in participatory policy processes should be seen as an attempt to improve 
democracy and make the results of political deliberations more legitimate, thus 
increasing chances of successful implementation of political decisions.  
We are not going to pursue these issues further here. Suffice it to say once again that the 
analyst’s understanding of the Soviet economy and society constitutes a restriction on 
the types of changes/reforms that he or she can envisage. And the fact remains: there is 
no unanimously agreed upon understanding of the character of the Soviet system nor, 
for that matter, of the reasons for its disintegration or the most efficient route of 
transformation.  
This is why here we should outline the most important points of departure for our study 
of institutional change in the Russian forest sector. In the following sections, therefore, 
we will (1) state our views on the character of the Russian transition and refer to some 
of the emerging theorizing about the process; (2) have a look at theories of institutional 
change, since the Russian transition is largely about changing inefficient rules to 
improve the institutional framework; and we will (3) briefly look at theories of 
democracy, especially modern developments of these theories elaborating so-called 
deliberative (or discursive) democracy, since these extensions of the theory seem to be 
highly relevant for policy-making in a political situation characterized by popular 
distrust, which seriously hampers policy implementation.  
2.3  Transition the Russian Way 
The literature on transition mainly deals with changes of the political governance 
system from a non-democratic to a democratic rule (Carothers, 2002). This literature has 
appeared in the last twenty years and it was occasioned by what seemed to be a clearly 
discernible trend among non-democratic countries to move towards more democratic 
rule. The literature offered an analytical framework that made it possible for the 
organizations (mainly in the US) promoting democracy abroad “to conceptualize and 
respond to the ongoing political events” (Carothers, 2002:6). Thus, “transitology” 
emerged as an academic field and, when the changes in Eastern Europe started in the 
late 1980s, American “democracy promoters extended this model as a universal 
paradigm for understanding democratization”. Carothers (2002) now suggests that it is 
time to dismiss this “transition paradigm,” which might have been of some use earlier, 
but which is not any more able to describe reality.  
According to Carothers (2002:6 ff.) five “core assumptions” define the transition 
paradigm: 
(a) Any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in 
transition toward democracy; 
                                                                                                                                               
the pursuit of naked power and personal wealth ahead of respect for democratic institutions, political 
accountability, and the general welfare.” He concludes: “When so much of what has been dignified with 
the title of ‘economic reform’ has involved dirty deals behind the voters’ backs, it is hardly surprising that 
public opinion turned against the ‘really existing democracy’ of the Second Russian Republic”. 
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(b) Democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages; opening, 
breakthrough, and consolidation; 
(c) Elections are believed to be an absolutely essential ingredient in the transition 
process; 
(d) The paradigm does not consider underlying conditions in transitional countries, 
such as the economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, 
sociocultural traditions or other “structural” features, to be major factors in either 
the onset or the outcome of the transition process; and 
(e) The paradigm also assumes that the democratic transitions are being built on 
coherent, functioning states where only some institutions need to be redesigned.  
Clearly, the transition process in Russia has run into problems on all these accounts. It is 
not obvious (even if this was assumed in the IIASA study of forest sector institutions) 
that the transition is really moving Russia toward democracy. (Doubts about this 
direction has, for instance, been expressed by Gerner et al., 1995.) While it seems that 
the Russian transition is unfolding in stages it is not quite clear which stages and how 
long the development is halted at a particular stage (see, for instance, Csaba, 1995). 
Elections have indeed been organized on many occasions already. The problem here 
rather concerns deficiencies in the emerging party system (too many parties with too 
few members and supporters) to articulate the needs and opinions of the electorate. 
After more than a decade of Russian transition it is quite clear to observers that 
underlying conditions have played a decisive role and severely restricted the unfolding 
of the process. It has also become evident that a major problem in the Russian transition 
has been the very limited power of the state. This has to do with the fact that many 
comprehensive institutional changes have been attempted, although these changes have 
not always (perhaps even rarely) produced intended results due to the “stickiness” of old 
patterns of behavior (again the so-called “path-dependence”).   
As the transition in Eastern Europe evolved it became increasingly clear that the process 
took different roads in different countries and that development was to a significant 
degree determined by the “initial conditions” that were obtained in the respective 
countries, including the existing institutional structure and political culture. Many 
analysts also emphasized that the kind of fundamental social changes that transition 
entails would take a long time to design and implement. The implementation, 
furthermore, requires a strong and well-organized state power. This is not to say that 
some reforms that were advocated by the early “shock therapists,” like macro-economic 
stabilization, ought not to have been introduced and implemented quickly once the 
political decisions were taken. On the contrary, certain reforms require quick action. 
One such reform was the macroeconomic stabilization undertaken at an early stage of 
the Russian transition. 
The two basic ingredients of the macroeconomic stabilization were price liberalization 
(that is, prices should be set free to be determined on markets reflecting supply and 
demand relations) and the enforcement of hard budget constraints for enterprises 
(meaning that the state should discontinue its practice of subsidizing unprofitable 
production that, in practice, amounts to allowing enterprises to go bankrupt). These 
reforms were intended to produce an improvement in enterprise governance, making 
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enterprise leaders adopt new and better rules to guide their behavior, a change that 
would make their behavior more similar to “western” management standards. It is, in 
principle, difficult to imagine how such reforms could be gradually introduced. And, 
indeed, these reforms were quickly introduced early on in the transition process.14 
However ― and this was an unexpected development ― the reforms triggered a 
spontaneous reaction in the Russian economy effectively forcing a large part of all 
Russian enterprises not to comply with the proposed changes, but rather maintain much 
of their behavior from the days of the Soviet command economy. The alternative would 
have been bankruptcy and social distress.15 This development moved a large part of the 
Russian enterprises into the so-called virtual economy.  
The notion of the virtual economy has proved very fruitful in explaining enterprise 
behavior in Russia.16 It was also taken as a fundamental hypothesis about the structure 
and functioning of the Russian economy in the IIASA study of forest sector institutions. 
The virtual economy is in fact a name for a specific institutional configuration (an 
institutional set-up).  
The theory of the virtual economy offers an explanation of the fact that much of the 
relations characterizing the Soviet economy can still survive in today’s Russia, although 
the system has changed fundamentally. In short, the virtual economy explains why so 
comparatively few Russian enterprises have gone bankrupt, although they would not be 
competitive if their performance were valued at true market prices. If prices for all 
goods and services in the economy were actually always set in the market, that is, 
through the interplay of supply and demand, it can be assumed that a large portion of 
Russian enterprises would be unprofitable. When price liberalization was instituted 
enterprises seemed forced to meet and respond to signals transferred through the market 
price system, but since this would “kill” a large number of enterprises unless very 
drastic efficiency improving measures were taken, a large portion of the existing 
enterprises chose to “insulate” themselves from the influence of the market price system 
and not let themselves be exposed to the severe competition that true market relations 
trigger. By reverting to barter trade at negotiated prices many Russian firms managed to 
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 In a recent review Tompson (2002) concludes that while the Gaidar government made “its share of 
avoidable errors, and its successors made many more” (one mistake being their failure to find broad social 
support for the reforms) it is nevertheless hard to see how the government could have adopted another 
strategy than it actually did. Tompson concludes: “In short, the Russian state in early 1992 was far too 
weak to pursue a “gradualist” approach. Unfortunately, it was also too weak to pursue radical policies 
effectively.” 
15
 One has to keep in mind that enterprises then still ran a variety of services for their employees, services 
that are provided by the public sector in most market economies (like housing, food supply, child care, 
schools, etc.) These services were subsequently transferred to the local administrations (for an account of 
this process see, e.g., Struyk et al., 1996; Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya, 1996; Healey et al., 1999). 
16
 The virtual economy concept was originally introduced by a Russian government committee and 
subsequently picked up and elaborated by two American researchers, Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, 
in their studies of the Russian economy in transition. The discussion here is based on a number of 
publications by Gaddy and Ickes (1998a,b; 1999a,b; 2002a) and other authors discussing their theory (see, 
e.g., Phillips, 1999; Åslund, 1999; Ericson 1999; Slay, 1999; Chang, 1999; Woodruff, 1999; Gaddy et al., 
2000; Carlsson et al., 2001). Gaddy and Ickes recently (2002b) compiled a book based on the material 
that they issued earlier as journal articles, chapter contributions to edited volumes, working papers, and 
manuscripts available via Internet.  
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stay alive (and keep their personnel) although what they produced and traded in this 
“virtual market” would not be possible to produce profitably if their input prices had 
been set in the market and their output (products) would have to be sold at prices 
reflecting market demand. Thus, through the virtual economy an inefficient resource 
allocation is being maintained in the economy, contributing to a continued economic 
“waste” of resources.  
How come, then, that such an inefficient system could be established and maintained? 
Efficiency is ultimately determined at the social level and, since the centrally planned 
system inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union had created an economy with a 
regional specialization that did not at all reflect demands as they are expressed in a 
market system, there were (and still are) whole regions, cities, and districts with a one-
sided production structure that cannot be changed overnight. There are, for example, 
forest communities entirely based on one enterprise (a harvesting company or a wood 
processing factory), which might turn out to be entirely unprofitable if market based 
prices would be allowed to operate. That would mean the bankruptcy not just of a single 
enterprise, but of a whole community. If this development were widespread it would of 
course create a very serious (and dangerous) social problem. But by reverting to 
operating in the “virtual economy” these enterprises and communities have managed to 
stay alive for the time being. However, investments are insignificant in the virtual 
economy and when investments are actually made there is a high risk that resources are 
invested in the production of unprofitable (in the market sense) products. Thus, life in 
the virtual economy is non-viable in the long term if society is moving towards a market 
economy.  
The real issue is how to create incentives that make enterprise owners and managers 
want to stop operating in the virtual economy and start to restructure enterprises’ 
production to become competitive in the (real) market sense. The issue is whether it is 
possible to somehow impose changes in the behavior of enterprises, their managers as 
well as their workers. Thus, changes are needed in the rules governing the behavior of 
economic actors. Such “rules-in-use” are in effect what we mean by institutions. Let us 
now turn to a discussion of institutional change in general and institutional change in the 
Russian forest sector in particular.  
2.4  Institutional Change in the Russian Context 
The Russian transition, which presumably is moving the country towards becoming a 
democratic market system, requires institutional change to make the rules of the game 
more conducive to economic efficiency. This is our point of departure. Transition is, in 
effect, social change brought about as a result of institutional change.  
To clarify, once again, by “institutions” we mean “rules-in-use,” that is, rules that 
govern the behavior of actors in society. Such rules can be formalized through law or 
regulation (both private and public), but they may also be informal rules, i.e., rules that 
are adhered to although they have never been sanctioned by any collective decision (see, 
e.g., North, 1990). Thus, it should be noted that not all laws are institutions in the sense 
that they actually govern the behavior of actors. (There may be laws that no one obeys, 
that is, a law that is actually not in use, which is not an institution.) Examples of formal 
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institutions in the Russian forest sector might include rules for allocating forest plots to 
forest users, harvesting rules, taxation rules (not all existing taxation rules, however). 
Examples of informal institutions might include the rule of advance payments, the rule 
that governs investment behavior and excludes bank loans, etc. 
A prominent feature of the Russian transition (and also, for that matter, the transition in 
other East European countries) is the much debated and dubiously legitimate 
privatization of state owned enterprises. Here, we shall not go into any further details of 
this process.17 To us privatization serves as an illustration of institutional change. 
Through privatization the formal and informal rules regulating the use of economic 
resources were radically changed. “Property rights,” as such rules are commonly called, 
constitute fundamental institutions in any society. “Property” may designate any 
resource and the “property rights” regulate the relations between different resource 
users. The fact that property rights do not only regulate ownership rights is often 
forgotten. Property rights ― and this is all the more important since we are dealing with 
the Russian forests here, which are (still) owned by the state ― also regulate rights of 
access to the resources. Table 1 illustrates the more complex notion of property rights.  
Table 1: Different kinds of resource claimants and their varying rights. Source: Ostrom 
and Schlager (1996:133). 
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized 
user 
Authorized 
entrant 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal X X X X  
Management X X X   
Exclusion X X    
Alienation X     
The table draws attention to the fact that other types of resource claimants than owners 
have a right to use the resource in various ways, except the right of alienation, i.e., the 
right to transfer the ownership of the resource to a buyer. Thus, in the context of our 
study of Russian forest resources, the table reminds us that, while the Forest Code 
stipulates that forest management units (the so-called leskhozy) as the representatives of 
the forest owner (the state) are not allowed to actually sell forest land to private 
companies or private citizens, there are, in fact, many other rights of access and use that 
they might (in principle) be able decide about.  
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 There is extensive literature discussing the Russian privatization, its intended scope and character as 
well as its results. See, for instance, Cox (1996) for the background of the Russian privatization; Sutela 
(1998) and Hedlund (2001) for the character of privatization; Perevalov et al. (2000) for the effects of 
privatization on enterprise performance; and Debardeleben (1999) for attitudes towards privatization in 
Russia. There are also some accounts of how privatization happened in Russia published by people who 
were deeply involved in the process (see, e.g., Boycko et al., 1995; Kokh, 1998) The legitimacy of the 
whole process has been seriously questioned and today court procedures are under way to rectify 
unlawful acquisitions.  
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The proclaimed ultimate purpose of privatization was to achieve better corporate 
governance, i.e., to install more efficient “rules-in-use” for enterprise management. 
Thus, one institutional change was expected to trigger another. Private ownership was 
expected to create a new middle class that embraced market economic thinking and 
worked to improve enterprise management. However, as it turned out, the reformed 
property rights did not remain stable and secure in Russia and the privatization process 
itself was in many cases manipulated illegitimately installing new owners and managers 
(often the former enterprise directors, so-called “insider privatization”) who primarily 
looked after their own short term interests and often stripped their enterprises of assets 
or brought them into the virtual economy pursuing goals that were suboptimal from a 
market economic point of view (see, e.g., Sprenger, 2002, for a recent analysis of the 
effects of privatization).  
Barter trade (goods traded for goods, not for money) is another prominent institution in 
transitional Russia. Barter is actually what made the virtual economy possible. It is, in 
fact, the predominant characteristic of the virtual economy, much in the same way as 
money is the dominant institution in a market economy.18 The main problem with barter 
is that it makes transactions intransparent, which opens up opportunities for fraud. The 
provision of goods (or services) has also been de facto accepted as a means of payment 
by public authorities ― enterprises’ tax payments may sometimes be made with 
products. This means that the state has been drawn into ― and is, in effect, sanctioning 
― transactions in the virtual economy, perhaps the most serious consequences of which 
is that it undermines normal budgeting procedures.19  
As has been shown in previous studies (i.a., in the IIASA study, see Carlsson et al., 
2001) the rules governing the behavior of Russian forest stakeholders are often 
intransparent, confusing, and contradictory creating an “institutional deadlock,” which 
makes consistent behavior difficult or impossible. Such a deadlock can only be resolved 
through changes of the system of rules governing actors’ behavior, i.e., by institutional 
change.  
Given this insight our interest should focus on questions like the following: How do 
institutions change? Obviously, institutions do change, but can institutions be changed 
by human fiat? Is it possible to modify existing institutions (rules-in-use)? Can new 
rules be designed and put in use? Who can (or wants to) make such institutional change 
happen?  
Clearly, formal institutions (rules sanctioned by law or other public or private 
regulation) are amenable to change through various forms of collective decisions. While 
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 As in the case of privatization, a lot has also been written about barter trade. Barter features 
prominently in the works by Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, who launched the theory of the virtual 
economy (cf. footnote 16). Other recent studies of the barter phenomenon include Woodruff (1999); 
Guriev and Ickes (2000); Yakovlev (2000); and Gara (2001).  
19
 An example: In Chelyabinsk some construction companies offered to build an underground railway 
system in the city instead of paying their taxes with money. As reported in IEWS Russian Regional 
Report, Vol. 3, No. 13, 2 April 1998, the project was actually started. When accepting such an offer a 
significant part of the local budget (money) income is immediately withdrawn, thus preventing the city of 
providing other services that might be more in demand. 
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it is quite possible to design and decide about new rules to govern the behavior of all or 
specific actors in the social system, implementing such rules is another matter. Rules are 
obeyed either because compliance is achieved through some enforcement mechanism 
(in the case of laws through the work of the police and courts) or because the norms 
expressed by the formal rules are internalized by the actors, who then try to obey the 
rules on their own accord. (Some kind of monitoring and enforcement mechanism is 
still necessary as probably not all actors will obey the rules, but “internalization” is 
nevertheless likely to reduce the need of “formal” rule enforcement.) The lesson is that 
institutional design (the design of formal rules) works best in an environment where 
actors find the procedures through which new rules or changes in existing rules are 
elaborated to be legitimate, i.e., in situations characterized by some degree of social 
trust.20  
But this is not the complete picture. We also have to consider informal institutions, i.e., 
rules that have emerged and are obeyed ― and enforced ― without ever having been 
sanctioned by any formal collective decisions. How do such rules come to exist, how do 
they change, can they be purposefully manipulated by the actors in the system? Informal 
institutions are slowly formed under strong cultural influence, which means that they 
are not easy to affect and change. They are in fact, as North (1990) has pointed out, an 
important source of path dependence, making actors stick to old patterns of behavior in 
the face of changes in their environment that would require new responses to be better 
accommodated.  
Institutions (both formal and informal) do change, however. They may, for instance, 
change as a consequence of external shock (major events like wars or technological 
changes that radically alter opportunities in economic systems, etc.) or they may rather 
more slowly emanate “autonomously” from within the institutional framework itself 
(for instance through changed behavior in organizations entrusted with monitoring rule 
compliance, decisions taken by governments to change formal rules, etc.). However, as 
suggested by Raiser (1997:11) there is also another avenue available for governments to 
achieve institutional change: 
…governments can attempt to influence positively the interaction between formal 
and informal institutions by engaging civil society in a policy dialogue. 
However, this will depend on the given level of trust in government and its 
formal institutions. When social capital is low, the government’s best chance is 
to enhance its credibility through signaling reform commitment and hoping that 
real economic improvements will in time feed back into a higher level of social 
trust.  
This view also recognizes that “spontaneously” changing informal institutions may 
exert an influence on the design and implementation of formal institutions. Using such 
“policy dialogues” that Raiser is talking about in the citation above requires that 
participants trust that deliberations will be free and that the outcomes of these 
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 For more about the importance of social trust (or generalized or “extended” trust in contrast to 
“interpersonal” or “ascribed” trust) for changes of formal institutions in the context of transition, see, e.g., 
Raiser (1999). In the IIASA study the establishment of trust in the Russian forest sector was discussed by 
Fell (1999).  
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deliberations will mean something, that they will be taken into account, in the process of 
forming new policies (installing new formal institutions). A prerequisite is that state 
power is strong enough to guarantee a certain political stability that makes it worthwhile 
for actors to engage in policy processes. One of the problems with the Russian transition 
process has been that the state (at least until recently) has not been strong enough to 
preserve other than moderate stability.21 A crucial task for the state in a transition 
country is to try to increase social trust by modifying incentive structures so that actors 
move towards changing the rules governing their behavior in a direction that will 
improve economic efficiency. Raiser et al., (2001) have presented some empirical 
evidence indicating that changes in the “social capital” in transition countries are indeed 
happening. Some evidence was found that trust in public institutions is positively 
correlated with “civic participation”. The authors conclude with the following policy 
recommendations (p. 27): 
The negative correlation between income inequality and social capital that had 
evolved by the mid-1990s suggests that policies aimed at reducing high levels of 
income inequality could be important in a strategy of increasing trust in others 
and in public institutions. … Finally, …, based on the success of East Asia, the 
ways for governments to build trust in public institutions are by offering a 
dialogue to members of the public and consulting over important policy changes. 
Low trust in public institutions is one of the predicaments politics in transition 
countries are faced with. But it is a predicament politics can deal with at least in 
many important respects. 
2.5  Democracy, Democratization and Trust-building Policy-making 
The “transitology” literature is being criticized for its teleological assumption that the 
transition is pushing society along a trajectory towards democracy, rather than towards 
something else. Today, after close to twelve years of transition, issues of the character 
of the emerging Russian political system can be put in some perspective. And, as it 
turns out, the issues raised are highly pertinent.  
“Overall,” claims Brown (2001), “the system is a hybrid ― a mixture of arbitrariness, 
kleptocracy, and democracy.” Solnick (1999) reminds us that when Gorbachev in 1991 
rejected central planning without adopting a liberalized market an unprecedented 
economic recession started. Such extreme conditions might have left the field open for 
the government to install new institutions on a large scale. However, the development 
also gave the transition “a highly improvisational character”. Actors had difficulties in 
perceiving their own interests or their own strength. But, surprisingly, while institutions 
crumbled there was a “striking continuity in the composition of the ruling elite”. The 
privatization process and the “loans-for shares” scheme of 1995 concentrated enormous 
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 This was true for the Russian transition period at least until Putin’s presidency. It seems that Putin after 
less than three years in power has managed to stabilize state power to the point where western observers 
become cautious. Thus, for instance, Fish (2001) warns: “Putin’s path may lead directly to hard 
authoritarianism. Yet it is also possible that some aspects of it will ― even if inadvertently ― spur a 
resumption of democratization. In whichever direction it leads, Russians are to a large extent getting what 
they want”. The importance of the role and function of the state during transition has been increasingly 
noted in the literature. See, e.g., Alexander, 1998; Solnick, 1998. 
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economic resources in the hands of a few so-called “oligarchs”22 and it is now a matter 
of contention how much influence these oligarchs really exert over Russian political 
life. While the oligarchs clearly affected events in connection with the “loan-for-shares” 
scheme and Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, it seems that today their direct influence on 
political events is more limited (cf. Schröder, 1999).  
But the problem for democracy might rather lie at the “systemic level.” Russia can be 
seen as an “oligarchy,” where the “rule of the few” is maintained through a balance of 
power ― a stalemate ― between the oligarchs making sure that no single oligarch can 
obtain a decisive influence over the economy, but also preventing the state to 
consolidate its power at the national level. It suits the oligarchs to have a weak state 
power.23  
Another interpretation of the system emerging from the Russian transition takes its 
departure in the center-periphery relations, in the relations between the Federation and 
the “Subjects of the Federation,” or the regions. Several observers have suggested that 
the Russian system might be characterized as a form of feudalism!24 It is noteworthy 
that the federal government has not been able to enforce federal laws within the 
country’s 89 regions. Solnick (1999:811) finds that the “regional leaders share the 
national oligarchs’ need for a federal government to preserve the integrity of the 
Russian state … but they also share the oligarchs’ preference for that federal 
government to remain anemic”. He continues: 
Thus, as with the oligarchy model, the feudal system exhibits powerful 
equilibrium characteristics: the central government is too weak to effectively 
define its sphere of competence, and those regional leaders whose consent is 
most crucial to a re-establishment of effective federal authority are precisely the 
ones with the most to lose from having a central government able to play the role 
of neutral arbiter. 
Whichever it is of the two “models” outlined above that best describes the current 
Russian system, the implications for democracy are worrying. The models suggest that 
fundamental institutional deadlocks (at the constitutional and collective choice level) 
need to be resolved if the state should be able consolidate and exert a power comparable 
to what is normally in the hands of governments in modern democracies. If these 
deadlocks, which are keeping the central state weak, cannot be resolved the 
consolidation of democracy may even become irrelevant. With the entrenchment of elite 
powers (both oligarchial and regional), which allows members of the elite to engage in 
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 “Russia’s Big Seven” as the oligarchs’ financial groups (FIGs) are referred to, were briefly presented in 
the World Bank newsletter “Transition” (February 1998).  
23
 This notion of Russia as an oligarchy is related to what Brown (2001) called “kleptocracy.” The way 
events unfolded and the relation between the presidential power and the oligarchs produced the 
arbitrariness (the “improvisational” character) of the Russian transition. It is also related to the notion of a 
“privatized state,” as the issue has been raised by, e.g., Schröder (1999).  
24
 Ericson (2000, 2002) has suggested an “industrial feudalism” and Shlapentokh (1996) sees parallels to 
feudal societies in the early Middle Ages. Here we follow Solnick (1999) who suggests that “the 
feudalistic model turns on its head some of the basic assertions of modern political economy of 
federalism”. 
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rent-seeking, practically all incentives for further democratization have been removed 
(Solnick, 1999:813): 
The coincidence of political transition with property re-distribution, a distinctive 
feature of the Russian transition, created strong incentives for elites to secure 
their own share of the transitional spoils. Once they did this, the process of 
“democratic” institution-building was subordinated to their desire to protect the 
property and power already accumulated. 
In practice, this meant ensuring that central state institutions were defanged, and 
once weakened these institutions found it impossible to enforce the regulations 
(including tax collection) that would revive them. Russia thus fell into a classic 
weak state trap (the fate of Italy comes to mind here). The state lacked the 
resources it needed to even acquire the resources that would make it effective.  
Even in this somewhat gloomy perspective Solnick maintains that “an oligarchic or 
feudalistic balance of power with electoral contestation is not entirely the same as a 
similar elite balance without it.” The discussion so far has primarily dealt with the 
somewhat limited notion of democracy that is sometimes called “electoral democracy,” 
which basically sees democracy as a move from authoritarianism combined with the 
introduction of popular elections. However, if we consider the more advanced notion of 
“liberal democracy,” which apart from the qualities embraced by “electoral democracy” 
also emphasizes other qualities in society allowing citizens to take an active part in 
governance, the prospects for democracy in Russia may perhaps not necessarily look 
that bleak. Qualities belonging to the so-called civil society have been found to be of 
special importance in this respect. Ever since Putnam’s (1993) study of civic traditions 
in modern Italy a rapidly expanding political science research all over the world has 
focused on people’s opportunities to engage in all sorts of organizations for collective 
action. Research on Russian civil society is nowadays also expanding.  
On the surface, judging from membership numbers, civil society in the Soviet Union 
was well developed and strong, the prime example of such organizations being trade 
unions. But since all organized civil activity was controlled by the Communist Party the 
real influence that members of such organizations might have had on political decisions 
was very limited, in effect a choice between supporting existing proposals or staying 
quietly passive. Expectations have been high for a rapid revitalization of the Russian 
civil society during the transition period. A vital civil society is believed to help 
mobilize and focus citizens’ interests and ultimately be conducive to a positive 
democratic development.  
Recent studies indicate that, while the most optimistic expectations for a revitalization 
of Russia’s civil society have not been met, the situation nonetheless gives some ground 
for optimism. Howard (2002) finds that post-communist civil society is characterized by 
comparatively low levels of organizational membership. He explains the low 
participation levels by three factors originating in these countries’ communist past. 
Mistrust of the old communist organizations still makes “large majorities of citizens 
throughout Europe continue to have a common sense of mistrust of organizations 
today”. The second reason that Howard finds is related to the persistence of friendship 
networks established under communism. Such networks still substitute for civil society 
organizations. A third reason is what Howard calls “post-communist disappointment”, 
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that is, people’s feeling that “they have been let down, even cheated, by the new system 
that quickly replaced the old one.” Howard sees the weakness of civil society as a 
“distinctive feature of post-communist democracy” and he fears that the situation might 
persist for many decades to come. The main problem with the current situation is that 
(Howard, 2002:165) “not only are post-communist citizens deprived of the 
opportunities for developing greater “civic skills” through participation in voluntary 
organizations, but their voices and views are hardly represented in the political decision-
making process”. Speculating about what can happen over the next few decades 
Howard sees two main ways through which post-communist civil society might be 
strengthened: “generational change” and a “reappraisal of the role of the state and its 
relation to voluntary organizations”.  
March (2000) in his review of social capital and democracy in Russia comes to a 
somewhat more positive conclusion concerning the existence of a “social capital stock” 
in Russia and the relationship between social capital and democracy in the Russian 
regions. In Putnam’s vein March develops a “civic community index” which he then 
correlates with an “index of democratization”25 calculated for the Russian regions. The 
results of March’s calculations indicate that (p. 196) “social capital exists in many 
regions of Russia” and that “higher levels of social capital associate with higher levels 
of democracy.” March’s conclusion is that “it appears that social capital is not only 
beneficial in making democratic governments more effective and efficient, which 
Putnam’s study of Italy shows, but that social capital can actually facilitate the 
democratic development of post-Communist societies”. 
In a recently published study of political discourses across thirteen post-communist 
countries Dryzek and Holmes (2002:94) characterize Russia as “a stalled or halted 
transition” due to the fact that at the time of the study (1997–8) “its major political 
players were only weakly committed to pursuing their ends through constitutional 
means, as distinct from trying to manipulate constitutional structures to their own 
advantage.” However, when analyzing interviews conducted in 1997 with individuals in 
six Russian regions Dryzek and Holmes are able to identify (through the use of Q-
analysis) three political discourses, which they label “Chastened Democracy”, 
“Reactionary Anti-Liberalism”, and “Authoritarian Development”. In their 
“minimalistic” analysis the authors find that all three discourses (which are taken to 
represent three fundamental and different “political attitudes” prevailing among 
Russia’s citizens) make it possible to envisage a future that is more democratic than the 
present. In such a future the presidency would be strong without being authoritarian, 
rather adopting a “facilitating” role. It is argued that such a development is in principle 
feasible in Putin’s Russia that the presidency does not necessarily have to end up in 
dictatorship. All three discourses also “recognize and lament alienation, a breakdown in 
trust, and the absence of civic engagement” (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002:112). This is 
taken as proof of the existence of some common political ground on which consensus 
for policies to remedy these negative features may be built. The authors’ conclusion is 
(2002:112): 
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 The “index of democratization” that March is using was developed by Tatu Vanhanen in his 1997 book 
Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, London: Routledge. 
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Acknowledging that the situation in Russia has been chaotic and depressing is 
quite different from arguing that this means the future of democracy in that 
country is doomed. A dynamic, strong new presidency might just make a 
significant difference in a relatively short time, especially if Putin’s commitment 
to the “dictatorship of law” really translates into the rule of law rather than rule 
by the coercive agencies of the state.  
Finally, to conclude this summary of findings that indicate that democracy is amenable 
to improvements through the development of civil society, let us look at the results of a 
study by Mishler and Rose (2001), who have found that “institutional theories” do a 
better job than competing “cultural theories” in explaining the development of trust in 
post-communist societies. While cultural theories assume that trust is “an emergent 
property linked to basic forms of social relations”, that is, as something exogenous to 
the political process, institutional theories, on the other hand, look upon trust as 
“rational responses by individuals to the performance of institutions”. Testing two 
hypotheses about trust based on cultural theory and two based on institutional theory by 
using data generated in 1998 through the fifth and seventh “New Democracies 
Barometer”26 the authors received results strongly supporting institutional explanations 
of trust. “Trust or distrust in political institutions is substantially endogenous and largely 
determined by the political and economic performance of new democracies” (Mishler 
and Rose, 2001:55). And indicating some important policy implications they conclude 
(p. 56): 
Insofar as institutional performance holds the key to developing trust in political 
institutions, then trust can be built more surely and swiftly than the decades or 
generations suggested by cultural theories. Trust can be nurtured by improving 
the conduct and performance of political institutions. Governments can generate 
public trust the old-fashioned way: They can earn it by responding promptly and 
effectively to public priorities, rooting out corrupt practices, and protecting new 
freedoms. … Ultimately, the character and performance of trustworthy 
institutions can generate trust just as the performance of the old untrustworthy 
institutions generated skepticism and distrust.  
In conclusion, here we take the findings of the research referred above to support our 
understanding of the following “causality chain”: 
(1) trust can be generated through institutional change;  
(2) institutional change can be achieved through the development of civil society; and  
(3) civil society can be advanced through purposeful interventions (including financial 
and other support) by (representatives of) the state and through “autonomous” 
initiatives from within civil organizations.  
Taken together the reasoning in this section of the report provides a basis for the 
systemic interventions attempted by IIASA through its policy exercises with Russian 
regional forest stakeholders. Before going over to an account of the policy exercises in 
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 See the presentation given of the “New Democracies Barometer” on the Internet site of the University 
of Strathclyde’s Centre for the Study of Public Policy at URL: http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk. 
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Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk we should, however, first review the approach 
and results of IIASA’s study of the institutional problems besetting the forest sector in 
these three regions. 
3 The IIASA Case Studies of the Forest Sector  
Institutions in Murmansk, Karelia and  
Arkhangelsk ― Comparing the Situation 
The fundamental question ― the puzzling fact ― that much research concerning the 
Russian transition period wants to answer is this: Why did production in the Russian 
economy drop so dramatically in the years following the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union? In Figure 2 this development is strikingly illustrated for the Russian forest 
sector. 
 
Figure 2: Production decline in the Russian forest sector during the transition period. 
A basic hypothesis in the IIASA study of the forest sector in eight Russian regions was 
that the decline had to do with deficiencies in the institutional setup affecting actors’ 
behavior in the forest markets. The approach used in the IIASA study to analyze this 
phenomenon was based on the so-called Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and associates at Indiana University, 
Bloomington, USA.  
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3.1 The Framework for Institutional Analysis 
Informing IIASA’s Case Studies 
The IIASA case study design was informed by ideas proven fruitful in previous research 
based on the IAD framework.27 This framework suggests certain features that condition 
the behavior of actors in the system, i.e., factors that affect the adoption of certain 
institutions (“rules-in-use”). The focus of the IAD framework lies on what happens in 
the “action arena” (cf. Figure 3). In our case the action arena was the timber 
procurement in eight Russian regions and the study focused on actors’ behavior on these 
action arenas. However, the IAD framework also insists on the importance of the 
embedding of this action arena, on features in the environment conditioning or 
constraining the behavior of the actors in the arena. Such features include the physical 
characteristics of the resource, the commodity or service in question, the attributes of 
the community and the established “rules-in-use” (i.e., institutions) governing the 
behavior of the actors. What emerges on the action arena is a specific pattern of 
interaction entailing certain outcomes. These outcomes must be evaluated according to 
some criteria. One can presumably look upon this framework as a stylized model of an 
actual interaction situation, in which case the evaluation is “automatically” made by the 
actors in the system themselves. But one can also look upon it as a description of a 
study design (and this was actually the way it was used in the IIASA study), in which 
case the evaluation is performed by some outside analyst studying the system in 
question.  
Institutional analysis of the 
Russian forest sector
Attributes of 
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Figure 3: The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework used in the 
IIASA case studies of the institutional embedding of the Russian regional 
forest sector (after Ostrom et al., 1994:37). 
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 The IAD framework has been used in numerous studies of resource management around the world. 
Good overviews of the approach are given, for instance, in Ostrom et al. (1994) and Ostrom (1995).  
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The very reason for engaging in the study of these phenomena has to do with the fact 
that the Russian forest sector is extremely inefficient. Thus, actors’ behavior produces 
suboptimal economic outcomes. Changes of the rules governing actors’ behavior should 
therefore be high on the agenda. And, indeed, it has already since long been high on 
forest sector stakeholders’ agenda and it is just becoming a high priority item on the 
federal political agenda (see, e.g., Clark, 2002).  
The forest sector institutions identified through the IIASA study were both formal and 
informal. Information about the latter category was compiled through a series of 
interviews with forest enterprise managers. The conclusions reached in the IIASA study 
largely concern what institutional changes would be required in the forest sector in 
order to improve its functioning in the emerging market economy. Recommendations 
were given of measures to change rules at three different levels: the constitutional level, 
the collective choice level and the operational choice level (Carlsson et al., 2001). In the 
current stage of the Russian transition, where the state is (still) fairly weak, where there 
is a huge and mostly very inefficient forest sector (which was dominating the economy 
in some of our case study regions), where forest stakeholders no longer trust that the 
“traditional” forest organizations (which, even if reformed, are remnants from the old 
Soviet command economy) should be capable of improving the situation, there seems to 
be a timely opportunity to engage a broad circle of regional forest stakeholders in a 
collaborative effort to develop new forest policies. Some kind of “participatory policy 
process” seems to be a suitable vehicle for such an effort (Stiglitz, 1998b).  
In the next section we will have a closer look at the policy exercises conducted by 
IIASA in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. The remainder of this 
section gives a background to these exercises through an overview of the main results of 
the earlier IIASA case studies of the institutional problems afflicting the forest sector of 
the three regions.  
3.2 Overview of the Institutional Problems in the Forest 
Sectors of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
In order to arrive at some kind of coherent understanding of the actual (observed) 
behavior of the actors in the regional forest sector, which the IIASA study tried to 
capture through in-depth interviews with a number of forest enterprise leaders in the 
case study regions, knowledge about the characteristics of the resource, the society and 
the rules-in-use is required.  
Here we will try to summarize the most important findings reported in the previous 
IIASA case studies of the forest sector institutions of Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk. We will compare the situation obtained in the three regions regarding the 
resource (forests), the societal development and the existing institutions (“rules-in-use”) 
governing people’s behavior. The characterization of the features influencing actors’ 
behavior in the action arena as either pertaining to the resource, to society or to existing 
rules-in-use is not entirely straightforward. To the features pertaining to the resource 
(timber) belong land-use patterns, resource reserves and quality, forest use, but also the 
socioeconomic significance of forest utilization patterns. Among the “societal features” 
we distinguish demographic development (including educational levels), workforce 
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characteristics (composition, employment, competence, wages), the economic structure 
and market adaptation, the infrastructure and the environmental situation. Under the 
“rules-in-use” category the focus is on formal and informal rules and their enforcement. 
This entails looking at the forest legislation in relation to the constitution, the 
organizational structure in the regional forest sector, the actual behavior of forest sector 
actors (based on survey data), and the modes through which policy changes might be 
designed and implemented.  
Before diving deeper into this discussion let us first, however, provide some basic facts 
about the area that we are looking at. 
3.2.1  Some Basic Facts about the Area 
Together with the Komi Republic and the Vologda County (Oblast) the counties of 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk and the Republic of Karelia form the Northern Economic 
Region of Russia. The total area of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties and the 
Republic of Karelia is 728 thousand sq. km, which is about 4.3 percent of the total 
Russian territory. The total population of the three regions amounts to more than 3.2 
million people, corresponding to a mere 2.2 percent of Russia’s total population. The 
area has a population density of only 4.4 inhabitants per sq. km. This means that we are 
looking at a huge and very sparsely populated territory. Just to indicate the order of 
magnitude we can note that the total area of our three regions is only slightly smaller 
than that of Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Poland taken together. (In 
contrast, the total population inhabiting those four countries amounts to slightly more 
than 146 million, which is roughly the same as the total Russian population size.)  
The most prominent natural geographic characteristic of our three case study regions is 
their northern location. For instance, most of the Murmansk region is situated north of 
the Arctic Circle. Thus, most of its territory belongs to the tundra or pre-tundra zone. 
Karelia and Arkhangelsk are located further to the south; only very small portions of 
these regions are to be found north of the Arctic Circle. This extreme northern location 
affects all life in the region and it is of course of great significance for the possibilities 
to develop the forest sector.  
In the Soviet era the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk experienced 
significant economic development (see, e.g., Andreev and Olsson, 2003). The Soviet 
planned economy strived for a high degree of economic self-sufficiency, which made it 
necessary to exploit remote natural resource deposits. Huge investments were allocated 
to the establishment of the infrastructure (cities, municipalities, transport routes, etc.) 
necessary for a heavy natural resource exploitation. To run these operations labor was 
recruited from other parts of the Union. Immigration was stimulated by the higher 
wages offered for work in “cold locations,” but labor was also allocated “by force” 
through the establishment of many large prison camps in the area. Another factor that 
has contributed to the development of all of these regions is their military importance. 
Especially the Murmansk region with its ice-free harbors is vital for the Russian navy. 
Exact data of the magnitude of the military establishments in the three regions are 
difficult to obtain, but one can safely assume that the military investments have made a 
significant impact on the regional economy in the area.  
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Until the beginning of the 1990s, all this planned economic expansion resulted in a 
steady population growth in the Russian north. Since the early 1990s, however, all our 
three regions have displayed a moderate population decrease, a decrease which is most 
pronounced in the Murmansk region (where the population was reduced by more than 
13 percent during the 1990s). Like Russia at large the three regions are highly 
urbanized. About one third of the total population of the three regions lives in the 
regional capitals (the cities of Murmansk, Petrozavodsk and Arkhangelsk), 72 percent 
of the total population in the area live in the ten largest towns in the respective regions. 
Murmansk has the highest urbanization degree (92%), while Arkhangelsk and Karelia 
has a somewhat smaller share of their populations in urban areas (74%). 
 
Figure 4: Map of northern Europe showing the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. 
3.2.2 Forest Resource Characteristics ― Comparing the Three Regions 
Some size relations 
Since there are significant differences between the three regions in our study it might be 
useful to have a brief look at some indicators illustrating their relative size in terms of 
population, territory, forest lands and growing stock (see Table 2). (Relevant figures for 
northern Sweden ― the counties of Norrbotten and Västerbotten ― have also been 
added for comparison.)  
It can be noted that Arkhangelsk accounts for a dominant share of all indicators 
displayed in the table. The region occupies 47 percent of the total territory; it holds 40 
percent of the total population in the area and 58 percent of the total forest resources. 
The Republic of Karelia is homogenous in the sense that its share of the population, 
territory, forest land and growing stock is roughly equal to one fifth of the total. 
Murmansk is the least homogenous region in terms of these indicators, with a 
comparatively large population density and only a small share of forest lands and, 
especially, growing stock. Northern Sweden has a small population share ― in fact its 
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population density is the lowest in the whole area. While its share of the total territory is 
more or less the same as that of Murmansk and Karelia, it has significantly lower shares 
of the total forest land and growing stock than Karelia.  
Table 2: Population, territory, forest lands, and growing stock in Murmansk, Karelia, 
Arkhangelsk and Northern Sweden, 1998.  
Percent 
Indicator Totals (= 100%) Murmanska Kareliaa Arkhangelska Northern Swedenb 
Population (1,000 inh.) 3813.5 27 20 40 13 
Total area (mln. ha) 106.9 14 16 55 15 
Forest fund (mln. ha) 60.8 16 24 49 11 
Forest land (mln. ha) 43.4 12 21 52 15 
Growing stock (mln. m3) 4187.3 5 22 58 15 
a
 Source: Data for 1998 from Komistat, 2000. 
b
 Source: Data for northern Sweden (the counties of Norrbotten and Västerbotten) in the year 2000 were 
obtained from Statistics Sweden as published on the Internet at URL: http://www.regionfakta.com 
(retrieved on 24 April 2003).  
The significance of the forest sector for the regional economy 
Already the size relations displayed in Table 2 indicate that the forest sector is of greatly 
varying significance in the four regions. In terms of employment the size of the 
industrial sector is roughly equal in the three Russian regions (28–30% of total 
employment in 1995, decreasing to about 25% in 1999), while it is slightly smaller in 
northern Sweden (around 24% 1995–1999). The forest industry is of paramount 
importance as an employer in Karelia, where close to 50 thousand people worked in the 
forest sector in 1995, corresponding to 48.5 percent of industrial employment and 
slightly over 13 percent of total employment in the republic. It was also very important 
in Arkhangelsk, where about 82 thousand people worked in the forest sector in 1995 
(corresponding to almost 45 percent of the industrial and close to 13 percent of total 
employment in the region). In Murmansk, on the other hand, only about 2,800 people 
worked in the forest sector (roughly 2 percent of industrial and a mere 0.6 percent of 
total employment in the region).  
Figure 5 illustrates the importance of the forest industry in terms of its contribution to 
total regional industrial production. It also shows the size relations between the different 
industrial sectors in the three regions.  
The figure clearly displays the striking similarities in industrial structure that exist 
between Arkhangelsk and Karelia. Here the forest industry is dominating the industrial 
production. Arkhangelsk is distinguished from the other two regions through its fuel and 
machine and metalworking industry. Murmansk displays a radically different industrial 
structure compared to the other two regions. Here the industry is dominated by non-
ferrous metallurgy (which alone accounts for 38.5% of total industrial production), 
while practically no such industry exists in Arkhangelsk and Karelia. Murmansk is also 
set apart from the other two regions by the fact that a fairly large share of its industrial 
production emanates from electricity production (13.2%), ferrous metallurgy (10%), 
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chemical and petrochemical production (almost 12%) and food production (close to 
20%). The share of total production produced by the forest industry in Murmansk is 
insignificant, only 0.3 percent.  
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Figure 5: Volume and structure of industrial production in 1999. Source: Komistat, 
(2000:78, 80–81.) 
Export volume is a good indicator of the importance of an economic sector for the 
whole economy. Export was of particular importance in the Soviet era as the major 
generator of foreign currency income to the state budget. But also after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the onset of the transition to a market economy 
export volumes are still a good indicator of the situation in the economy. The 
development of exports indicates the general competitiveness of the economy. Products 
that are exported have successfully competed in the market and proved to have an 
attractive price-quality relation. This is an especially important signal in an economy in 
which a large share of production takes place inside the so-called virtual economy, 
where products are not directly exposed to market competition (cf. Sections 2.3 and 
2.4).  
Reliable data on export developments are not easy to come by, however. In Figure 6, the 
size relations in terms of export volumes between the three regions can be readily 
seen.28 The picture only confirms the previous impression that the forest sector is of 
negligible importance for the economy of Murmansk Oblast, while it is of vital 
                                                 
28
 Total export values are given for the year 1999 (based on data from Komistat, 2000:125). The shares of 
pulp and paper and forest and woodworking in total exports were obtained from a database compiled at 
the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi published on the internet at URL: http://arcticcentre.urova.fi/barentsinfo/ 
intro/index.htm (data retrieved on May 12, 2003).  
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importance for the Republic of Karelia, and especially important for Arkhangelsk 
Oblast. It can be noted that Arkhangelsk alone accounts for about one third of the total 
Russian export of forest products (Bjorvatn and Castberg, 1994:133). Even if available 
figures are uncertain it seems that the share of the forest industry in total exports has 
increased in both Karelia and Arkhangelsk during the latter part of the 1990s. According 
to Strakhov et al. (1996) the share of the forest and forest industry in the total export of 
the Republic of Karelia was 46.5 percent in 1994 and it is said to be increasing. One 
official statistical source (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997:91) gives the corresponding 
share for the forest industry of Arkhangelsk to be as much as 85 percent in 1994 (88% 
in 1995). According to one of the sources of the data used in Figure 6 (Arctic Centre, 
2003) the share of the forest sector in total commodity export in 1998 was 53.5 percent 
for Karelia and 81.7 percent for Arkhangelsk. These are extremely high shares. By 
comparison, in the year 2001, the exports (net export value29) of the forest-based 
industry in northern Sweden amounted to 28 percent of total regional industrial exports 
(cf. Infraplan AB, 2003:7).  
Figure 6: Commodity exports in 1999 (million USD). Source: See footnote 28. 
Finally, it can be noted that, in 1998, as much as 44 percent of the exports of forest 
products from the Republic of Karelia was sold to Finland, another 11 percent to 
Turkey, 8 percent to Great Britain, and 5 percent to Iran. In the mix of forest products 
exported from Karelia the share of sawn wood drastically decreased in the 1990s, from 
more than one third to around 6 percent (Nemkovich et al., 2000:80). Instead paper 
increased its share from around 16 percent at the beginning to about 25 percent towards 
the end of the period (with peak levels of 40–44 percent in the middle of the period). 
                                                 
29
 Net export value is equal to gross export value minus the value of imported inputs. The data on which 
the percentage for the forest sector given here is based is an approximation where the distribution 
between various regions and branches of the economy has been made in accordance with the number of 
employees. 
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Unprocessed raw wood also radically increased its share of total forest commodity 
exports towards the end of the period (to around one fifth).  
Two changes in the mix of exported forest commodities characterize developments in 
Arkhangelsk during the 1990s (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997:92). The first was a 
decrease in the share of sawn wood, from around 50 percent of the total in 1992–1993 
to only about 10 percent in 1995, then again increasing to about 25 percent towards the 
end of the period. The second was a radical increase in the shares of pulp (from 13% in 
1993 to almost 50% in 1995) and paper and cardboard (from about 10% in 1993 to close 
to 30% in 1995).  
In summary, the picture of the regional industrial structure and the importance of the 
forest sector for the regional economy that is produced by the above indicators reflects a 
legacy from the command economy of the Soviet era, where the exploitation of natural 
resources were mainly governed by national interests often resulting in very skewed 
regional economic structures with an almost monocultural type of production. With the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Republic of Karelia were 
left with economies that were highly dependent upon the forest sector, while the 
economy of Murmansk Oblast was somewhat more diversified but still largely 
dominated by ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy. In Murmansk and Arkhangelsk being 
situated on the sea, sectors like fishing and (fish) food production were also developed. 
Furthermore, due to its geopolitical location (bordering “the West”) and due to the 
specific maritime conditions (the Golf Stream producing all-year-round ice-free 
harbors) the northwest of Russia has always had a special military significance. The 
military presence in the area resulted in large investments in armaments and military 
establishments, which have greatly affected the economic conditions and the living 
standard of the population.  
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, most of the fundamental reasons 
for the Soviet-type planned economic development based on the exploitation of one or a 
few natural resources have vanished. Instead, the legacy from Soviet times in terms of 
industrial structure and dimension now constitutes a serious obstacle for a prosperous 
development in the emerging market economy. The challenge is to find ways to 
facilitate and speed up the political and economic changes that are needed if these 
regions should be able to move smoothly towards an efficient market economic system.  
Characteristics of the forest resource 
The kind of legacy left with the Russian regions after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union is not, however, that easy to overcome. In effect, the regions are stuck with an 
economic structure that often does not at all suit the new emerging market economic 
system ― much of the existing economic activities actually cannot survive the 
competition in the market. Fast and dramatic structural changes are required in order to 
improve the competitiveness of these economies, introducing new kinds of economic 
activities while simultaneously closing-down or down-sizing many existing production 
establishments. The problem is that achieving such changes on a sufficiently large scale 
is no easy task. Existing large production establishments (which were often constructed 
jointly with whole towns to provide housing for their workers) cannot be closed down 
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or restructured at an instant. Realistically, whatever policy is pursued, these regions will 
be stuck with their industrial structure for some time to come.  
Since large parts of the sizeable populations in the three regions discussed here are 
likely to be profoundly affected by the future (necessary) structural changes in the 
economy it would seem natural (and arguably also efficient) to freely engage people in 
the development of public “transition policies” with the purpose of achieving legitimate 
changes and efficient governance of the transition process. Obviously, these policies 
will have to take their departure in the existing economic situation and the resource 
exploitation that has led to and still sustains the existing situation. Thus, since the 
forests and the exploitation of forest resources have been the basis for the development 
in both Arkhangelsk and Karelia, it seems natural to commence an investigation of the 
prerequisites for market economic structural changes in these regions by looking at the 
existing conditions in this sector. The argument also bears upon the situation in 
Murmansk, even if the forest sector does not occupy any prominent position in the 
regional economy. Still, the forest sector in Murmansk engages a sufficiently large 
number of people (e.g., all those living in the 10 forest settlements, so-called leskhozy, 
with their 28 forest villages, lesnichestva) to make an assessment of the problems 
afflicting the Murmansk forest sector well motivated.30  
Russian forests are classified according to criteria that may not be entirely transparent to 
a layman. The State Forest Fund is a basic concept. It might be measured in either 
hectares of land or in cubic meters of standing forest. The State Forest Fund (FF) 
contains land covered by forests (so-called Forest Land, FL) as well as land not covered 
by forests (NFL31). FL, in turn, is divided into stocked areas, so-called Forested Areas 
(FA), and unstocked areas.32 Furthermore, crosscutting FF, FL and FA, Russian forests 
are divided into three management “groups” according to their function: Group I 
consists of forests that are protected for various reasons (there are 25 protective 
categories). Group II consists of forests that are protected but where restricted industrial 
                                                 
30
 Cf. Eikeland et al. (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the development of the leskhozy in 
Murmansk Oblast. There were actually two basic reasons for incorporating Murmansk Oblast in the 
IIASA study of the institutions governing the Russian regional forest sector. One reason was of a mostly 
ad-hoc character. We had selected Arkhangelsk and Karelia to be part of the study. Since Murmansk is 
also part of the “Barents collaboration” established in 1993 and since this collaboration allows people 
from the western parts of the Barents Region good access to various decision-makers it was both easy and 
cost-effictive to incorporate Murmansk in the study as well. By doing so we would also get a more 
complete picture of the situation in the forest sector in the Russian part of the Barents Region. The second 
reason for incorporating Murmansk has to do with the fact that it is not a typical “forest region”. The 
forest sector means a lot in most of the different regions incorporated in the IIASA study. It therefore 
seemed interesting as a comparison to have a look at what the forest institutional problems looked like 
and how they were handled in a region that was not heavily dependent on the workings of the forest 
sector.  
31
 NFL consists of (a) areas which are not suitable for forest production under current conditions; and (b) 
areas with other land-use functions, such as pastures, arable lands, peat production, farmsteads, etc. These 
two categories of land must be managed by a forest authority in order to be classified as NFL (Nilsson et 
al., 1994).  
32
 To indicate the rough proportions between these various forest land categories we can note that the the 
total area of Russia is roughly 1.7 billion ha. Almost 70 percent of this area (close to 1.2 billion ha) 
belongs to the FF. FL comprises about 75 percent of FF, and FA, in turn, slightly more than 87 percent of 
FL. 
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exploitation may be allowed (usually forests situated near densely populated areas). 
Only forests belonging to Group III are entirely available for industrial exploitation (cf. 
Nilsson and Shvidenko, 1997; Strakhov et al., 1996).  
While, as already pointed out above, all forests in Russia are owned by the State, the 
actual management of the forests ― the execution of ownership rights ― may be 
handled by several different authorities representing the forest owner (the State). It is 
rather difficult to follow how the state ownership of the forests has been managed 
historically. A number of organizational reforms have been passed over the years, which 
tend to confuse the picture. While in Soviet times the management functions were 
largely handled through delegation from the political level (ultimately the Communist 
Party apparatus), the system started to change to what it is today through the reform 
measures decided under Gorbachev in 1988. These reforms started a period of 
organizational turmoil ending in 1992 with the establishment of the independent 
Russian Federal Forest Service (FFS).33 Until its incorporation into the Ministry of 
Natural Resources of the Russian Federation (in late May 2000) the FFS was in charge 
of the management of the State Forest Fund. Thus, during the period 1988–2000 (which 
includes the years during which the IIASA study of forest sector institutions was 
performed) the management of the forest resources continued to be in the hands of an 
authority that had no (or only little) control over the (industrial) use of the resource. In 
fact, the history of Soviet/Russian forest management and forest use is largely about 
alterations between periods in which the control and use of forest management were in 
the same administrative hands and periods as when they were under the control of 
separate state organs.  
Beside the Federal Forest Service, which manages the overwhelming majority of the 
State Forest Fund, smaller shares (less than 5%) of the Fund is managed by other State 
organs, such as various agricultural organizations, the State Committee for 
Environmental Protection, the State police, and the military.  
Figure 7 shows the stocked forest land (FA) managed by FFS and its distribution 
between the three forest use groups for Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. It can be 
noted that neither Murmansk nor Arkhangelsk has any forested areas belonging to 
Group II. A major share of FA in Murmansk is categorized as Group I forests. And, 
again, the figure clearly illustrates the overwhelmingly large size of the Arkhangelsk 
forests. Group I forests in Arkhangelsk are in fact somewhat larger than Group III 
forests in the Republic of Karelia. It should also be noted that the major share of the 
forests in the region is coniferous, although deciduous forests occupy rather significant 
shares of the forest land in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. For comparison it can be 
noted that the total FA of northern Sweden occupies close to 6.5 million ha to be 
compared with the totals of 5, 9, and 19.8 million ha for Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk, respectively. 
Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of the growing stock for the five dominating tree 
species in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. To facilitate comparison the growing 
stock of northern Sweden is also given.  
                                                 
33
 A brief overview of these events can be found in Sheingauz et al. (1995).  
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Figure 7: Stocked forest land (FA) managed by FFS by forest group in Murmansk, 
Karelia and Arkhangelsk. Source: Based on data from the Arctic Centre 
Database (2003.) 
 
Figure 8: Growing stock by species in Murmansk, Karelia, Arkhangelsk and northern 
Sweden, end of the 1990s. Source: Based on data from the Arctic Centre 
Database (2003).  
The size relations between the regions displayed in the figure are familiar by now. In 
terms of growing stock as well as in terms of forest lands Arkhangelsk is the dominating 
region. Its stock of spruce is roughly 2.5 times larger than the combined spruce volumes 
of Karelia, Murmansk and northern Sweden. It also has the largest stock of pine of all 
the regions included in the figure notwithstanding the fact that pine is the dominating 
tree species in each of the other regions. The figure also clearly shows that in this area 
of the world there are in fact only three tree species that matter ― spruce, pine and 
birch, and even the birch stocks are relatively insignificant compared to the stocks of 
spruce and pine. The total growing stock in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk was 
close to 3.2 billion cub. m. corresponding to almost 4 percent of the total growing stock 
in all of Russia and about 15 percent of that of the European part of the country. 
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(Arkhangelsk alone contributed close to 2.7 percent of the total Russian growing stock 
and just over 10 percent of the total for the European part of Russia.) The growing stock 
of northern Sweden is roughly equal to 20 percent of the total for Sweden.  
So much for the physical characteristics of the forest resources of north-west Russia and 
the north of Sweden. Now let us turn instead to the economic use of these resources.  
Characterizing forest utilization 
Historically, the development of the forest sector has been similar in the regions of 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. Especially in the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a 
drastic expansion of production capacities and production volumes reached their highest 
levels ever. Forest harvesting volumes in Russia is governed by norms stipulated for 
individual regions by the forest authorities and set with the purpose to avoid over-
exploitation. In Soviet times, especially during the peak years from the 1960s and into 
the 1980s, harvesting ― typically large-scale clear-cutting ― often exceeded these so-
called Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) levels, which anyway were often very high despite 
warnings from forest researchers (Carlsson et al., 1999). This development has led 
observers of the transition period (see, e.g., World Bank, 1997) to speak of a “legacy of 
overuse” of Russian forest resources, a legacy that must be corrected in order to make 
the forest sector environmentally and economically sustainable in the emerging market 
system.  
One consequence of the heavy exploitation of the forests is that the share of mature and 
over-mature stands in the total forest of Karelia has decreased since the 1950s. In 1956, 
mature and over-mature stands occupied 65 percent of the total forested areas. Ten years 
later this share was 56 percent, in the late 1980s it was down at 33 percent and it has 
remained at approximately this level since (Piipponen, 1999). In Arkhangelsk the share 
of mature and over-mature stands was close to 60 percent still in the mid 1990s despite 
a fast reduction since the 1950s (Carlsson et al., 1999). In Murmansk the corresponding 
share has remained lower (around 40%) in the whole period since the 1960s (Strakhov 
et al., 1996). Since these stands are densely stocked they remain attractive for continued 
heavy exploitation. Thus, the struggle over the exploitation of pristine forests can be 
expected to continue primarily increasing the pressure on those old forest areas which 
are most accessible for exploitation, i.e., areas along existing transport routes.  
The deep economic crisis (output decline) following the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union “automatically” helped to bring down harvesting levels way below the AAC in 
most regions of Russia. While harvesting sometimes exceeded or remained closely 
below the AAC in the 1960s through the 1980s, a sharp reduction in the AAC 
utilization levels took place in the 1990s. While, for instance, in 1970, the AAC 
utilization was 109 percent in Murmansk, in 1990 it was 92 percent, in 1992: 61 
percent, and in 1996 it was down to slightly over 26 percent (Ivanova and Nygaard, 
1999). AAC utilization levels have changed in a similar way both in Arkhangelsk and in 
Karelia (Carlsson et al., 1999; Piipponen, 1999).  
In Murmansk Oblast and the Republic of Karelia harvested volumes were highest in the 
1960s. About 15–20 million cub. m. of wood was then harvested annually in Karelia ― 
in Murmansk the corresponding volumes were over 2 million cub. m. In the 1970s 
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annual harvesting volumes were slowly decreasing in both regions. In Arkhangelsk 
Oblast harvests peaked in the 1970s and into the 1980s with annual volumes up to about 
25 million cub. m. As illustrated in Figure 9 harvest volumes were dramatically reduced 
in the 1990s in all three regions.  
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Figure 9: Wood harvests in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, 1990–1999. Sources: 
Carlsson et al. (1999); Piipponen (1999); Ivanova and Nygaard (1999); 
Layton and Pashkevitch (1999). 
The total forest harvest in the three regions decreased from 34.6 million cub. m. in 1990 
to a minimum around 12.7 million cub. m. in 1996, after which volumes again increased 
to around 14 million cub. m. towards the end of the 1990s (the exact numbers are a bit 
shaky though).  
The development pattern is very similar for all three regions. The relative decline has 
been most pronounced in Murmansk, where output levels as of 1996 have remained at 
slightly over 11 percent of the 1990 level. It was least drastic in Karelia where the level 
in 1996 was around 40 percent of the 1990 level and then climbed back to over 50 
percent at the end of the period. (The harvested volumes in the three regions together 
seem to have remained around 12–13 percent of the total harvests in Russia throughout 
the period.)  
For comparison we can note that annual harvesting volumes in northern Sweden has 
remained fairly stable around 10–11 million cub. m. during most of the 1990s (Statistics 
Sweden). (This corresponds to around 15 percent of the total Swedish harvested 
volumes in this period.)  
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Table 3 shows the production in the 1990s of the most important forest industrial 
products in the three regions.  
Table 3: Forest industrial production in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, 1990–
1999. Source: Komistat (2000:84–87). 
Murmansk 1990 1995 1999 1995 (1990 = 100) 
1999 
(1990 = 100) 
Commercial wood (mln m3) 1 0.2 0.1 20 10 
Sawn wood (1,000 m3) 354 47 31 13 9 
Karelia      
Commercial wood (mln m3) 10 4.6 5.1 46 51 
Sawn wood (1,000 m3) 2004 861 709 43 35 
Plywood (1,000 m3) 28.2 8.3 12.2 29 43 
Pulp (1,000 t) 765.7 324.3 307.2 42 40 
Paper (1,000 t) 1219.8 632.3 659 52 54 
Cardboard (1,000 t) 53.1 8.8 9 17 17 
Arkhangelsk      
Commercial wood (mln m3) 21.6 8 8.5 37 39 
Sawn wood (1,000 m3) 5011 1737 1754 35 35 
Plywood (1,000 m3) 50.4 25.4 47.2 50 94 
Chip board (1,000 m3) 149.4 18.6 0 12 0 
Pulp (1,000 t) 2154.3 1344.4 1504.7 62 70 
Paper (1,000 t) 396.5 211.1 253.4 53 64 
Cardboard (1,000 t) 628.1 399.7 575.1 64 92 
One noticeable trend shown in the table is that the production decrease in Murmansk 
Oblast almost extinguished the regional forest industry. Production of both commercial 
and sawn wood ― the two main forest industrial products produced in the region ― 
rapidly vanished from their already very low levels at the beginning of the 1990s and 
there is no sign of recovery towards the end of the period. The production of these two 
commodities decreased severely in Karelia and Arkhangelsk as well. In Arkhangelsk, 
where production volumes are about twice as large as volumes in Karelia, the reduction 
was most dramatic, with output volumes already in 1995 down to slightly over one third 
of the 1990 levels. Towards the end of the period a slight increase in production can be 
noticed for commercial wood in Arkhangelsk as well as in Karelia (where output 
decrease was less drastic, falling to “only” around half of its 1990 volume).  
The most dramatic output decrease (apart from chip board production in Arkhangelsk, 
which seems to have vanished altogether after 1995) took place in Karelia, where the 
production of plywood and cardboard was reduced in the first half of the period to 
slightly less than one third and one fifth, respectively, of their 1990 levels. However, 
plywood production then increased again and by 1999 it had reached 43 percent of its 
1990 level. In contrast, in Arkhangelsk production of plywood and cardboard never 
sank below 50 and 64 percent of their respective levels in 1990, and by the end of the 
period production had returned to almost their initial levels. (It should also be noticed 
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that output volumes of plywood and cardboard was always very much larger in 
Arkhangelsk compared to Karelia ― the output of plywood was almost twice as large in 
1990 and close to four times as large in 1999, the output of cardboard as much as 12 
times as large in 1990 and almost 64 times larger in 1999.)  
While Arkhangelsk is by far the largest producer of chemical pulp in this area ― 
production volumes were roughly 3–5 times higher than volumes in Karelia throughout 
the period ― the situation is reversed when it comes to paper production, where 
Karelian paper plants together produce about three times more than the paper producers 
in Arkhangelsk. Output volumes of both pulp and paper display reductions similar to 
most other forest industrial products. By 1995, volumes in Karelia were reduced to 
between 40 and 50 percent of their 1990 level and there seems to have been no or only a 
moderate recovery in production volumes towards the end of the period. In 
Arkhangelsk, however, production decline was not as drastic. Here volumes had 
decreased by 1995 to roughly 50–60 percent of their levels in 1990, and in the second 
half of the decade output recovered significantly so that, by 1999, output had reached 64 
percent of the 1990 level for paper and 70 percent for pulp. 
It can also be noted that Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk together have accounted 
for a substantial share of the total forest industrial production in Russia during the 
1990s. The shares seem to have remained rather stable throughout the period despite the 
declining output volumes. The total share of commercial wood production has remained 
around 14–17 percent (with Arkhangelsk alone accounting for 9–11 percent) of the total 
Russian production. The corresponding share for sawn wood has been roughly 10–13 
percent (Arkhangelsk 6–9%), for plywood roughly 4–5 percent (Arkhangelsk 3–4%). 
For products like cardboard, paper and chemical pulp Karelia and Arkhangelsk together 
accounted for a large share of total Russian production ― 28–36, 30–32, and 40–42 
percent, respectively, of the total Russian production during the 1990s. (For comparison 
it could be mentioned that, according to a rough estimate, the five pulp producing plants 
in northern Sweden accounted for around 45 percent of the total Swedish pulp 
production in the late 1990s.) 
3.2.3 Characteristics of Society Compared 
Informed by the IAD framework the IIASA case study of regional forest sector 
institutions also focused on “societal features” affecting actors’ behavior in the Russian 
timber procurement “arena.” Since the behavior of many ― if not most ― actors 
(citizens) in society influences the outcome of interaction in all conceivable action 
arenas, we could in principle distinguish a very large number of “societal features” as 
contributing to what happens in the timber procurement arena. But, evidently, not every 
“societal feature” is of equal importance for the behavior that is analyzed here ― some 
features must be considered more pertinent than others. Without being able to fall back 
on broad data mining techniques when selecting which features of society that deserve 
attention in this context, one is forced, in practice, to lean on established theory of the 
“forces” governing socioeconomic behavior.  
Here we will briefly review some data describing the development in Murmansk, 
Karelia and Arkhangelsk with regard to (a) the regional demography and level of 
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education, (b) the workforce and its composition, competence, employment, wage level, 
etc., (c) the economic structure and enterprise restructuring, (d) the infrastructure 
serving the population and the actors in the forest sector, and (e) the environmental 
problems, especially problems relating to forestry and forest utilization.  
Features of regional demography conditioning actors’ behavior 
As already noted above (cf. section 3.2.1) population numbers in all three regions have 
been steadily decreasing at a slow and even pace throughout the 1990s. The decrease 
has been most significant in Murmansk Oblast, where the total population in 2000 was 
13.6 percent smaller than in 1990. (The population decline in Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
was smaller, only 4.2 and 7.5 percent, respectively.) All three regions are highly 
urbanized. About a fourth of the population in Karelia and Arkhangelsk live in rural 
areas, in Murmansk the share is slightly less than 10 percent. Significant shares of the 
total regional population live in the regional capital. The population of the city of 
Murmansk amounts to 37.7 percent of the total population in the region, the 
corresponding share for Petrozavodsk was almost as large (36.7%) while only slightly 
over a quarter of the regional population lives in Arkhangelsk. (There the total 
population is distributed over several smaller cities. All in all there are seven cities and 
districts in the region with a population of 40–80,000 people, and one large city 
(Severodvinsk) with a population of close to 235,000 people). Population density in the 
three regions is much lower than the Russian average (8.6 inh./sq. km) ― for 
Arkhangelsk (including the Nenets Autonomous Okrug) it is 2.5, for Karelia 4.5, and 
for Murmansk 6.9 inhabitants per sq. km. (In northern Sweden, by comparison, 
population density is merely 3.1 inh. per sq. km.). Looking at the age distribution of the 
population in 1999 (cf. Table 4) we find that Murmansk had the youngest population. 
The share of the regional population under the age of 15 was almost equal in all three 
regions, but the share in working age was largest in Murmansk (65.2%). The share 
above working age was largest in Karelia (18.7%).34 Using the same age classes as in 
the Russian calculation we find that the corresponding shares for northern Sweden are 
strikingly different. In 1999, the share of the population under the age of 15 was 19.5 
percent, the share in working age was merely 54.7 percent, while the share over 
working age was as large as 25.7 percent.35 
The natural population growth (births minus deaths) has been negative in Russia since 
after 1992. The decline is due to a drastic decrease in the birth rate with a simultaneous 
increase in the death rate. The former decreased by 45 percent in the period 1987–1994; 
in 1996 it was reported to be nine births per 1,000 inhabitants. The latter increased by as 
much as 50 percent in the same period and in 1996 the death rate was reported to be 
14.4 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. This development also meant that life expectancy 
declined. Life expectancy in Russia grew until around 1989. Between 1989 and 1994 
there was a decrease in life expectancy from 64.1 to 57.7 years for males, and from 74.4 
to 71.2 years for females. These are very low numbers compared to most other 
industrialized countries (Granåsen et al., 1997).  
                                                 
34
 See note to Table 4 for age groups definitions.  
35
 Age classified population data from Statistics Sweden recalculated to fit the Russian age group 
definition (cf. note to Table 4). (Data retrieved on May 26, 2003 from http://www.scb.se.) 
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Table 4: Some demographic characteristics of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk (as 
of 1.1.1999). Source: Based on data obtained from The Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region (2003). 
 
Murmansk 
Oblast 
Republic of
Karelia 
Arkhangelsk 
Oblast Total 
Area (1,000 km2) 144.9 172.4 587.4 904.7 
Population (1,000)  1,000 772 1,478 3,250 
Population Density 
(inh./km2) 6.9 4.5 2.5 3.6 
Structure by Age (%)a 
Under Working Age 21.7 22.2 22.8 22.3 
Working Age 65.2 59.1 59.4 61.1 
Above Working Age 13.1 18.7 17.8 16.6 
Share of Population 
Living in Towns (%) 92 74 74 79.5 
a
 Under working age <=15; working age males 16–59, females 16–54; above working age males >=60, 
females >=55. 
As can be seen in Table 5 the development of these indicators has been similar in our 
three regions with levels mostly slightly below the averages for Russia. There was a 
dramatic decrease in life expectancy during the 1990s. Infant mortality rates (deaths 
within the first year of life per 1,000 births) also displayed a negative development in all 
three regions.  
Table 5: Some demographic characteristics for Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, 
1990–1999. Sources: Komistat (2000:13–17); Goskomstat (1996a,b; 1995) 
(data retrieved from http://www.gks.ru). 
Murmansk 
Oblast 
Republic of 
Karelia 
Arkhangelsk 
Oblast Russia  
1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 2000b
Birth rate 11.5 8.1 7.6 13.2 8.5 7.9 13.5 8.7 8.1 13.4  8.7 
Death rate  6.0 11.4 10.1 10.1 16.3 15.1 9.8 14.6 15.1 11.2 14.9 15.4 
Natural pop. growth 5.5 -3.3 -2.5 3.1 -7.8 -7.2 3.7 -5.9 -7.0 2.2 -5.7 -6.7 
Male life expectancy 65.3 57.0a 63.7 63.8 55.0a 59.7 64.0 55.9a 60.0 63.8 58.0  
Female life expect. 74.4 69.7a 74.0 74.2 69.0a 72.3 74.0 70.0a 72.7 74.3 72.0  
Infant mortality 16.1 15.9 11.3 14.0 17.4 17.5 14.4 16.2 14.8 17.4 18.1 15.3 
a
 Data for 1994. 
b
 Data for 2000 retrieved from Goskomstat’s website at http://www.gks.ru. 
Explanations: Birth rate: Number of new-born children per 1,000 inhabitants; Death rate: Number of 
deaths per 1,000 inhabitants; Natural population growth: Difference between birth rate and death rate; 
Male/female life expectancy: Expected length of life at birth (years); Infant mortality: Number of new-
born children who die within their first year per 1,000 births.  
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Comparing these figures with corresponding data for Sweden we find that birth rates in 
Sweden are also declining but from higher levels than in Russia (14.5, 11.7, 10.2 for the 
years 1990, 1995, 2000), death rates remain stable around 10–11 throughout the period, 
natural population growth in Sweden is changing from small positive to small negative 
numbers (3.4, 1.1, -0.3). The life expectancy and infant mortality levels, however, are 
dramatically different in Sweden compared with Russia. Life expectancy is significantly 
higher in Sweden. Especially male life expectancy displays a huge difference ― the 
Swedish level was 17 percent higher compared to that of Russia in 1990 and the gap 
increased drastically to 1995 when a Swedish male (on average) could expect to live 
slightly over 18 years longer than a Russian male. (The numbers for females display a 
similar pattern but with smaller differences.) Infant mortality in Sweden decreased from 
its already comparatively low level of close to 6 deaths per 1,000 newly born in 1990 to 
3.4 in 2000. The same indicators for northern Sweden display a similar pattern to that of 
Sweden at large, the main difference being that the population decrease has been 
somewhat more pronounced in northern Sweden compared to the Swedish average.36  
The population development in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk has 
also been affected by migration flows. Figure 10 shows immigration and emigration 
over the regional borders as percentages of total regional population for the years 1992, 
1995, and 1999. (Migration to and from northern Sweden has been included for 
comparison.) Migration flows in all the three Russian regions have decreased in the 
period displayed in the figure. (For northern Sweden the situation is the opposite.) 
Murmansk has had the largest migration flows of all regions. Net migration is also 
highest in Murmansk. In 1992 migration caused a population decrease of 2.3 percent in 
the region, in the latter half of the period the share decreased to around 1.5 percent. It 
can also be noted that Karelia is the only region where net migration has been positive 
for most of the period (in 1999, however, in- and out-migration flows were roughly of 
equal size). In Arkhangelsk migration has decreased significantly, net migration is 
slightly negative and slowly increasing. By the beginning of the 1990s migration was of 
least significance in northern Sweden ― net migration was also slightly positive, more 
people moved to the region than from it. However, migration increased and by the end 
of the period the immigration share was the largest of all regions displayed in the figure 
while the emigration share was surpassed only by that of Murmansk.  
It can be noted that migration to and from the Russian “North” has always been 
sizeable, due to the tangible material benefits (a temporary) relocation to the North 
entailed for people willing to perform hard and often hazardous work in the natural 
resource extractive industry. After enjoying the benefits of working in these extreme 
environments for some time, on retirement (if not earlier) many “immigrants” would 
move to other parts of Russia. This explains the fact that the populations of the three 
regions is comparatively young, and that the share of pensioners is fairly low (this is 
especially true for Murmansk Oblast). However, the tendency of emigration flows to 
decrease is a bit surprising considering the expected economic consequences of the 
introduction of market relations among existing enterprises in the region. The 
introduction of market competition was expected to disclose the inefficiency of a large 
                                                 
36
 Numbers for northern Sweden are from Statistics Sweden (retrieved on May 23, 2003, from 
http://www.scb.se). 
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part of the enterprise sector. The consequence would be an economic restructuring 
(through enterprise close-downs or down-sizing). Such a quantitative shrinking of the 
economic activity would only illustrate the fact that these northern regions were in fact 
“overpopulated” (Heleniak, 1999). An hypothetical explanation of the fact that the 
expected increased migration never materialized is that a sufficiently large part of the 
enterprises in these regions were, in fact, pulled into the virtual economy (cf. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4) and thereby “insulated” from the most immediate and dramatic effects of 
market competition. In combination with the fact that the turmoil in the Russian 
economy ― where, furthermore, employment relocation services were only barely 
being introduced ― made prospects for finding employment anywhere else in the 
country seem very uncertain, the labor force tended to stay put and try to “ride out the 
storm.”  
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Figure 10: Regional immigration and emigration shares, 1992–1990. Sources: 
Komistat, (2000:18), and Statistics Sweden. 
Human resources conditioning economic behavior  
In order to pin down more aspects of the way actors’ behavior in the timber 
procurement arena is conditioned by various features of society we may look at the 
demographic development from a production factor point of view. As already noted 
employment in the forest sector accounts for a significant share (around 13%) of total 
employment in Karelia and Arkhangelsk (and as much as 45–48 percent of total 
industrial employment), while forest related labor in Murmansk contributes a mere 0.6 
percent to the total regional employment. The aggregate sector employment structure 
looks very similar in the three regions. Industry, which is by far the largest sector in all 
regions, accounted for 24–27 percent of total employment in 1999. Next in size was 
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Trade with 13–15 percent, followed by Education, Culture and Arts with 12–13 percent 
and Transport and Communications with 10–12 percent of total regional employment. 
Two small differences in employment structure should be noted. While Murmansk has 
only 2 percent of total employment in Agriculture and Forestry the corresponding shares 
for Karelia and Arkhangelsk is 6 and 7 percent. On the other hand, Murmansk has a 
slightly higher share of total employment in Public Administration (8%) compared to 
Karelia and Arkhangelsk (with 6% each). In all three regions there has been a relative 
decrease in industrial employment in the latter half of the 1990s. In Arkhangelsk and 
Karelia Transport and Communications also lowered its respective shares of total 
employment in this period. Trade increased its share of total employment from 10–12 
percent in 1995 to 13–15 percent in 1999. Public Administration in all regions also 
increased its share of total employment by two percentage points in this period and by 
1999 it had reached 6 percent in Karelia and Arkhangelsk and 8 percent in Murmansk.  
Industrial employment displays a greater variation between the three regions. A rough 
indication of the industrial employment structure can be induced from Figure 5, 
showing the distribution of production between various industrial branches.  
Unemployment was an almost non-existent phenomenon in the Soviet era. However, 
during the transition period people have had to get used to the risk of losing their job. 
This prospect has been ― and probably still is ― extremely frightening, since 
preparedness for such crises (on the individual/psychological as well as the societal 
level) is not yet well developed. Although public employment agencies have been 
established today with the task of distributing unemployment relief and helping the 
unemployed to find new jobs, this institution is still new in Russia and people seem 
reluctant to make full use of its services. It is therefore likely that strong rigidities in 
people’s behavior still inhibit the mobility on the labor market, a mobility that is crucial 
for the possibilities to restructure the economy and generate economic growth.  
Data on unemployment can be suspected to be biased, but official unemployment 
figures are nowadays regularly published. Data of both registered and estimated total 
unemployment is provided in the official statistical publications. Figure 11 shows the 
development of total estimated unemployment in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
for the years 1992, 1995, and 1999.  
The rapid increase in unemployment from comparatively low levels at the beginning of 
the 1990s depicted in Figure 11 is due to many possible reasons. As already noted, 
transition brought unemployment on a scale never experienced in the Soviet Union. At 
first it is likely that people who lost their jobs were not even aware of the services 
offered by the employment agencies or they did not bother to register (which often was 
a cumbersome and costly procedure, especially for people living in remote areas) to 
obtain the meager benefits that were offered (Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999; Piipponen, 
1999). The rapid increase in unemployment numbers that can be seen in the data for 
1995 and 1999 must be regarded as a consequence partly of improved registrations and 
partly of the increasing competition facing enterprises in the emerging market economy 
― a process that is forcing them to lay off labor. The fact that unemployment numbers 
are not even higher, which might have been expected knowing the Soviet legacy of high 
labor intensity with accompanying low labor productivity, is probably due to the 
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workings of the virtual economy that often seems to lead enterprise managers to hoard 
labor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Russia is from 1992, 1995, and 2001. 
Figure 11: Estimated total unemployment in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, 
1992, 1995 and 1999. Sources: Komistat (2000:23); Goskomstat 
(1996b:21); On-line Pravda, February 12, 2003.37  
Still, unemployment numbers reported by the official statistical agencies can be 
expected to underestimate real unemployment levels (Carlsson et al., 1999). But at the 
same time the numbers also hide the fact that many unemployed are anyway gainfully 
employed in the “shadow economy,” since people are forced to perform some work in 
this large unofficial sector in order to survive (Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999).  
Unemployment in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk was similar to the average 
Russian level of around 5 percent of the economically active population at the 
beginning of the period. By the mid 1990s it had increased sharply to 11–14 percent, 
which is well above the Russian average of slightly over 8 percent. Towards the end of 
the period it had reached 15–16 percent in Karelia and Arkhangelsk while it was more 
than 20 percent in Murmansk (Goskomstat, 1996b:21). For comparison it can be noted 
that unemployment in northern Sweden also increased substantially during the 1990s, 
from levels slightly over 3 percent to levels around 8 percent by the mid 1990s. 
However, towards the end of the decade unemployment seems to have slightly 
decreased again in northern Sweden, to 6–7 percent of the working age population.38  
Reliable data on incomes and wages are difficult to come by and data obtained from 
different sources (such as regional statistical offices) are sometimes impossible to 
compare. It seems clear that average workers’ wages in northern regions like 
                                                 
37
 Retrieved on May 28, 2003 from http://english.pravda.ru/economics/2003/02/12/43298.html. 
38
 Numbers for northern Sweden from Statistics Sweden (http://www.scb.se, data retrieved on May 27, 
2003).  
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Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk traditionally have been higher than the Russian 
average. This was due to the fact that special subsidies were paid to attract labor to the 
often hard work available in regions with extreme natural conditions. With transition 
such public subsidies can be expected eventually to disappear altogether. Official data 
(Goskomstat, 1996b) indicate that workers’ average monthly wages by the mid 1990s 
were still significantly higher than the average for all of Russia. Wages in Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk were around 25–30 percent higher than the Russian average, and wages in 
Murmansk were about 90 percent higher. (Per capita money incomes for Murmansk and 
Karelia display a similar pattern but with smaller differences. For Arkhangelsk, 
however, per capita incomes were slightly lower than the Russian average.) It can also 
be noted that nominal monthly average wages increased rapidly in all three regions, the 
wage level was around three times higher in 1999 compared to 1995. Wages remained 
highest in Murmansk, in Karelia the wage level was 70 percent of that for Murmansk 
throughout the period, in Arkhangelsk it was slightly higher in 1995 (72%) but 
decreased towards the end of the decade to 66 percent of the Murmansk level.  
For both Karelia and Arkhangelsk, where, as we have seen, the forest sector is of great 
importance for the regional economy, the wages of forest sector workers were 
comparatively low, only around 80 percent of the average monthly wage in industry 
(Piipponen, 1999; Carlsson et al., 1999). In the small forest sector in Murmansk, the 
wage level in the forest industry was only 50 percent of the average monthly wage in 
the region (in fact, workers in the Murmansk forest industry were paid the second 
lowest wages among all industrial branches). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the 
general wage level was so much higher in Murmansk, it seems that a worker in the 
Murmansk forest industry still earned slightly more than his colleague in Karelia in 
1997 (Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999). It can also be noted that wages differ between the 
three main activities in the forest industrial sector (forest harvesting, woodworking, and 
pulp and paper). A worker in the pulp and paper industry earns much more than a 
worker in forest harvesting or woodworking. In Karelia, for example, the average wage 
in the pulp and paper industry was slightly higher than the average wage for the whole 
industrial sector in 1997, while wages in forest harvesting and woodworking were 23 
and 40 percent below this average, respectively (Piipponen, 1999).  
However, nominal wages alone cannot say very much about the living standard of the 
population. By relating the per-capita money incomes to the minimum subsistence level 
we obtain a measure indicating something of the real value (purchasing power) of the 
nominal wage. Data for the latter part of the 1990s show that incomes in relation to 
minimum subsistence were highest in Murmansk and lowest in Arkhangelsk, they were 
at a high in 1997 in all three regions only to fall back towards the end of the decade, 
when the income level in Murmansk was still more than twice as high as the minimum 
subsistence, while that of Arkhangelsk had fallen below its 1995 level and in 1999 was 
only about 20 percent higher than minimum subsistence.  
This state of affairs is reflected in the fact that significant shares of the total population 
in the three regions have incomes below the minimum subsistence level. In Murmansk, 
the region with the highest wage level, 18 percent of the population had incomes below 
the minimum subsistence level in 1997. In 1999, this share had increased slightly to 20 
percent. The corresponding shares for Karelia and Arkhangelsk were 20 and 25 percent, 
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respectively, in 1997, increasing to 26 and as much as 50 percent, respectively, two 
years later.39  
An important “feature of society” conditioning all economic behavior in a region has to 
do with the education level of the workforce. The education level in a region reflects a 
potential resource for economic efficiency improvements and economic structural 
change. Higher general and professional education is of special importance in this 
respect.  
An important measure of the education level in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk is given by the number of specialists with higher education per 1,000 
inhabitants. As can be seen in Figure 12 all our regions increased the relative numbers 
of specialists in their respective populations between the years 1989 and 2000. 
Arkhangelsk was most successful in this respect. While the region had by far the lowest 
relative number of specialists in 1989 (less than 80 percent of the Russian average), it 
had increased its share more than twofold by the year 2000 and reached the Russian 
average (94 specialists per 1,000 inh.). Murmansk and Karelia, on the other hand, have 
fallen further behind. While having been on the Russian average level in 1989, 
Murmansk had increased its share to a moderate 81 specialists per 1,000 inhabitants in 
2000 (almost 14 percent lower than the Russian average), while Karelia had reached a 
mere 74 specialists per 1,000 inhabitants (which is more than 20 percent lower than the 
Russian average). The corresponding numbers for northern Sweden was 90 specialists 
per 1,000 inhabitants (by the beginning of 2003). The average for all of Sweden was 
98.40  
While Figure 12 shows the “stock” of specialists available at two points in time, Figure 
13 displays an education “flow” indicator, viz. the relative number of newly graduated 
specialists from higher educational institutions. It should be noted that only 
comparatively few specialists have graduated each year from higher educational 
establishments in Murmansk. Obviously, this has to do with the fact that the capacity 
for higher education is low in Murmansk. However, the number of graduating 
specialists has also increased in Murmansk during the last few years. This tendency 
probably has to do with the fact that there has been a capacity increase in higher 
education in Murmansk during the last ten-year period with the establishment of several 
                                                 
39
 The dramatic deterioration indicated by the figures for 1999 may be an effect of the profound financial 
crisis of August 1998. However, since this crisis should cause a similar deterioration in most Russian 
regions it is not clear why the change for Arkhangelsk is so much larger than that for Karelia and 
Murmansk. Thus, this may also be an effect of deficiencies in statistical reporting. Slobodanuk (2003), 
however, citing Russian official statistics, claims that the share of all Russians with incomes below the 
subsistence level was 21.5 percent at the beginning of 2003. At the beginning of 2002 this share is said to 
have been 31.5 percent.  
40
 Calculation based on data for Västerbotten and Norrbotten in “Facts and Perspectives” published on the 
Internet at URL: http://www.regionfakta.com/ (data retrieved on May 30, 2003). The basis for the 
comparison with the Russian situation is, however, uncertain since it is not clear how the definitions of 
“specialists with higher education” compare between the two countries. For Sweden the population aged 
20–64 with “tertiary education of more than 3 years” and “post-graduate education” were added to obtain 
the number of specialists with higher education. If the population with “tertiary education of less than 3 
years” is also added to these totals the number of specialists per 1,000 inhabitants increases to 180 for 
northern Sweden and 184 for Sweden as a whole.  
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new higher educational institutions in the region. It probably also has to do with the fact 
that many higher educational services nowadays are offered at fees to be paid by the 
student. By enrolling in higher education in the region where they live students can 
better afford their studies by staying longer with their parents. Earlier, students had to 
leave Murmansk to get their education at universities in more central regions of Russia 
(Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999). Otherwise, it should be noted that Karelia has the 
comparably largest “output” of graduated specialists. But it is Arkhangelsk that displays 
the fastest relative growth in the number of new specialists among our three regions. 
This has probably contributed to the improvement of the “specialist stock” in 
Arkhangelsk that was displayed in Figure 12.  
Specialists with higher education per 1,000 inh. 
5656
44
55
81
74
94 93
0
20
40
60
80
100
Russia Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk
1989
2000
 
Figure 12: Level of education, 1989 and 2000. Sources: Calculations based on data 
from the IIASA Russian Forest Study Database, from Minobrazovaniia 
Rossii (2002), and from Goskomstat Rossii (2003).  
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Figure 13: Yearly addition to workforce competence. Yearly number of specialists 
graduating from higher educational institutions, 1991–2000. Source: Russia 
in Figures (2003). 
 50
The share of the total working age population enrolled in higher education has also been 
increasing rapidly in all three regions. While Karelia had the highest share throughout 
the 1990s (220 students per 10,000 inhabitants in 1991; 363 in 2000), and Murmansk 
the lowest (86 in 1990; 276 in 2000), Arkhangelsk displayed the fastest increase in the 
share of students (from 166 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 358 in 2000). For 
comparison we can note that the share of students in higher education in northern 
Sweden was twice as large as that of Karelia in 2000.  
The number of students in higher education studying forest related sciences and 
economics and management is of special importance in the present context. In the three 
year period between 1998 and 2000 (for which data is available41) Arkhangelsk had 
twice as large a share of students enrolled in forest science courses compared to Karelia. 
However, the share was comparatively low and slightly decreasing for both regions, 
from 6.6 to 6.2 percent in Arkhangelsk and from 3 to 2.8 percent in Karelia. (In 
Murmansk no higher education in forest sciences was offered.) The share of all students 
enrolled in higher education specializing in economics and management was, not 
unexpectedly, much higher: for Murmansk the share was decreasing slightly from 19 to 
17 percent, for Karelia the share increased from a low 8 percent to 16 percent in the 
three year period and in Arkhangelsk the share grew from 12 to 18 percent, the highest 
share of all three regions in 2000.  
Changing enterprise structure, ownership and employment  
A set of “societal features” that has profoundly affected all activities in Russia during 
the last 10–15 years have to do with the changing structure of the enterprise sector, with 
changes of enterprise ownership and improvements in corporate governance, including 
enterprise close-downs, restructuring, and the emergence of new (small) enterprises. 
The first structural feature that should be noted, however, is the fact that the economies 
of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk all have become smaller in terms of 
employment during the transition period. The relative number of people of working age 
who are employed in the economy has decreased in all three regions. For Murmansk 
(which had the lowest level at the beginning of the period) the decrease was least 
dramatic with a share falling from 75 to 65 percent of the working age population 
between 1991 and 2000. For Karelia (which had the highest employment numbers 
throughout the period) the share decreased from 88 to 73 percent. The employment 
numbers decreased the most in Arkhangelsk, where the share of the working age 
population with employment decreased from 82 percent in 1991 to 64 percent in 2000. 
Between 1996 and 1997 alone it fell by almost 8 percentage points and for the rest of 
the period it remained below the level of Murmansk. This development can be blamed 
on shrinking population numbers (due, as we have seen, to a negative natural population 
increase and out-migration) and changes in the population age structure.  
At the same time, per-capita regional GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has increased 
moderately at least up until 1997 (figures for 1998 seem to be biased probably due to 
                                                 
41
 These calculations were based on official data on higher education compiled in Russia in Figures and 
from an interactive database published on the Internet portal “Rossiskoe obrazovanie” (Russian 
education) at URL: http://www.edu.ru/db/portal/index_statistic.htm (data retrieved on May 25, 2003).  
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the “ruble crash”). However, available data are difficult to assess. Measuring regional 
GDP in current ruble prices does not tell us much about the real situation in the 
economy due to the high rate of inflation. If the GDP series is converted to US dollars 
using average exchange rates for the separate years, a more realistic picture of the 
development is obtained. Looking at the development as it is indicated by the per capita 
GDP at current USD prices reveals that GDP has increased in all three regions, it was 
highest in Murmansk throughout the period (well over the Russian average) and 
increased from around USD 2,500 in 1994 to close to 3,200 in 1997. In Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk per-capita GDP remained below the Russian average, but increased from 
USD 1,940 to 2,231 in Karelia and from 1,764 to 2,210 in Arkhangelsk. Taking account 
of the difference in purchasing power between the ruble and the dollar shows that the 
real per-capita GDP may be around 130 percent higher than the level indicated by the 
data just mentioned (Arctic Center Database, 2003). This would mean that “real” GDP 
in, for example, Murmansk would have been close to USD 7,300 per person in 1997. 
(For reference these figures might be compared to the per-capita GDP level of the 
neighboring Nordic countries, e.g., that of northern Sweden, which was about USD 
25,000 in 1997, i.e., more than three times higher than the Murmansk level.)  
A pertinent characteristic of the Soviet command economy was that it consisted of 
comparatively few, but often very large, enterprises, and that production of material 
goods had a much higher priority than production of services. This resulted in a special 
economic structure that has been causing problems for economic reformers during the 
whole transition period. The monopolistic legacy of the Soviet Union was automatically 
challenged by the increased competition that resulted when market economic principles 
were allowed to govern business organization and behavior in Russia. But this legacy, 
the dominant feature of which was a high degree of inertia, has not yet been overcome 
despite the process of intensive structural change in the Russian economy that was 
automatically triggered by the release of the “market forces.” Various policy programs 
aiming at fostering the establishment of new enterprises in Russia has been a prominent 
part of the reform process during the 1990s. The effects of the changeover to the market 
system were also immediately to be seen. To what extent these effects have been policy-
driven or to what extent they simply resulted from the workings of the market forces is 
not clear.  
In Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk this process is illustrated by the fact that the 
number of enterprises has increased from very low levels of a few thousands at the 
beginning of the 1990s to 15–20 thousand enterprises in the year 2000. In relative terms 
this means increases from less than five enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants of working age 
to slightly over 20 in Arkhangelsk, 25 in Murmansk and 33 in Karelia. Still, these are 
comparatively low numbers. In old market systems like, for instance, that of northern 
Sweden, the “enterprise density” is much larger. During all of the 1990s there were 
about 50–52 enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants of working age.42  
A major part of the Soviet enterprise sector was privatized in the period 1991 to 
1995/96. While more than 400 enterprises were privatized in Murmansk in the four year 
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 Data for these calculations were obtained from Russia in Figures (2003) and Facts and Perspectives 
(2003). 
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period 1993–1996, not one was privatized in the following four years. However, 
privatization seems to have proceeded at a somewhat slower pace in Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk, where as many as 777 and 827 enterprises, respectively, were privatized 
between 1993 and 1996. But also here the number of privatized enterprises decreased 
radically in the next four-year period, when a total of 106 enterprises were privatized in 
Karelia and 206 in Arkhangelsk.  
By the year 2000, the private sector, measured as the number of privatized enterprises, 
had reached a dominant position in all three regions (cf. Figure 14). Less than 20 
percent of all enterprises were owned by the state (including municipalities). 
Arkhangelsk had the highest share of state owned enterprises (17%), Murmansk the 
smallest (12%). However, looking instead at how many people the various types of 
enterprises employed in the year 2000, we find that the state sector still dominated the 
picture. Between 46 (in Karelia) and 51 percent (in Arkhangelsk) of all employed in the 
economy still worked in a state owned company or organization.  
Figure 14: Number of enterprises and employment by forms of ownership in the year 
2000. Percent. Source: Calculations based on data retrieved from Russia in 
Figures (2003). 
While the proportion of state employed tended to decrease slowly, there were three 
other shifts in employment characterizing the development in the latter half of the 
decade that could be observed. The first was a rapid increase in the share of private 
sector employment. The largest change happened in Murmansk where privately owned 
enterprises increased their share of total employment from around 20 percent in 1995 to 
close to 40 percent in the year 2000. The same tendency could also be seen in Karelia 
and Arkhangelsk.  
The second shift in the enterprise-employment configuration characterizing the latter 
half of the decade was the fact that enterprises with mixed state-private ownership lost 
much of their importance as employers. (This is in fact the reason for the increase in 
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private employment that we just noted.) While in 1995 the joint state-private enterprise 
sector employed close to one third of all occupied in the Murmansk economy this share 
had decreased close to one tenth by the end of the decade. In Karelia this share changed 
from 20 to 13 percent and in Arkhangelsk from 24 to 8 percent! This development 
indicates a decreasing need for state support of recently privatized enterprises in the 
latter half of the 1990s. The interpretation would be that many privatized enterprises 
actually became gradually more competitive in the emerging market environment, being 
able to increasingly rely on their own resources. The development could possibly also 
be seen as an indicator of a progressing decrease in the size of the virtual economy, with 
its characteristic reliance on “relational capital” (cf. Section 2.3).  
The third characteristic development of enterprise sector employment was the rapid 
growth in the relative number of employees in foreign and joint venture enterprises that 
took place between 1995 and 2000. This development was clearly to be seen in Karelia 
and it was especially pertinent in Arkhangelsk, where the share of foreign and joint 
venture enterprise employment grew from 0.5 to more than 7 percent in the five-year 
period. (In Murmansk this share remained low throughout the period, around one 
percent.) It can also be noted that the foreign and joint venture enterprises seem to have 
made a somewhat different impact on our respective regions in the late 1990s. In terms 
of employment, data show that in 1998/99 Arkhangelsk had the smallest number of 
foreign and joint enterprise units of all our three regions, but on average (i.e., per unit) 
these enterprises, nevertheless, had the highest number of employees as well as the 
outstandingly highest production turnover compared to corresponding enterprises in 
Murmansk and Karelia (the numbers are 4–5 times higher than for Karelia).  
The majority of the joint ventures in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk have foreign 
partners from a limited number of countries. In Murmansk most foreign partners are 
from two countries, Great Britain and Finland. A few enterprises are also partly owned 
by Americans and Germans. As might be expected the major share (almost 50%) of the 
Karelian joint ventures have partners from Finland. Other important partner countries 
are Cyprus (13% in 2000), USA (9%) and Germany (8%). In Arkhangelsk, foreign 
capital is more evenly distributed between various partner countries. Here the most 
important joint venture partner country is Germany (involved in 20% of all joint 
ventures in 2000), followed by the USA (15%) and Cyprus (12%). There are also small 
Belorussian and British interests in the Arkhangelsk joint ventures sector.43  
Finally, we should note the feature of the new market economy that probably is the most 
striking for the Russian citizens: the emergence of a large number of small enterprises. 
Available data suggest that small enterprises in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
comprised around one fifth (in Murmansk) to one quarter (in Karelia and Arkhangelsk) 
of the total number of enterprises in the year 2000.44 If these numbers are related to the 
total number of private enterprises we find that the share is one fourth to well over one 
third. What ever measure is used it is clear that the emergence of small enterprises has 
                                                 
43
 The prominence of Cyprus in this context has to do with the fact that many Russian companies are 
registered in Cyprus. This means that there might well be Russian investors behind the Cyprus nationality 
label. 
44
 Data were retrieved from Russia in Figures (2003).  
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meant quite a change for a country where only ten years earlier there were practically no 
such enterprises. However, the number of small enterprises is no certain indicator of 
their importance for the economy at large. Data also clearly show that the comparatively 
large number of private small enterprises together only employ a fairly small number of 
people. In 2000, the small enterprises of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk only 
employed 5–8 percent of all occupied in the respective regional economies. As can be 
seen in Figure 15 around half of all small enterprises (in Murmansk closer to two-thirds) 
are to be found in the trade and catering sector. About one fifth of the small enterprise 
sector consists of industrial enterprises. A somewhat smaller share (12% in Karelia, 
20% in Arkhangelsk) of all small enterprises is engaged in construction activities.45 On 
the other hand, if we look at the value of production these proportions are almost 
“reversed” so that the comparatively few industrial enterprises account for a 
significantly larger proportion of the total value produced by the small enterprise sector. 
For small trading enterprises the situation is the opposite with a large number of 
companies producing a relatively smaller value share of total output.  
 
Figure 15: Number of small enterprises and value of production by type of economic 
activity in the year 2000. Percent. Source: Calculations based on data 
retrieved from Russia in Figures (2003.) 
                                                 
45
 In the previous IIASA case studies it was clearly shown that very few small enterprises were active in 
the forest sector. Furthermore, it was often claimed by small forest company managers that the 
establishment of small forest enterprises was actively opposed by the “forest establishment”. The 
registration in 2003 of an Association of small and medium sized forest sector enterprises (Assotsiatsiia 
malogo i srednego biznesa lesopromyshlennogo kompleksa) in Arkhangelsk may perhaps be seen as a 
sign that this attitude from the “forest establishment” is being relaxed. (Information Agency “REGNUM”, 
August 22, 2003, http:www.regnum.ru/ allnews/148151.html.) 
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Figure 15 also shows that small industrial and construction enterprises in Murmansk (35 
percent of all small enterprises in the region) account for a comparatively larger share of 
total regional production than the corresponding enterprises in Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
(84 percent of the total value produced in the small enterprise sector compared to 53 
percent in Karelia and 52 percent in Arkhangelsk). The difference in the so-called 
“other activities” that can be noticed in the figure between Arkhangelsk and the other 
two regions is due to the fact that the 131 small enterprises in the Arkhangelsk transport 
sector in 2000 produced a vastly larger production value (almost 3.5 times higher) than 
the corresponding 181 enterprises in Murmansk and Karelia together.  
Finally, we should perhaps mention a last “feature of society” that affects the 
functioning of the emerging Russian market economy. Against the background provided 
above and considering the effect of the legacy of the old Soviet state-owned, large-
scale, and inert production machinery, it should come as no surprise that many 
enterprises are in principle non-viable in the new market environment. A dominating 
characteristic of the Russian economy is that it still is very labor intensive with an 
accompanying low labor productivity. Many enterprises are in fact unprofitable and 
should be restructured or even closed down if behavior were governed by unrestrained 
“market forces”. However, partly due to the workings of the “virtual economy”, many 
enterprises have managed to stay in operation without engaging in restructuring, despite 
the fact that they cannot make a profit.  
Data for the period 1995–1999 (Komistat, 2000:59) display a rather gloomy picture of 
enterprises’ profitability in our three regions. The situation has been worst for 
enterprises in the agricultural sector. More than half of all agricultural enterprises in the 
three regions were unprofitable during the whole period. In 1996–1997 less than 40 
percent worked with a profit. (The situation was the most extreme in 1996 when, 
respectively, 86 and 91 percent of all agricultural companies in Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk were unprofitable.) The construction sector had the smallest share of 
unprofitable enterprises in 1995–1999. In Murmansk, for instance, where developments 
in the construction sector were comparatively the most positive, 64–78 percent of all 
construction enterprises were profitable. Murmansk has also had the comparatively best 
development for the large industrial sector. Still between one third and nearly half of all 
industrial enterprises in Murmansk were unprofitable throughout the five-year period. In 
Karelia, and especially in Arkhangelsk, the situation was far worse with 64–67 percent 
of all industrial enterprises in Arkhangelsk being unprofitable in 1996–1998. 
Infrastructure and environment 
The construction and maintenance of communication and transport infrastructure 
traditionally belong to the obligations of the public sector. In Russia infrastructural 
investments were part and parcel of the decisions to “colonize” remote areas for the 
extraction of valuable natural resources. It is common knowledge that transport distance 
did not constitute the same kind of absolute restriction for the procurement of raw 
materials to processing industries in the Soviet Union as it often did in western market 
systems. Raw materials ― timber is a good example ― were hauled across huge 
distances from remote extraction sites to reach processing industries that were often 
located in the European parts of the Soviet Union. The whole command economy was, 
in fact, based on an established network for the delivery of goods between suppliers and 
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users all over the former Soviet territory. This vital distribution network was largely 
disrupted through the changes brought about by the transition.46  
Transition, with the pressure that price liberalization and the accompanying market 
competition for products exerted on all economic agents in the new Russia, often 
produced strange effects when enterprises (including state-owned transport and network 
maintenance companies) were compelled to make ends meet. In the eyes of old 
customers, freight tariffs were often raised to astronomically high levels, thereby 
effectively forcing customers to find other transport modes or ship smaller volumes. As 
might be expected, one effect was that transport volumes decreased significantly. The 
problem with such a development is that it easily deteriorates into a vicious circle, 
where transport volumes decrease to the extent that it hampers enterprises’ further 
development and decreases the incomes of the transport companies thereby leading to 
under-investments and insufficient grid maintenance.  
A well-developed transportation system allowing smooth and efficient operation is of 
course essential for the development of the entire economy, not only for the forest 
sector. While the network densities for most transport modes have remained almost 
unchanged in Murmansk and Karelia during the 1990s (in Arkhangelsk both road and 
railway densities even increased), the amount of goods transported (and transport work) 
decreased significantly. This situation is depicted in Table 6 and Figure 16.  
Table 6: Railway and road density, 1999 (km per 1,000 km2, percent 1990 = 100). 
Sources: Russia in Figures (2003); SNRA Road Database (2003, 
http://www.vv.se/vdb/webb-sidor/Slitlager.htm). 
Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk Russiab Northern Sweden Sweden 
 
Km Change (%)  Km 
Change 
(%) Km 
Change 
(%) Km Km Km 
Railroad  6.1 95 12.1 98 4.0 133 9.2  26.5 
Roadsa 17.0 106 38.0 109 16.7 152 40.9 68.3 172.4 
a
 Roads with hard cover in general use.  
b
 Data for 1992. 
Clearly, the sparse road and rail network constitutes a severe obstacle for the 
development of the forest sector. This problem is pertinent in all of Russia, but 
especially severe in the northern regions. Comparing the numbers indicating the density 
of hard cover roads in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk (cf. Table 6) with the 
corresponding number for the extremely sparsely populated northern Sweden gives an 
indication of the dimension of this problem. The difference would be even more 
accentuated if we were to add the lengths of other types of roads, which are essential for 
the exploitation of the forest resources (branch roads ― both permanent and for winter 
use only, and various types of haulage roads). Since a large share of the roads necessary 
for procuring timber in Russia does not allow year-round transportation at full lorry 
                                                 
46
 See, for example, Granberg (2000a,b) for a discussion of the importance of inter-republican supply 
linkages in the Soviet Union.  
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capacity and speed (due to their low quality with inferior surface, bad passages over 
streams, bad embankments, bad maintenance, etc.) wood deliveries to the forest 
industries cannot be steadily performed during all seasons of the year (Strakhov et al., 
1996; Nemkovich et al., 2000). 
Note: Columns = rail transport; Lines = road transport. 
Figure 16: Goods transported on rail and road 1991–1999. Source: Based on data from 
Russia in Figures (2003.)  
The very location of the sparse transport network also constitutes an obstacle for the 
further development of the forest sector in the area. Forests have been over-exploited in 
areas close to existing roads and railways. In the very huge areas without transport 
facilities high-quality raw material has remained unavailable for exploitation. Thus, 
actual forest harvesting has been restrained to areas with the most favorable existing 
transport facilities ― which are also the forest lands that have been most extensively 
exploited already ― and not to areas with the best harvesting potentials from a raw 
materials and forest maintenance point of view. This has resulted in an inefficient land 
use pattern. To increase future forest harvesting it will be necessary to make substantial 
road investments (Carlsson et al., 1999). For instance, in Arkhangelsk, the road density 
(including winter roads) is merely 0.1 km/sq. km. The optimum density for forest 
exploitation has been estimated to 0.5 km/sq. km (Strakhov, et al., 1996).  
Ports and waterways are also of great importance in the transportation network of our 
three regions. Both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk have year-round ice-free ocean harbors 
that are used for shipping export goods, including timber and forest products. Rivers 
and canals are also of significant importance in the area. Petrozavodsk, for example, is 
an important center in the internal waterway transport network. As with road and 
railway transports the volume of goods shipped by water transport has drastically 
decreased with rising shipping tariffs. (For instance, goods transported on internal 
waterways in Arkhangelsk decreased by as much as 87 percent between 1990 and 1995 
(Carlsson et al., 1999:20).) 
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The ecological problems in Russia have received much attention both from 
environmental activists, domestic authorities and international organizations. The 
environmental situation in Russia is severe in many respects, but the current situation is 
largely a legacy from Soviet times.47 As the Soviet society gradually deteriorated 
environmental issues were actually the first to engage broader layers of the population 
in public actions, and the environmental movement that emerged might be seen as a 
precursor to the politically oriented mobilization that eventually resulted in the 
breakdown of the Soviet system.  
It is hardly surprising that the heavy natural resource exploitation allocated by the 
Soviet command economy to the northern regions of Russia with their extreme and 
highly sensitive ecology would cause a severe strain on the natural environment.48 
Keeping in mind, however, that, since these are sparsely populated and very large areas, 
the existing ecological distress, which today has to be taken into account in all 
socioeconomic policy decisions, is in fact highly localized. Population centers and large 
factory sites are often affected by pollution causing severe environmental damage and 
health problems. At the same time, huge and largely uninhabited areas are virtually 
unaffected by pollution. Pollution sources and deposition patterns are fairly well known, 
the questions that remain to be solved basically concern what can be done to improve 
the situation and ― perhaps most importantly ― how can policies aiming at such 
improvements be identified and implemented. 
Beside the heavy air and water pollution associated with the mineral extraction and non-
ferrous metal processing that has led to the virtual extinction of much of the flora and 
fauna around the towns of Nikel and Monchegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, there are also 
the high-risk problems related to the storage of spent nuclear fuel (again mostly 
concentrated to the Kola Peninsula and to the islands of Novaya Zemlya). These are 
probably the most studied and publicized environmental problems in the area today.49  
Even if air pollution has ruined the soils and thereby converted large forest and 
agricultural lands to “ecological deserts” there are other types of environmental 
disturbances that cause the worst problems for the maintenance and development of the 
forest sector in our three regions (cf. Strakhov et al., 1996). In general, forest fires are 
the most serious threat to the Russian forest environment. Every year huge areas of the 
Russian forests are devastated by fire. According to Strakhov et al. (1996:130) between 
12,000 and 34,000 forest fires affecting more than one million ha of forest are registered 
in Russia every year. Forest fires in Russia are only reported for territories where fire 
protection has been in operation ― previously around 60 percent of the Forest Fund. In 
recent years this share has decreased significantly (Shvidenko and Goldammer, 2002). It 
has been estimated that on average about 1.2 million ha of Forest Land were annually 
affected by forest fires in Russia during the 1990s. For example, in Murmansk Oblast 
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 See, e.g., Mnatsakanian (1992) for an overview of the environmental legacy of the Soviet Union. 
48
 The environmental problems in Russia’s north-west are discussed in, e.g., Olsson and Sekarev (1994); 
and in Andreev and Olsson (1995, 2003).  
49
 For instance, the grave problems related to the storage of nuclear waste materials were studied in a 
large project coordinated by the Centre for Regional Science, Umeå University. A number of reports were 
published by participants in the project. (The reports can be obtained through Cerum’s web site at 
http://www.umu.se/ cerum).  
 59
alone the average annual number of forest fires in the period 1990–1996 was close to 
200 (varying between 126 in 1996 and 433 in 1994). The average area that was annually 
affected by these fires was 830 ha ― with a maximum (1992) of 2,497 ha caused by 
222 fires and a minimum (1991) of 100 ha caused by 157 fires (Ivanova and Nygaard, 
1999). The large majority of all fires are caused by human carelessness.  
There are many and complex reasons for the prevalence and incidence of forest fires, 
but there seems to be agreement about the fact that the level of forest fire prevention and 
protection is low compared with countries in Europe and North America (Korovin and 
Isaev, 1998; Shvidenko and Goldammer, 2002; Grigoriev, 2003). The activities of fire 
prevention and protection organizations have decreased due to insufficient state 
funding. While, for instance, at the end of the 1980s, the Russian state airborne fire 
prevention organization used to have 7–800 aircraft in operation during the fire season, 
nowadays the number of aircraft and the patrol time has decreased by more than 50 
percent (Shvidenko and Goldammer, 2002). But the lack of financial resources does not 
seem to be the only problem hampering an efficient forest fire protection. Lack of 
coordination between airborne and ground based fire protection organizations and 
between different regional levels as well as a lack of new initiatives in the work to 
improve the activities of these organizations has also been suggested (Korovin and 
Isaev, 1998; Shvidenko and Goldammer, 2002).  
Another cause of the serious environmental problems currently disturbing the Russian 
forest sector development has to do with the mode of operation on the part of the forest 
enterprises themselves. Many of the problems encountered today go back to the practice 
of over-exploitation and the practice of extensive clear-cutting that characterized the 
Soviet era. The practice of over-exploitation and the effect it has had on land use 
patterns has already been mentioned above. This problem has (at least temporarily) been 
“solved” through the dramatic decrease in harvesting that has characterized the 
transition years. However, clear-cutting on large harvesting areas is still common ― 
approximately 95 percent of all forest harvesting in Russia is still made using clear-
cutting. Harvesting may be performed on large plots of up to 50 ha, which could be 
compared with the maximum size of operation in, for instance, Finland, which is 10 ha 
(Strakhov et al., 1996)50. One reason for the prevalence of clear-cutting is to be found in 
the available harvesting technology. Mechanization of harvesting operations has 
radically expanded since the beginning of the 1980s.51 But, typically, existing 
harvesting machines cannot be used for selective felling and since they are heavy 
(crawler tractors are common) they cause serious damages on the forest land soils and 
existing shrubbery (Strakhov et al., 1996).  
The forest industry also contributes significantly to the environmental disturbances in 
Russia’s Northwest by emitting large volumes of pollutants to air and water. Due to the 
drastic production decrease the volumes of pollution emitted by the forest enterprises 
also decreased significantly. Between 1991 and 1994, emissions to the air by the 
                                                 
50
 During Soviet times, clear-cutting might be performed on areas of the size of up to 200 ha (Strakhov et 
al., 1996:133). 
51
 “In 1975, only a few percent of forest work had been mechanised. By 1990, 38% of the tree felling 
work, 42% of forest haulage, and 59% of delimbing and 43% of bucking had been mechanised” 
(Strakhov et al., 1996:134). 
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Russian wood-based industry was reduced by nearly 80 percent, and in 1994 it 
amounted to 2.7 percent of total atmospheric emissions in Russia. The corresponding 
share for polluted water emitted by Russian forest enterprises was 19.9 percent, and 
despite a reduction of 50 percent, this was the highest pollution share compared to all 
industrial branches. The three most common atmospheric pollutants emitted by Russian 
forest industrial plants (together accounting for close to 85 percent of total forest 
industrial emissions to the air) were solid particles, carbon dioxide, and sulphur dioxide. 
The largest individual source of forest industrial air pollution in 1993 was the 
Arkhangelsk Pulp and Paper Complex (in Novodvinsk) contributing 7.5 percent (47,800 
tonnes) of the total (Strakhov et al., 1996). This plant together with the Kotlas Pulp and 
Paper Complex (also in Arkhangelsk Oblast) also account for 23 percent of total 
wastewater emissions from Russian pulp and paper mills. All in all, pulp and paper 
production accounted for 20 percent (2 billion cub.m.) of the total waste water emitted 
by the Russian industry (Strakhov et al., 1996).  
As already noted, the dismal environmental situation in Russia has triggered a reaction 
both among the general public and their political representatives. Today environmental 
protection is high on the formal political agenda all over Russia and it influences 
decisions in practically all spheres of society, which is not to say that all political 
decisions that are actually taken are environmentally sound. For the traditional actors in 
the Russian forest sector this development has meant an awakening to a number of 
problems caused by established practice both in forest management and forest use. 
Especially the development during the transition period, when both domestic and 
international environmental organizations have taken a very active interest in the 
environment, not least in Russia’s northwest regions, has forced all actors in the Russian 
forest sector to reconsider their attitudes and behavior. The fact that the demand for 
wood products is extremely sensitive for consumers’ preferences is something that can 
no longer be ignored by the actors in the Russian forest sector. During the last 5–10 
years customers’ preference for wood produced in an environmentally acceptable way 
has exerted a significant influence on, for instance, harvesting in Murmansk and 
Karelia.52  
                                                 
52
 The fact that a large part of the discussion concerning environmental issues contained in the 
background analysis for the Karelian long-term development program (see Nemkovich et al., 2000:27–
31) was focused on the behavior and demands of various “green” NGOs acting for the preservation of 
pristine forests close to the Finnish border is perhaps indicative of the degree of influence that 
environmenal issues have on economic development planning today. Another recent example is a petition 
to the governor made by the directors of the five largest forest industrial enterprises in Murmansk Oblast 
to establish new specially protected nature preserves in the region, the motive for the petition being that 
their most important European customers demand wood produced under sustainable forest management, 
guraranteeing the preservation of the most valuable pristine forests. In Murmansk the concept of “model 
forests” is also attracting an increasing interest in the debate on sustainable forest management. For 
instance, the Kovdozerskii leskhoz has recently started to prepare for becoming a model forest (cf. 
releases from the Information Agency REGNUM on August 22, 2002 and June 10, 2003 retrieved on 
August 27, 2003, from the Internet at http://www.regnum.ru/forprint/49203.html and http://www.regnum. 
ru/forprint/124552.html, respectively). Similar examples may be found also in Arkhangelsk. Here the 
Solombala LDK (sawmill) recently entered the “Association of ecologically responsible forest 
industrialists of Russia”, which is an organization working to promote voluntary forest certification 
(FSC). Thereby for its customers, the company is displaying an active interest in the creation of an 
environmentally sustainable forest management in Arkhangelsk (cf. news release from the Information 
Agency REGNUM on August 12, 2003, retrieved on August 27, 2003, from the Internet at 
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As could be expected, the growing public awareness of the environmental problems 
disturbing the development of the Russian forest sector, has forced political actors and 
forest sector officials to take a number of steps to improve the situation and prevent 
further negative consequences of continued forest exploitation. One measure taken has 
been to reclassify forest land areas to Group I forests53 thereby withdrawing lands from 
commercial forest exploitation. In northwest Russia about one third of the total forest 
lands nowadays belong to Group I (Strakhov et al., 1996). In Murmansk Oblast, 
furthermore, researchers have suggested that all forest lands be reclassified to Group I, 
allowing only a very restricted forest use (cf. Mal’kova and Peshev, 1997:78).  
Regeneration of the forests after final harvesting is another hotly debated issue in 
Russian forestry during transition. Areas under artificial and so-called assisted natural 
regeneration have decreased during the transition period. Regeneration is traditionally 
the responsibility of leskhozy, but with the deterioration of leskhoz funding forest 
regeneration work has gone down dramatically. The extensive use of clear-cutting in 
combination with natural regeneration tends to produce broadleaved low-value stands 
(Strakhov et al., 1996). Thus, new approaches are called for both with respect to 
harvesting and regeneration methods. This has also recently been noted in the ongoing 
development of a new Russian forest policy.54 
This rather sketchy overview of the infrastructure and environment of North-West 
Russia and their relation to the development of the regional forest sector may serve to 
illustrate the gravity of the current situation as well as the fact that Russian forest 
stakeholders today have realized the necessity to take these issues into account when 
developing new market oriented policies with the purpose of improving the efficiency in 
the forest sector. This is based on a growing insight on the part of Russian forest 
stakeholders concerning the factors determining world market demand for wood.  
Let us now turn to an overview of the results of IIASA’s survey of the “rules-in-use” (or 
institutions) governing the behavior of forest enterprises in Murmansk, Karelia, and 
Arkhangelsk.  
3.2.4 Comparing Existing “Rules-in-Use” 
In the series of eight regional case studies performed in Russia by the IIASA team of 
researchers in the period 1997–2000 the impact of existing institutions on forest 
stakeholders’ behavior in the forest procurement arena was captured through interviews 
with 24–36 representatives (mainly CEOs) of regional forest enterprises (including 
leskhozy, the state forest management units) in each one of the study regions.55 All in all 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.regnum.ru/forprint/ 144430.html.) (For other examples and overviews of the Russian forest 
preservation issues engaging various environmental organizations, see the Internet web portal 
http://www.forest.ru.) 
53
 Cf. Section 3.2.2 for more on the division of Russian forests into different exploitation groups.  
54
 The central importance assigned to forest regeneration in the new Russian forest sector development 
strategy for 2003–2010 is explained by Mikhail Giriaev, head of the institute “Rosgiproles,” in an 
interview in Lesnaia gazeta in May 2003 (Rossiiskaia lesnaia gazeta, No. 10 (12), p. 2, May 2003). 
55
 The organizational background to the project is briefly presented in Section 1.2 (especially footnotes 5 
and 6) and Section 1.3.2.  
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221 interviews with forest enterprise managers in the eight regions were made by 
Russian collaborators in the project. In Murmansk 24 interviews were made, in Karelia 
36, and in Arkhangelsk 31. For comparison a parallel study was made among 24 
representatives of forest enterprises in northern Sweden.  
The Russian study coordinators made appointments with enterprise representatives and 
conducted in-depth interviews based on a questionnaire form developed by the IIASA 
research team. The respondents’ answers were recorded in writing and all questionnaire 
forms were then delivered to the IIASA team, where the answers were coded and stored 
in a computerized database. The results of the eight regional case study investigations 
were reported in a series of IIASA working papers (see Appendix A for a complete 
listing of publications from the project). The overall results of the series of case studies 
were published in Carlsson et al. (2001).  
Institutions are “rules-in-use” 
The questionnaire used in the survey of Russian forest enterprise representatives was 
designed with the purpose to capture (a) background facts of the enterprises included in 
the study, (b) the behavior of the enterprise management in its encounter with the new 
emerging market economic context, and (c) the attitude of the interviewed enterprise 
representatives towards the new developments in the transitional Russian economy. To 
(a) background facts of an enterprise concerns information about the type of production 
in which the enterprise is engaged, the age, ownership structure and size of the 
enterprise, the characteristics of the management, etc. The behavior of the enterprise 
management (b) was captured through questions concerning the enterprise’s 
procurement and sales, its relation to branch organizations, various market support 
institutes (such as banks, state organs, legislation), etc. The attitudes of the interviewed 
company directors towards the effects of the Russian transition process (c) were 
captured through questions asking respondents to assess how well they felt they were 
able to cope with certain common problems facing managers in contemporary Russian 
business life.  
Through the analysis of the responses given to the survey questions the IIASA team 
wanted to arrive at conclusions concerning the viability and efficiency of the 
institutional framework embedding contemporary Russian forest business activities. The 
purpose was to identify and assess some of the rules that actually govern the behavior of 
Russian forest enterprise managers. Such rules-in-use are actually what is meant by the 
concept of institution. (Note that to qualify as “institution” rules have to be in general 
use, i.e., actively governing the behavior of the actors of a system.) Various such rules-
in-use are often related to one another. In fact, they typically appear in bundles or sets. 
Such rules are also normally varying in scope; some rules restrict the operation of 
others. The result is what has been called “institutional set-ups,” consisting of a 
hierarchical set of rules-in-use. Ramazzotti (1998) even speaks of the existence of a 
“dominant institutional set-up” as the set of hierarchical rules that condition (restrict) 
the operation of most (all?) other existing sets of rules-in-use.  
Rules-in-use (or institutions) are often ― but they do not necessarily have to be ― 
expressed in the form of a legislative act or otherwise binding recommendation. Thus, 
rules-in-use (institutions) can be established by collective decisions (so-called formal 
rules) but they can also be established through people’s actions, through praxis 
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(informal rules). The decisive characteristic is that they enjoy some kind of legitimacy, 
i.e., that they are recognized and followed by a major portion of the population in a 
certain society.  
It is important to note that by “institution” we do not in principle mean an 
“organization”. “Institution” refers to the rule, not to the way in which a rule is 
enforced. At the same time, it should be clear that rule enforcement is often 
“institutionalized”, that is, certain structures are established (sometimes in the form of 
organizations) to enforce certain rules. Consider, for example, the tax legislation that 
contains both rules-in-use (institutions) and rules that are not obeyed by the actors in the 
system. Rule enforcement is handled by the tax authorities (which is an “organization”). 
Thus, to refer to the tax authorities as an “institution” is misleading in our framework, 
even if the tax authorities (the organization) is related to the enforcement of taxation 
rules (the institutions). To summarize, to the extent we are able to map and understand 
how institutions related to the Russian forest sector work, we are also able to analyze 
problems and suggest solutions.  
This is of course not to say that organizations do not matter. On the contrary, 
organizations often “epitomize” existing rules-in-use and are set up to monitor rule 
compliance, to advice or govern the behavior of the actors and impose penalties for 
violations of existing rules-in-use. Before looking at the summary of the results of 
IIASA’s survey analysis we will have a look at the changes in the organizational 
structure of the Russian forest sector that took place during the turbulent 1990s.  
Political changes during the transition period and their effects  
on the organizational structure in the Russian forest sector 
As already noted the many and often dramatic changes in the structure of the organiza-
tions governing the Russian forest sector are not easily accounted for. In principle, there 
seems to have been a constant struggle between two tendencies ― the tendency to unite 
the governance of forest management and forest utilization under the same 
organizational roof and the tendency to keep those two issues apart under separate 
organizational roofs.56 Here we will have a brief look at the organizational framework 
of the forest sector in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk as it was in the period 
1997–2000 when the IIASA case studies were made.57  
The history of Soviet/Russian forest sector management can be seen as an illustration of 
the notion of institutional path-dependency (cf., for instance, North, 1990). Rules 
governing actors’ behavior (institutions) and the structure and operation of various 
organizations established to enforce certain institutions tend to change at a 
                                                 
56
 The historical development of Russian forest management is discussed in Malmlöf (1998, 1999). See 
Lehmbruch (1998, 2001) for an analysis of the struggle for power and influence at the federal level 
between governmental organs and the forest sector bureaucracy during the 1990s.  
57
 Overviews of the forest sector organizational structure in the Soviet Union and Russia as well as more 
detailed descriptions of this structure in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk are given in 
the IIASA studies by, respectively, Ivanova and Nygaard (1999:27–39); Piipponen (1999:14–20), and 
Carlsson et al. (1999:33–44). The remainder of this section is largely based on these sources. 
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comparatively slow pace (if at all) in response to changes in external conditions.58 So, 
for instance, it is easy to see how forest sector rules (institutions) and management 
organizations in transitional Russia are still largely preserved from the late Soviet era 
with only minor changes.  
The formal institutions governing the Russian forest sector are set down as laws and 
regulations in various legislative acts. A central act in this context is the new Forest 
Code of the Russian Federation that was (at long last) approved in 1997 and which is 
currently being amended in an extended legislation procedure. This code preserved 
many of the rules and regulations that were part of previous Soviet and Russian 
legislation on forest issues. Through a 1947 Council of Ministers’ resolution a unified 
forest management system for the whole of the Soviet Union was created. In 1977, the 
law “Basics of Forest Legislation in the USSR and Union Republics” created a general 
legislative framework around forestry related issues. In 1988, the Central Committee of 
the CPSU (the Soviet communist party) and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a 
new policy resulting in significant changes in Soviet forest management. This was the 
start of a turbulent period in Soviet forest sector management. Not only were there 
many forest management reforms introduced ― in 1991 the entire Soviet Union 
disintegrated and the Russian Federation was established as an independent nation. 
Through the adoption in 1993 of a new law, “Basics of Forest Legislation in the Russian 
Federation,” the most intensive period of forest management reform came to an end 
(Sheingauz et al., 1995).  
The 1988 reform was intended to change the structure of forest administration, but 
instead it conserved the old centralized management structure. Through the reform 
forest management returned to a situation similar to the one existing in the chaotic late 
Khrushchev period (1959–1964). The central forest management authority (the old 
Gosleskhoz transformed through the reform to Goskomles) was supposed to supervise 
forest management, but ended up controlling also the forest industry units managing 
forest utilization (Sheingauz et al., 1995). After the establishment of the Russian 
Federation in 1991, a power struggle immediately emerged between the center (federal 
authorities in Moscow) and the regional and local levels. A number of legislative acts 
were adopted on the federal level while at the same time many normative acts were 
introduced by regional and local authorities. The latter acts varied greatly between 
regions and were often inconsistent with federal legislation concerning forest 
management and use and environmental legislation ― sometimes they even 
contradicted the Russian constitution. The 1993 “Basics of Forest Legislation” law 
sorted out some of these contradictions.59  
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 Arguably, these changes are interdependent, so that changes in the rules-in-use might also ultimately 
affect the environment in which actors in the system act.  
59
 While the Russian legislation contains rulings concerning many different aspects of forest actors’ 
behavior we focus here on the aspects of legislation pertaining to the organizational structure of forest 
management and forest use. It could be noted that members of the IIASA institutional framework project 
also conducted studies of other aspects of legislation of relevance for the Russian forest sector in 
transition. See Pappila (2000), Kotova (2001), and Nysten-Haarala (2001). A somewhat earlier overview 
of the Russian Forest Legislation produced within IIASA’s Forestry Project is given in Sheingauz et al. 
(1995). 
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Through a management reform after the formal disintegration of the USSR (in 
December 1991) Goskomles and the RSFSR Ministry of Forestry were liquidated and 
replaced by a forestry department within the Russian Federal Ministry of Ecology and 
Natural Resources. One year later, through a presidential decree, this department was 
transformed into the independent Russian Federal Forest Service (FFS or Rosleskhoz) 
(Sheingauz et al., 1995). 
As the official proprietor of the Russian forests FFS, like its predecessor organizations, 
managed a major part of the Russian Forest Fund and had the right to sub-allocate forest 
resources to harvesting enterprises. In the Soviet era this was a part of the command 
economy operating by administratively connecting a producer to a customer. Overall 
production plans were elaborated by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) while the 
State Procurement Committee (Gossnab) handled the actual assigning of, for example, a 
certain amount of timber to a particular sawmill. After the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union a new allocation mechanism was introduced through the 1993 law “Basics of 
Forest Management of the Russian Federation.” It allowed the distribution of forest 
resources to forest users (both juridical and physical persons) through short-term or 
long-term lease of forest lands. Leases could be allocated through closed bidding, open 
auctions or direct negotiations with the authorities (Sheingauz et al., 1995). The law 
also made stipulations about payments for various kinds of forest utilization. It 
remained largely quiet on issues of legislative disputes and rule violations. In a follow-
up regulation the Russian Federal Government in July 1993 recommended direct 
negotiations and competitions for leases, rather than auctions (Sheingauz et al., 1995).  
In Soviet times a parallel system of government existed, with basically three lines of 
political administration ― the formal representational/legislative hierarchies (soviets), 
the executives (the bureaucracy, nominally subordinate to the soviets at each level), and 
the communist party. The ultimate power to settle disputes and decide on future policies 
rested with the communist party, the formal political hierarchies were of insignificant 
practical importance, while the bureaucracy could wield all the more executive power. 
Forest management was a bureaucratic task; it was a task for public authorities. The 
principle of “dual subordination” was in effect. Thus, regional forest management was 
subordinated both to the central ministry of forestry and to the republican council of 
ministers. In practice, furthermore, the whole structure was at all levels subordinated to 
the communist party’s hierarchical organization (cf., for example, Kotz and Weir, 
1997:23–33).  
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 this whole political-administrative 
structure was in principle abolished. The communist party was forced to yield its 
“leading role” in society.60 But it was only in December 1993, after an intensive power 
struggle between President Yeltsin and the Parliament (the Congress of Peoples’ 
Deputies) culminating in Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Parliament and the attack by tanks 
on the White House on October 4, that new representative organs, named Dumas, were 
elected in most regions. For the coming couple of years the role and working procedures 
                                                 
60
 Already in June 1991, Boris Yeltsin, then president of the Russian Republic, had even prohibited party 
organizations in all workplaces on Russian soil (Stoner-Weiss, 1997). The process diminishing the power 
of the CPSU had in fact started already some years earlier (cf. footnote 12).  
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of the regional Dumas were being established and their actual influence on regional 
policies was comparatively small.  
Thus, these were the years when the Russian presidency established its authority. 
Already in the summer of 1991 Boris Yeltsin, who was still the president of the Russian 
Republic, in an effort to strengthen central control had introduced the (ill-defined) 
position of “Presidential Representative” in all regions of the Russian Republic. He had 
also converted the former regional executive organs (the oblispolkomy) to regional 
administrations to be headed by a gubernator. The regional governors were at first 
appointed by the Russian president, the intention being that popularly elected candidates 
should successively replace them. (As it turned out, however, it was not until the 
autumn of 1996 that Yeltsin, now President of the Russian Federation, allowed 
gubernatorial elections across the whole country.) Through the initial appointments of 
governors, Yeltsin had hoped to attain some influence over regional governments. It 
seems, however, that in many regions “old style” communists were appointed to the 
office, many of whom supported their own region’s efforts to gain increased 
independence vis-à-vis Moscow (Campbell, 1995; Stoner-Weiss, 1997).  
Thus, in hindsight, one could perhaps interpret Yeltsin’s reformation of regional 
administration as a process through which many of the communist party’s officials were 
“transformed” to become the staff of the new regional administrations. Even the real 
estate belonging to the communist party (the main regional offices of the party were 
often centrally located impressive buildings) was “confiscated” and “transformed” to 
offices for these new regional administrations. One interesting feature of this 
transformation process, which led to a reformulation of the power relations between the 
center (Moscow) and the periphery (oblasti), goes back to the 1990 elections to the local 
soviets, where candidate nominations were not controlled by the CPSU. The elections 
were the result of Gorbachev’s attempt to resurrect the political role of the soviets, to 
make them real legislatures. In the elections many party first secretaries were elected to 
the oblast soviets, but the electoral procedures now made it clear that “a measure of 
accountability” existed to the soviet, even above the Party. As Stoner-Wise (1997:72) 
has put it:61  
The elections fundamentally changed the point of reference of these officials. 
Where previously Moscow and the Central Committee were the source of power, 
after the elections even the obkom was far more dependent for power on its 
domestic constituency than on an increasingly weakening Moscow.  
This whole development, which can seem to an outside observer, as very fast and 
resulting in fundamental changes in governance, might actually be quite consistent with 
the path-dependency hypothesis saying that old institutions are “sticky” and cannot be 
profoundly changed in a short time. If the interpretation is correct it should come as no 
surprise if old behavioral patterns among the actors in the Russian regional forest 
procurement arena were preserved well into the late 1990s. The fact is that, despite 
some dramatic changes in the formal organizational structure, the old lines of command 
between various “forest officials” were preserved. At first even the old party officials 
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 Kotz and Weir (1997) have noted that a large portion of the new pro-capitalist elite that emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s were in fact recruited among the Soviet party-state elite. 
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tended to play the roles they had played earlier, even if they now had adopted a 
somewhat different perspective with regard to Moscow’s influence. It also means that 
the administration of the Russian regional forest sector (at least initially) largely 
remained in the hands of the bureaucracy, thus continuing Soviet practices.  
The organizational structure within which Russian forest management was operated 
during most of the 1990s is depicted in Figure 17.  
The figure gives the general picture ― one that reflects the structure of forest 
management in most Russian regions. It should be noted, however, that this structure 
might vary slightly between regions. In the Karelian Republic, for instance, some 
features of this structure differ from what is depicted in the figure. Between the federal 
level and the local operative level (the leskhozy) there is the Government of the 
Republic of Karelia and immediately below (in place of the Regional Forest 
Management) there is in Karelia the State Forest Committee (Goskomles). In Table 7, a 
comparison is given between the state forest management structure in the regions of 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk.  
 
Forest management units (leskhozy) 1,831
Forest districts (lesnichestva) 7,851 
Forest compartments (uchastki) 13,969 
Forest tending plots (obkhody) 68,935 
Local Administrations 
The Federal Forest Service (Rosleskhoz) 
State Committee on 
Environmental 
Protection 
(Goskomekologiia) 
Government of Russia 
Governments of the 
Russian Republics, 
with ministries, 
committees, etc. 
 
Administrations of 
oblasts, etc. with 
boards, forest industry 
departments, etc. 
National parks 28 
Regional Forest Management 81 
 
Figure 17: Forest Management Structure of the Russian Federation.62 Source: Carlsson 
et al. (1999:35). The figure is based on Strakhov et al. (1996) and World 
Bank (1997). 
                                                 
62
 There are a number of Federal Forest Service organizations which are not included in Figure 17, such 
as ten Forest Inventory and Planning units (lesoustroistvo), eight forest research institutes and eighteen air 
forest protection units. 
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Table 7: Different forest management units and their average Forest Fund and Forest 
Land area in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk (end of the 1990s). Sources: 
Ivanova and Nygaard (1999); Piipponen (1999); Carlsson et al. (1999); 
Strakhov et al. (1996); Nemkovich et al. (2000). 
 Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk 
Regional forest management 
 
 
Total Forest Fund (FF) area 
Total Forest Land (FL) area 
Total growing stock 
Average growing stock per ha FL 
Murmansk Regional 
Forest Management
 
9.8 mln ha 
5.2 mln ha 
200.6 mln cub.m 
38.6 cub.m 
State Forest 
Committee of the 
RK 
14.8 mln ha 
9.7 mln ha 
848.6 mln cub.m 
87.5cub.m 
Arkhangelsk Reg. 
Forest Management
 
27.4 mln ha 
19.9 mln ha 
2,150.6 mln cub.m
108.1cub.m 
Number of Forest Management 
Units (leskhozy) 
Average FF (1,000 ha)a 
Average FL (1,000 ha) 
Average growing stock (mln cub.m) 
 
10 
980  
520 
20.1 
 
38 
389 
255 
22.3 
 
28 
979 
711 
76.8 
Number of Forest Districts  
(lesnichestva) 
Average FF (1,000 ha) 
Average FL (1,000 ha) 
Average growing stock (mln cub.m) 
 
28 
350  
186 
7.2 
 
224 
66  
43 
3.8 
 
212 
129 
94 
10.1 
Number of Forest Management 
Compartments (uchastki) 
Average FF (1,000 ha) 
Average FL (1,000 ha) 
Average growing stock (mln cub.m) 
 
87 
113 
60 
2.3 
 
334 
44  
29 
2.5 
 
413 
66 
48 
5.2 
Number of Forest Tending Plots  
(obkhody) 
Average FF (1,000 ha) 
Average FL (1,000 ha) 
Average growing stock (mln cub.m) 
 
305 
32 
17 
0.7 
 
1,463 
10 
7 
0.6 
 
1,348 
20 
15 
1.6 
a There are huge variations in the area of different territorial management categories within an individual 
region. Looking, for instance, at the Forest Fund (FF) area of different leskhozy in Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk we find that the smallest leskhoz in Murmansk has an FF area of 46 ha, the largest 2,085 ha. 
In Arkhangelsk the corresponding figures were 27 and 3,733 ha.  
There are some differences in the forest management structure of the three regions that 
deserve to be noticed. While the share of the Forest Fund occupied by Forest Land is 
about 66 percent in Karelia and almost 73 percent in Arkhangelsk, it is merely 53 
percent in Murmansk. Looking at growing stock we find that Arkhangelsk has by far the 
largest growing stock volume per hectare of Forest Land, and that the corresponding 
figure for Murmansk is merely one third of the Arkhangelsk level. Figures such as these 
are of course affected by the natural conditions in the respective regions as well as by 
previous forest harvesting and management practices. Foresters in Murmansk have to 
operate over much larger areas in their different forest management units than their 
counterparts in Arkhangelsk and (especially) in Karelia to manage similar growing 
stock volumes. 
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The leskhoz is an entity with independent accounting and separate funding. During 
Soviet times leskhozy, and state harvesting enterprises (lespromkhozy), sawmills and 
other forest industries formed an integrated system. It is this system that has been 
deteriorating during most of the 1990s.  
The description above has largely concerned Russian forest management. Until the 
beginning of the 1990s the forest industry was governed by a similar hierarchical 
structure (cf. Figure 18, exemplifying the situation by showing the pre-transition 
organization of forest harvesting).  
MINISTRY
Combine Ob”edinenie
Regional
Ministries
lespromkhoz lespromkhoz
lesopunkt lesopunkt
 
Figure 18: Organizational structure of forest harvesting before Perestroika. Source: 
Carlsson et al. (1999:36). The figure is based on Blandon (1983:58). 
In the figure “Ministry” may, in fact, represent any one of a large number of so-called 
branch ministries, which were the “central command” of individual sectors of 
production in the Soviet economy. Whitefield (1993:29) has pointed out that “industrial 
ministries occupied a peculiar and powerful position in the Soviet economy:” 
The most notable and consequential feature of this position was that the 
ministries straddled both state power (vlast’) and economic functions. On the 
one hand, ministries were nominated by the political leadership as the 
instrument of the state in the economy, while, on the other, they physically 
controlled resources in the way that their exercise of power was more akin to 
that of an economic organization. On the basis of their control over resources 
and on account of their presence in the heart of the state, which prohibited the 
emergence of a clear demarcation between politics and the economy, industrial 
ministries were able to act in their own interests, undermine the control, and 
even dominate the agendas, of other institutions, and function both directly and 
indirectly as the most powerful, hegemonic political forces in the Soviet system. 
In a fairly long period preceding the Perestroika years the economic and political power 
wielded by the economic ministries was a source of conflict with the communist party 
and its claim for dominating political power. This conflict was, according to Whitefield 
(1993), what ultimately brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
After 1988, the struggle to reform the industrial ministries intensified. In the end both 
the ministries themselves and their critics agreed in viewing the transfer of ministries to 
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economic actors as their favored solution. The plethora of organizational forms 
available for use by the ministries in this changeover to more market-like organizations 
(concerns, consortia, joint-stock companies, associations, unions, commercial banks, 
exchanges) offered a possibility for the ministries to “have the best of all worlds” 
(Whitefield, 1993:228). This was the time when, for instance, in August 1989, Gazprom 
was established as an independent state concern. It should be noted that (Whitefield, 
1993:230): 
Ministries were being transformed into concerns without the existence of proper 
legal regulations. Leonid Abalkin’s State Commission on Economic Reform in 
October 1989 had passed recommendations on the formation of concerns and 
associations, but these were considered to contain serious flaws. For one thing, 
they were only recommendations: and they relied on a traditional approach by 
sharply defining the internal structure of the new concerns, while ignoring the 
more important fact ― that they must not be ministerial structures. Despite the 
paper change, for example, concerns retained the right to issue subdepartmental 
acts of an administrative-directive character. Gazprom, for example, like the old 
ministry has responsibility for gas supply, and used state orders to achieve it. 
Many enterprises had even less juridical independence than previously; they 
could not leave the concern, had to fulfill their given plan, and were subjected to 
central redistribution of profits.  
In the process central command was even strengthened in the hierarchy of enterprises 
belonging to such concerns. After the August 1991 coup and the demise of the Soviet 
Union the task for the new president and the reformers surrounding him was to find a 
new functioning structure in government regulation of industrial management. We will 
conclude this section by a brief look at the organizational structure that emerged in the 
Russian Federation during the early 1990s for managing (or “coordinating”) activities in 
the Russian forest industry. 
In her recent dissertation on the fragmentation of sectoral governance in Russian 
industry, Lehmbruch (2001:22) gives the following shorthand description of the results 
of the reforms in the Russian forest industry at the beginning of the 1990s: 
At first glance, market transition in the timber industry did live up to its 
potential. Within a few years of the breakup of the Soviet Union, decentralization 
was everywhere. Regional conglomerates had been broken up into their 
constituent enterprises and privatized separately, to the extent that a Moscow 
paper in 1994 called the forest complex “the most privatized sector of Russian 
industry.” Branch management was all but abolished. Along with textiles and 
light industry, the sector was one of the few exceptions to a half-reformed 
national economy in which ministerial bureaucracies had been significantly 
reduced in size and influence, yet still, in the form of “state committees” and a 
few ministries, preserved basic organizational continuity. Former administrators 
had moved over to the private sector and created a rich infrastructure of spin-off 
organizations. Thus, one Brezhnev-era minister, Mikhail Busygin, headed the 
foreign trade organization “Vneshles,” while Busygin’s successor as minister, 
Vladimir Mel’nikov, was president of the joint-stock company “Soiuz 
lesopromyshlennikov.” Around these, and often connected through cross-
holdings or overlapping membership, a variety of other organizations emerged. 
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A commodity exchange, an insurance company, and several banks ― two alone 
in Moscow ― were set up to cater specifically to the timber industry. 
Organization-building wasn’t restricted to the commercial sector: two separate 
timber industry organizations were also set up. The “Union of Timber 
Exporters” (Soiuz Lesoeksporterov) was created in July 1992; a “Union of 
Timber Industrialists” (Soiuz Lesopromyshlennikov) followed months later. Just 
as other 1992 start-ups, these two bodies were created by old ministry insiders; 
however, their mission statements, their names and even their formal status were 
visibly oriented towards Western organizational models. 
The organizational structure that emerged in the Russian forest industry during the 
beginning of the 1990s (briefly outlined in the citation from Lehmbruch above) was 
clearly reflected in the eight regions that were studied in the IIASA project. It was found 
that many of the individuals who, in the late Soviet era, had occupied prominent 
positions in the forest industrial sector still did so at the end of the 1990s, but now as 
representatives of recently established “private” forest organizations.  
Forest management was preserved in a basically similar organizational form all over 
Russia (cf. Figure 17) with a single central authority, the Federal Forest Service (FFS) 
in Moscow, regional forest management offices in regional capitals supervising a 
number of forest management units (leskhozy) in their respective regions. The Russian 
forest industry also preserved many organizational features from the Soviet era, but here 
the regional organization displayed more variation and the subordination to central 
authorities in Moscow was seemingly less pronounced. So, for instance, in Arkhangelsk 
the “Union of forest industrialists” was found to be a formally important and centrally 
placed organization. In reality, however, the Union was rather small and insignificant, 
with a limited membership consisting of directors of forest industrial enterprises 
meeting to exchange information rather than playing a more operative role in the forest 
sector. Instead the newly established Arkhangelsk Forest Bank (Lesobank) had come to 
occupy the central position, the director of the bank, a former official in the state forest 
sector (the huge state concern Arkhlesprom), now being transformed into a powerful 
actor in the new private sector. The public interest in the Arkhangelsk forest sector was 
exercised through a Forest Department within the Regional Administration.  
In Karelia the major forest industrial organization in operation at the end of the 1990s 
was based on Karellesprom, a large state concern formed in 1986, a characteristic 
feature of which was the merger of leskhozy (the local forest management units) with 
lespromkhozy (local harvesting enterprises) into kompleksnye lespromkhozy. At the end 
of the 1980s Karellesprom entirely dominated the Karelian forest sector employing 
more than 90 thousand people and managing 97 percent of the forest area (Piipponen, 
1999). In the 1990s, the kompleksnye lespromkhozy and other forest processing 
enterprises were privatized, often becoming joint-stock companies. In this process the 
forest management regained its independence from the forest industry and became, once 
again, a state authority. Karellesprom was reorganized and became a joint-stock holding 
company with only about 60 people directly employed. The state is a major shareholder 
in the company and in 1998 Karellesprom owned shares in 28 forest industrial 
enterprises in Karelia with a total employment of more than 29,000 people (Piipponen, 
1999).  
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The activities of the company have changed from formerly being the central 
organizer of the whole regional forest sector to a form of consultancy and 
trading company. It can handle the sales transactions of the companies which 
are dealing with Karellesprom. It offers judicial and business advice services 
and auditing for the companies of the sector. It can also transmit credits and buy 
equipment in the role of a wholesale buyer. … About 50–60 percent of the 
exports goes through Karellesprom and the rest is exported by several 
production enterprises and agents (Piipponen, 1999:18). 
The public interest in the regional forest industry was taken care of through the Karelian 
Ministry of Natural Resources and the State Committee for the Forest Industrial 
Complex.63  
In Murmansk, where the forest sector never played any really significant role in the 
regional economy, there are no specialized forest industrial organizations similar to 
those found in regions such as Arkhangelsk and Karelia. A group of specialists in the 
Committee of Industrial Development in the Regional Administration used to cater for 
the forest industry. Until 1998, there was still one person in the Department of Industrial 
Development (succeeding the earlier Committee) in the Regional Administration who 
kept track of forest issues. Ivanova and Nygaard (1999:36) conclude that “the forest 
sector does not have any priority with the Administration and there are in fact no people 
who can promote the interests of the forest sector. This development can be explained 
by the lack of pressure groups”. 
The important feature to note concerning the Russian regional forest industrial 
organizations is that all or most of them have emerged from the structure that existed 
during Soviet times. The new (or “reformed” and sometimes renamed) organizations 
were formally privatized ― even if the state maintained a significant influence over 
their activities ― and they were populated by much the same officials who were 
previously in charge of the corresponding Soviet forest organizations. Another 
prominent feature that, at least initially soon after the start of the privatization period, 
characterized these organizations was that the same people were often members of 
several different organizations, the same people occupied key positions in many 
different organizations thereby becoming liable to double (or multiple) loyalty conflicts.  
The organizational changes that took place in the 1990s (and are still taking place) were 
triggered by changes in the Russian socioeconomic system. But, simultaneously, the 
new or reformed organizations that appeared were instrumental in modifying existing, 
or even installing new, institutions (rules-in-use) in the Russian regional forest sector. 
The previous study performed by IIASA sought to identify key institutions in the 
Russian regional forest sector and assess their efficacy in the emerging market 
economic context. Through surveys among decision-makers (directors, civil servants) in 
forest enterprises and forest organizations compliance to various institutions was 
evaluated.  
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 Today (at the beginning of 2004) these organizations have been restructured and (partly) renamed: 
Ministry of the Forest Complex, Natural Resources and Ecology of the Republic of Karelia, and State 
Committee of the Republic of Karelia for the Forest and Mining Complex.  
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Rules, behaviors and attitudes ― results of a survey  
among actors in the Russian regional forest sector 
The findings in the previous case studies of the institutional embedding of the forest 
sector in eight Russian regions (cf. summary in Carlsson et al., 2001) indicated that the 
behavior of a majority of the Russian forest enterprises is guided by the dominant 
institutional set-up that has been labeled the virtual economy.64 The concept designates 
a set of informal rules according to which a Russian company that cannot operate 
profitably in the new market environment might nevertheless (at least temporarily) 
avoid bankruptcy, maintain its workforce and keep up its production by shying market 
competition. Transactions among companies in the virtual economy are not based on 
cash but on more or less elaborate forms of barter. The use of barter trade makes it 
possible to keep up the pretence of a sizeable economy, in which products are 
exchanged at inflated nominal “values” that have little to do with the prices that would 
have emerged if the products had been traded in a normal market where they had been 
exposed to competition.  
The virtual economy dictates a specific behavior on the part of the actors of the system, 
a behavior that in many respects drastically deviates from what is typical in a well-
functioning market system. In comparison with the situation in a market system, 
managers of companies operating in the virtual economy will take very strange (but, in 
the virtual economy context, rational) decisions concerning, for instance,  
• company personnel: not laying off labor despite decreased demand for the 
company’s products;  
• investments: favoring investments in so-called “relational capital” at the expense of 
investments in modern production technology and management competence;  
• product development: not seeking to develop new products despite decreasing 
demand for existing products and/or signs of growing demand for products that the 
company would be able to produce;  
• marketing and sales: not exploring the potential benefits of marketing nor striving to 
find new (cash paying) customers;  
• business contracts with suppliers and customers: trusting only personal relations, 
always expecting, and trying to safeguard against, breach of agreements;  
• relations with public authorities: seeking to negotiate favors and alternative ways of 
fulfilling company obligations towards the state, like paying taxes in kind rather 
than in cash, thereby making public affairs less transparent;  
• etc.  
Examples of this type of behavior were clearly to be seen in the material gathered 
through the survey among regional forest sector decision makers performed within the 
previous IIASA study.  
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 The characteristics of the virtual economy were briefly summarized in Section 2.3. See also footnote 16 
for numerous references to work in which the concept is discussed. 
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However, some “transition oriented” firms were also found in our survey. While such 
companies might also be in a difficult position in terms of market efficiency they 
nevertheless strive to improve their operations to become viable in the emerging 
Russian market environment. While firms operating in the virtual economy tend to 
explore their “relational capital” in order to compensate for their inefficiency and avoid 
bankruptcy, transition oriented firms tend to invest in productive capital or management 
skills in order to reduce their “distance to the market”, to improve their market 
efficiency. The former behavior can be seen as a legacy of the Soviet command 
economy modified to counter the consequences of the restrictions enforced by the 
transition to a market system. The latter behavior rather seeks to embrace and make the 
best of these consequences. In a longer-term perspective, assuming that the transition to 
a market economic system continues in Russia, only the latter behavior is viable.  
Labeling a forest enterprise as either a “virtual economy firm” or a “transition firm” 
should be seen as a kind of “shorthand” indicating that the enterprise tends to behave in 
a certain way with respect to its future existence. Using the simplest assessment criteria 
(cf. Carlsson et al., 2001) it was possible to group the enterprises in our previous survey 
study according to the answers given by the respondents on questions relating to the 
current level of (market) efficiency of the enterprises and their investment strategy. This 
way the enterprises in the study could be grouped according to their degree of  
(in-)efficiency ― their “distance to the market” ― and their tendency to make use of 
possibilities offered by the virtual economy that in certain respects might compensate 
for market inefficiency. Typically, such possibilities are connected to the enterprise’s 
ability to explore so-called “relational capital,” i.e., its ability to make use of personal 
relations with people in public office who can (lawfully or unlawfully) distribute 
benefits or favors to individual enterprises.  
Using the same classification criteria as in the previous survey study the forest 
enterprises in our three regions, our selected enterprises have been grouped in a two-
dimensional dichotomy to produce four groups based on their different behavior with 
respect to their “distance to the market” and use of “relational capital”. The resulting 
“map” showing the shares of enterprises belonging to the four different groups is 
displayed in Figure 19 for Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk as well as for the total 
of all 221 enterprises in the eight Russian regions, and for the 24 enterprises in northern 
Sweden that were part of our previous survey. (This “map” should only be seen as a 
kind of illustration since the number of enterprises in the individual regions, which were 
part of our survey, was limited and since the selection of enterprises to be part of the 
survey did not guarantee unbiased samples.)  
As can be seen in Figure 19, the great majority of Swedish forest enterprises in the 
survey are to be found in the diagram in the lower left corner of the figure, displaying a 
typical market behavior. They are fairly efficient and they do not invest much in 
“relational capital”. While more than 60 percent of the Murmansk forest firms seem 
fairly efficient, the remaining close to 40 percent of the firms seem to be less efficient 
without trying to compensate for their inefficiency by investing in relational capital. 
Forty-five percent of the forest firms in Arkhangelsk also seem to be in a precarious 
situation being inefficient without trying to compensate by investing in relational 
capital. Firms found in the lower right diagram in Figure 19 might in fact prove 
unviable in the present Russian business environment. In contrast, it might be argued 
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that the firms found in the upper left diagram of Figure 19 are the ones that are most 
adapted to the present business environment, enjoying, as it were, the best of two 
worlds, being fairly efficient in a market sense and simultaneously making use of the 
benefits offered in transitional Russia from investments in relational capital. The most 
typical “virtual economy firms” are found in the upper right diagram in the figure. It 
should be noted that neither any Murmansk firms nor any firms from northern Sweden 
can be found in this group. According to this classification more than 40 percent of the 
Karelian forest enterprises that were part of our survey are operating in the virtual 
economy. Firms in this position survive by exploring the benefits currently offered by 
the transition environment. The question is for how long their situation will remain 
viable, since if they keep relying on their “relational capital” and do not make serious 
efforts to reduce their “distance to the market” they are likely to fall behind their market 
oriented competitors when (assuming the transition towards a market system will 
continue in Russia) the virtual economy will eventually begin to disintegrate.  
Figure 19: Grouping of the forest enterprises in Murmansk, Karelia, Arkhangelsk, 
Russia, and northern Sweden according to their position in the “transition-
virtual economy space”. Source: Based on data from the IIASA 
Institutional Study Database. 
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In the analysis of the complete survey material it was found (cf. Carlsson et al., 2001) 
that, for instance, large publicly owned forest enterprises display a more typical virtual 
economy behavior than smaller ones and newly established companies. Thus, the 
distribution of forest enterprises in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk that is 
displayed in Figure 19 is likely to be affected by a biased prevalence of publicly owned 
or privatized formerly public enterprises. (In Karelia and Arkhangelsk as many as, 
respectively, 78 and 93 percent of the enterprises in our survey belonged to these two 
categories. The corresponding number for all eight regions in the survey was 66 
percent.) These facts should just caution us not to draw too far-reaching conclusions 
concerning regional differences on the basis of the survey data from individual regions.  
Some further illustrations of differences in behavior patterns between forest enterprises 
in the three regions, Russia at large (i.e., all eight regions) and northern Sweden might 
be mentioned. Looking at compliance with formal business rules, like, for instance, 
buying and selling agreements, reveals great differences between the Swedish and the 
Russian companies. While the overwhelming majority of Swedish companies (around 
90 percent) do not experience any problems related to buying and selling agreements, 
only about a fourth of the Russian enterprises are equally lucky. Many Russian forest 
companies in our survey have big problems with buying and, especially, selling 
agreements. It could be noted, however, that these problems are less pronounced among 
the forest companies in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk than they are for all of the 
Russian enterprises in our survey.  
While no Swedish firms use barter in their transactions with other firms, more than 40 
percent of the Russian forest firms make use of barter at least to some extent (and this 
figure probably underestimates the extent to which barter is used). Compared to the total 
Russian barter share it is interesting to note that only 14 percent of the Murmansk forest 
firms use barter, while as much as 71 percent of the Karelian firms do so. While almost 
all forest firms in northern Sweden accept payment after delivery, very few of the 
Russian firms do so. Most Russian firms want payment on or before delivery. 
Compared to the total for Russia the share of enterprises accepting payment after 
delivery is higher in Arkhangelsk (13 percent compared to 4 percent of all the Russian 
enterprises in our survey). These figures might be seen as an illustration of the weak 
trust that economic actors in the Russian society have for institutions governing trade, 
for the enforcement of business contracts, the work of arbitration courts, etc.  
While 85 percent of the northern Swedish forest enterprises make investments in their 
companies only slightly more than a third of all the Russian enterprises in our survey do 
so. For the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk the corresponding figures 
are, respectively, 42, 44, and 23 percent. The share for Arkhangelsk is very small, which 
might be seen as a reflection of the fact that a large part of the Arkhangelsk forest 
companies are still operating in the virtual economy.  
Finally, just a note on the impression produced by the answers to a question regarding 
what problems forest enterprise managers consider most important to solve in order to 
improve the functioning of the forest sector. The answers, which can be said to reflect 
the attitudes of the interviewed managers towards the ongoing transition process, are 
depicted in Figure 20. Note that the problems named in the figure are all matters 
typically dealt with by the political sphere; to be remedied they all require changes in 
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formal rules. Comparing the answers given by Russian business managers with those 
given by the managers of forest firms in northern Sweden (which we take to illustrate 
managers’ attitudes in a market economy) we find some interesting differences. For 
instance, no Swedish manager saw problems with investment/ technology or (lack of) 
state coordination as something that had to be solved in order to improve the 
functioning of the sector. However, these problems were seen as the most important to 
solve by slightly more than a third of all the Russian managers interviewed in our 
survey. Looking at our three regions we find that as much as half of the forest enterprise 
managers in Arkhangelsk thought that the investment/technology and the state 
coordination problem were the ones in most need of attention. By contrast, as many as 
half of the Swedish enterprise managers were most concerned with problems related to 
business legislation and ethics/politics. These issues seemed to trouble significantly 
fewer managers in Russia. While close to one fifth of the managers in Murmansk and 
Karelia saw problems with ethics/politics as the most important, it is striking that no 
forest enterprise manager in Arkhangelsk considered this the most serious problem to be 
dealt with in order to improve the functioning of the regional forest sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: What individual forest enterprise managers found to be the single most 
important change to be made in order to improve the functioning of the 
regional forest sector. Source: based on data from the IIASA Institutional 
Study Database. 
The fact that 45 percent of the interviewed forest enterprise managers in Murmansk find 
problems related to the forest legislation most urgently in need of solutions probably has 
something to do with the fact that a quarter of all Murmansk enterprises in our survey 
were forest management organizations (so-called leskhozy), for which forest legislation 
can be expected to be especially important. But problems related to the forest legislation 
is also considered important by 30 percent of the Swedish forest enterprise managers, 
something that might be explained by the fact that the Swedish environmental 
legislation is very strict and environmental clauses in the forest legislation is strongly 
enforced, and this is regarded by managers as a restriction on enterprise profitability.  
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To provide some kind of summary of the picture that emerged through the discussion 
presented above an attempt has been made to collect the most important statistical 
information characterizing the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhagnelsk in a 
single table (Table 8). Data pertaining to Russia at large as well as data for Northern 
Sweden have also been included in the table wherever it was possible to find 
appropriate information in official statistical publications.65 This summary concludes 
the account given in the present section of the forest sector institutional framework in 
the three regions, an account inspired by the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework outlined in Section 3.1.  
Table 8: Overview comparison of conditions obtaining in the three regions studied. 
(Data for Russia and Northern Sweden have been added if available and found 
relevant.) 
I Geographical characteristics: Russia Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk Northern Sweden 
1 Total area (mln. ha) 17075.2 14.5 17.2 58.7 16.5 
2 Population size 1998 (1,000) 146328 1035 775 1491 512 
3 Population density 1998 (inh./sq. km) 8.6 7.0 4.5 2.5 3.1 
4 Share of population living in urban areas 1999 (%) 73 92 74 74 79 
II Characteristics of the resource: Russia Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk Northern Sweden 
5 Forest land (mln. ha) 719 5.0 9.3 22.4 6.7 
6 Growing stock (mln. cub. m) 74322 198 919 2144 615 
7 Share of spruce/pine in growing stock (%) 13/20 42/44 32/58 65/25 31/50 
8 Forest industrial production 2000 (% of total ind. prod.) n.a. 0.3 54.9 52.7 n.a. 
9 Forest industrial employment 1995 (% of total ind. empl.) 6.3 (2003) 2 48.5 44.6 n.a. 
10 Export of forest products 1998 (% of total comm. exports) 8 (2002) 0.3 53.5 81.7 28 
11 Harvested volume 1990/1998 (mln cub. m) 311.3/107,4 1.2 0.14 10.8/4.4 22.6/8.4 n.a. 
12 Production of some forest industrial goods (1990/1999): 
 Sawn wood (1,000 cub. m) 
 Pulp (1,000 t) 
 Paper (1,000 t) 
 
75069/19164
7525/4225 
5240/2968 
 
354/31 
0/0 
0/0 
 
2004/709
766/307 
1220/659 
 
5011/1754 
2154/1507 
397/253 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
III Characteristics of society: Russia Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk Northern Sweden 
13 Share of population in working age 1999 (%) 56.8 65.2 59.1 59.4 54.7 
14 Share of population above working age 1999 (%) 20.2 13.1 18.7 17.8 25.7 
15 Male life expectancy (1995/1999) 58.0/n.a. 57.0/63.7 55.0/59.7 55.9/60.0 73.5/76.3 
16 Infant mortality, deaths per 1,000 births (1995/1999) 18.1/16.5 15.9/11.3 17.4/17.5 16.2/14.8 3.9/3.6 
17 Regional immigration 1999 (% of total pop.) - 20.7 16.1 17.7 n.a. 
18 Regional emigration 1999 (% of total pop.) - 35.1 16.4 26.1 n.a. 
19 Unemployment 1992/1999 (% of econ. active pop.) n.a./13.0 6.2/21.4 5/14.7 4.9/16.4 ≈ 5/≈ 4 
20 Share of total population with incomes below minimum 
subsistence level 1997/1999 (%) n.a./29.9 17/20 20/26 25/50 22
a
 
21 Specialists with higher education 1989/2000 (per 1,000 
inh.)  n.a./n.a. 56/81 55/74 44/93 n.a. 
22 Specialists graduating from higher education 1991/2000 
(per 10,000 inh.) 27.1/39.7 7/17.4 19 / 29 12/27 n.a. 
23 Per capita Gross Domestic Product in 1997 (USD/% of 
1994 level) 3,087/98 3,200/128 2,231/115 2,210/125 n.a. 
24 No. of state/private enterprises 2000 (% of total no.) 5/75  12/71 14/68 17/65 n.a. 
25 Employment in state/private enterprises 2000 (% of total 
employment) 21/46 49/37 46/35 51/33 n.a. 
26 No. of small enterprises 2000 (% of total no. of 
enterprises)  26 17.6 25.6 23.9 n.a. 
27 No. of employed in small enterprises 2000 (% of total no. 
of employed) 13 5.8 8.2 5.4 n.a. 
28 Road/railroad density 1999 (km per 1,000 sq. km) 40.9/9.2 17.0/6.1 38.0/12.1 16.7/4.0 68.3/- 
                                                 
65
 The work with this table has clearly illustrated the fact that official statistical data describing the 
situation in Russia is still surprisingly hard to come by. However, as we have noted with satisfaction, data 
published by a wide variety of Russian authorities and organizations are nowadays available on the 
Internet. At the same time, one could not cease to marvel at the limited data availability offered by the 
official Russian statistical authority (Goskomstat).  
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Table 8: continued. 
IV Institutions or rules-in-use: Russia Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk Northern Sweden 
29 Share of forest enterprises in our survey displaying the 
most market viable behavior (short distance to the market 
combined with low investments in relational capital) 
25 42 11 26 79 
30 Share of forest enterprises in our survey displaying a 
behavior that makes them unviable in the longer term 
(long distance to the market combined with low invest-
ments in relational capital) 
29 38 19 45 8 
31 Share of forest enterprises in our survey operating in the 
virtual economy (long distance to the market combined 
with large investments in relational capital) 
31 0 42 16 0 
32 Share of forest enterprises in our survey that are fairly 
efficient (short distance to the market) and simultaneously 
making use of benefits offered by the virutal economy 
(investing in relational capital) 
15 21 28 13 13 
33 Share of forest enterprises reporting big problems related 
to selling agreements (%) 59 50 49 38 0 
34 Share of forest enterprises reporting big problems related 
to buying agreements (%) 44 35 14 19 0 
35 Share of forest enterprises to some extent engaging in 
barter trade (%) 44 14 71 36 0 
36 Share of forest enterprises accepting payment after 
delivery (%) 4 0 0 13 96 
37 Share of forest enterprises having bank relations (%) 17 4 15 23 82 
38 Share of forest enterprises exporting more than 40% of 
their production (%) 
24 29 43 43 21 
39 Share of forest enterprises investing in their business (%) 36 42 44 23 85 
40 Single most important change required to improve the 
functioning of the regional forest sector:  
 Improve the taxation system 
 Improve forest legislation 
 Improve business legislation 
 Develop business ethics and business policy 
 Facilitate investments/improving technology 
 Increase state coordination 
 
 
23 
18 
13 
11 
19 
17 
 
 
18 
45 
5 
18 
9 
5 
 
 
21 
19 
18 
18 
6 
18 
 
 
29 
13 
8 
0 
29 
21 
 
 
20 
30 
25 
25 
0 
0 
n.a. = Data not available. 
a
 In 1998, between 22 and 23% of the working age population in northern Sweden had a low income  
(< 135.000 SEK, corresponding to the income of the 20 percent share of the male population with the 
lowest incomes).  
Sources: Numbers for this table were collected from the text of Section 3. Thus, sources can be found in 
the above text. Data for Russia and Northern Sweden have been added for comparison whenever it 
seemed appropriate and data were available. Data given under “IV Institutions or rules-in-use” were 
calculated from information obtained through the survey among Russian forest enterprise representatives 
that was part of IIASA’s Institutional framework study. Some data presented on lines 5–7 and 11 were 
retrieved (on May 4, 2004) from the website Forest.ru supported by the Russian “Forest Club”, an 
umbrella organization of various Russian NGOs at: http://www.forest.ru/rus/basics/statistic.html. Some 
data on lines 12 and 24–26 were obtained from Russia in Numbers at: http://www.sci.aha.ru/cgi-
bin/regbase.pl. Data for Russia on lines 13–14 were obtained from The Demographic Yearbook of Russia; 
Statistical Handbook. Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1995. Data for Northern Sweden presented on lines 
19 and 20 were obtained from the website of The National Board of Health and Welfare, Stockholm at: 
http://www.sos.se/epc/FS/index.htm. Data for Russia on line 27 were obtained from Maloe 
predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii; Offitsial’noe izdanie, Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2000.  
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4 The Policy Exercises in Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk ― Comparing Procedure and Results 
There are a number of problems that have to be overcome in order to allow participatory 
approaches to improve the situation in the Russian forest sector. The most obvious 
problem ― and perhaps the most fundamental obstacle for the successful 
implementation of participatory policy formulation methods ― is the historical legacy 
from Soviet times that is still today manifesting itself in a specific mind-set or mentality 
making people refrain from political activity and leave public policy decisions in the 
hands of (often incompetent and dubiously legitimate) public and private “decision-
makers” (cf. Howard, 2002).  
Finding a specific form for stakeholder participation in forest policy formulation 
suitable for the situation in the Russian regional forest sector is another difficult 
problem to solve. In Russia, with its limited prior experience of democratic processes 
and the relatively little impact of transition so far, there is not much to build this kind of 
participatory policy approach upon. Under the existing circumstances the only possible 
way of achieving a practical result seems to be to ask the existing power structures (the 
political “establishment” and official forest agencies) for sanction and support in testing 
methods for stakeholder participation in the formulation of modern regional forest 
policies. Their rationale for providing such sanction and support would be their need 
(without knowing how) to make changes happen that would improve the situation in the 
forest sector.  
IIASA has a fairly long experience in developing and using participatory approaches in 
policy making. The “policy exercise” concept was, in fact, developed in a large IIASA 
project called “The Sustainable Development of the Biosphere” during the beginning of 
the 1980s. Brewer (1986) proposed the use of a kind of “free-form, manual games” that 
he labeled “policy exercises” to engage broad layers of the population in the 
development of policies to cope with the emerging serious global environmental 
problems.66 In the second half of the 1980s, Ferenc Toth and his co-workers further 
developed Brewer’s policy exercise concept at IIASA (Toth, 1988a, b).  
Based on earlier work at IIASA, the Forestry Project further elaborated the concept of 
policy exercises and tested the approach in a run of five exercises for different 
categories of participants (Duinker et al., 1993). Here, a number of useful insights in the 
workings of policy exercises were gained.  
Since this time, a number of projects at IIASA have worked on the further elaboration 
of the policy exercise or employed the approach (or similar designs) to disseminate the 
results of their research and to engage stakeholders in continued research or policy-
oriented activities (see, e.g., Najam, 1995; Parson, 1996; Franz, 1997; Gluck et al., 
2000). 
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 In a comment to Brewer’s article, Nick Sonntag noted that the policy exercise concept proposed by 
Brewer had its closely related precursor in the so-called Adaptive Environmental Assessment and 
Management (AEAM) methodology developed ten years earlier by a team lead by C.S. Holling (cf. 
Holling, 1978).  
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4.1  Current Conceptualization of a IIASA Policy Exercise 
Before looking at the implementation and outcome of the policy exercises that IIASA’s 
Forestry Project organized in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk in 2000–2001, we 
should summarize the current understanding in the project of what characterizes a 
policy exercise for Russian forest stakeholders. This conceptualization is a result of 
previous experiences at IIASA and reflections upon recent experiences with 
participatory policy formulation approaches elsewhere.  
The policy exercise can be seen as a tool for disseminating the results of the research 
conducted at the institute to problem stakeholders, i.e., people and organizations who 
are affected by the results of the research and for whom it should be of most concern. 
Such exercises might also be used to open a discussion and a continuous dialogue with 
these stakeholders about the results of the research and its policy implications. Thus, the 
policy exercise can be seen as a tool that might be used in a participatory policy 
formulation process.  
To the group of forest sector stakeholders belong executives in the forest sector, 
politicians, businessmen, and representatives of environmental and other public 
organizations with an interest in the regional forest sector, etc. 
The general objectives of a IIASA policy exercise for forest sector stakeholders are: 
1. To foster exchange of knowledge and information and mutual learning through 
effective face-to-face communication (confrontation); 
2. To synthesize policy-relevant and useful information through the integration of 
disparate sets of formal and informal knowledge; and  
3. To identify policies for alternative and plausible futures. 
A policy exercise might be a relatively long event, lasting for months, even years. 
IIASA’s engagement in such a process should be limited to a (small) number of well-
defined interventions in the form of policy exercise workshops. In these workshops the 
results of the research performed by the institute is reported to the workshop 
participants, who are then challenged to identify the general issues and specific 
problems that they find particularly important to solve in order to improve the 
functioning of the forest sector in their region. It is important for the outcome of the 
workshop that an atmosphere is created in which different stakeholders could freely 
present their views on the problems and suggest solutions.  
The results of IIASA’s initiative to organize a policy exercise with stakeholders in the 
Russian forest sector are of course contingent upon the sanction and support that the 
initiative receives both from the regional authorities and from the forest stakeholders 
themselves (the legitimacy of the initiative). Ideally, the initial policy exercise 
workshop would result in a continued orderly discussion among the regional 
stakeholders after the first IIASA-led workshop is over. Such a discussion might, for 
instance, be conducted in permanent working groups formed with the purpose of 
developing a modern regional forest policy. The IIASA team would then only monitor 
the work and, when necessary, interact with the working groups until their work were 
self-sustaining.  
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4.2 The Policy Exercise Workshops in Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk ― From Preparation to Implementation 
4.2.1 IIASA’s Provisions and Requirements 
Based on the experiences gained through a policy exercise workshop in Tomsk in June 
2000 (cf. Olsson, 2001) the IIASA team decided to opt for similar interventions in the 
regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk with the purpose of disseminating the 
results of the previous case studies and initiate a discussion of the institutional problems 
hampering a further development of the regional forest sector. The idea was discussed 
with the authors of the case study reports previously published by IIASA and it was 
agreed that it would be suitable to contact the regional forest sector officials to find out 
if it would be possible to obtain official sanction for a policy exercise from the regional 
government. The result of these preliminary explorations indicated that the forest 
officials and the representatives of the regional governments in Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk clearly were very interested in IIASA’s proposal to organize a policy 
exercise for forest stakeholders in the respective regions. In Murmansk, however, it was 
not possible to obtain any formal commitment from the Regional Administration for 
such an endeavor. The idea was supported by the person in charge of forestry and forest 
industry matters in the Regional Administration. The regional forest management also 
expressed an interest in the idea. However, the representatives of the Regional 
Administration and the forest management preferred the actual organizational duties to 
be handled by IIASA with the help of the Institute of Economic Problems (IEP) of the 
Kola Science Centre in Apatity and the Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional 
Research (NIBR) in Alta.67  
To be able to handle all practical details related to the organization of the planned 
events IIASA decided to ask the authors of the reports from the case studies previously 
performed in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk to serve as regional coordinators for 
the policy exercises in the respective regions. The case study report on Murmansk was 
jointly authored by a Russian and a Norwegian researcher (Lyudmila Ivanova and 
Vigdis Nygaard). The report on Karelia was authored by a Finnish researcher (Minna 
Piipponen) who recruited a Russian colleague from the Karelian capital Petrozavodsk 
(Nadezhda B. Polevshchikova) as co-organizer. One of the three authors of the 
Arkhangelsk case study report was a Russian researcher (Mikhail Yu. Varakin) from the 
Arkhangelsk State Technical University, who undertook the organization of the 
Arkhangelsk exercise with strong support of one of the vice-rectors of his university 
(Galina V. Komarova). In the late summer of 2000 the coordinators of the Murmansk 
and Karelian policy exercises spent a few days at IIASA in Laxenburg to prepare the 
budgets, programs, list of invitees, etc., for the upcoming events.  
In order to negotiate the final conditions for the organization of the policy exercise and 
stir up an active interest from the top executive level the leader of IIASA’s Forestry 
Project (Sten Nilsson) paid a brief visit to the regional government and the forest sector 
organizations in the Republic of Karelia about a month before the exercise was held.  
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 The authors of the previous IIASA case study report on Murmansk were affiliated with IEP and NIBR. 
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The IIASA team issued general instructions about the desired format of the policy 
exercise workshops and stated some principal objectives regarding the program and 
participants. It was recommended that some 40–70 people be invited in order to get a 
total of 25–50 workshop participants. Invitations to the event were to be sent to top 
managers of regional forest industrial enterprises, leading personnel in the regional 
forest management (including chief foresters of the leskhozy in the region), officials in 
the Regional Administration responsible for forestry and the forest industry as well as 
representatives of regional environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
local organizers and supporting organizations were also asked to propose additional 
regional stakeholders to be invited as participants.  
Invitation letters were sent out after prior agreement with the IIASA group. IIASA also 
sent invitations to a number of officials working with forestry and forest industry issues 
at the federal level (in Moscow).  
The workshop was expected to last for two full days. To facilitate participants’ travel it 
was decided that the program should commence only after lunch on the first day, use a 
full second day for group deliberations, and end with lunch on the third day.  
The practical requirements for the meeting that IIASA set up were simple and 
straightforward ― a large meeting room for the initial and final plenary sessions, four 
smaller meeting rooms for group sessions, computer and copying facilities should be 
readily available. Two well-qualified interpreters (for “sequential” interpretation) were 
required for the plenary sessions. Discussions in the group sessions were to be held in 
Russian without interpretation so as not to inhibit an efficient exchange of opinions. 
(The idea was that some members of the IIASA group with native or acquired ability in 
Russian were to sit in during the group sessions as observers.)  
IIASA strived to externally recruit a person to serve as “facilitator” of the workshops. 
Using an external facilitator seemed appropriate considering the fact that the whole 
event was initiated from an “outside” organization (IIASA), and that the policy exercise 
concept was new and largely unknown to the regional forest stakeholders in the three 
regions. Even if a suitable local candidate had been available for serving as workshop 
facilitator, earlier experiences in participatory action (cf., for example, Wright, 1999) 
suggest that it would still have made good sense to use an “external consultant” since it 
would probably not be possible to find a “local” facilitator who would be allowed to 
take a leading position in the exercise in the first place and, since the negative 
consequences of failure could be considered severe, it would also be difficult to find 
someone willing to take on the task.  
The offer to serve as workshop facilitator went to a former IIASA research scholar 
(Peter Duinker, Head of the School for Resources and Environmental Studies at 
Dalhousie University, Canada) with extensive experience in conducting policy 
exercises, both during his period at IIASA (cf., Duinker et al., 1993) and in his work in 
Canada. As it turned out Peter Duinker was only able to participate in the policy 
exercise workshop that IIASA organized in Murmansk.68 In the workshops in Karelia 
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 Peter Duinker also served as a facilitator in IIASA’s policy exercise workshop in Tomsk in June 2000. 
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and Arkhangelsk Sten Nilsson, leader of IIASA’s Forestry Project, served as the 
facilitator. 
4.2.2 The Workshop ― Design and Implementation 
In principle, as outlined in the previous paragraphs, IIASA strived for a similar design 
of all the three policy exercise workshops in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk. By 
setting aside plenty of time in the workshop program for informal group deliberations 
among participants representing different interests in the regional forest sector, it was 
hoped that existing problems hampering a further development of the sector would 
receive an unprejudiced and inventive analysis in which new suggestions for problem 
resolutions would emerge. The IIASA team would begin the workshops with plenary 
presentations of the main findings in its previous series of case studies of the 
institutional problems in eight Russian regions. The more specific findings pertaining to 
the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk would also be presented at the 
outset of the workshops to serve as “food for discussion” in the subsequent group 
sessions. The outcome of the workshop would hopefully be a consensus on the 
prioritization of the existing problems and some thoughts on how solutions to the 
identified problems might be elaborated. Ideally, the workshop would end with 
participants specifying how the work started during the workshop might continue and 
making a commitment to continue this work with the purpose of elaborating detailed 
proposals for improvements of the regional forest policy.  
Clearly, such an ambitious program would require a lot from the workshop participants. 
A crucial task in the preparation for the workshops was, therefore, to attract a suitable 
selection of participants from among the various forest stakeholders in the three regions. 
Since the transition process was gradually changing the context in which forest related 
business activities in Russia were performed, IIASA found it important to get a good 
representation of the forest industrial sector to participate in the workshops. Thus, 
finding representatives of forest enterprises in the respective regions should be 
emphasized in the recruitment of participants to the workshops. Other stakeholder 
groups that ought to be represented among the participants included forest officials in 
the Regional Administrations and the regional forest management, environmental NGOs 
and other civic initiative groups with an interest in forest utilization.  
In general, IIASA’s requirements and intentions for the design and implementation of 
the policy exercise workshops were satisfactorily met in all three regions. Some 
differences in the implementation of the workshops could, however, be noted.  
Murmansk 
The policy exercise workshop in Murmansk took place on October 23–25, 2000. In 
terms of format and program the Murmansk policy exercise workshop arguably was the 
one that best corresponded with IIASA’s prior intentions. The workshop program 
covered two full days of work dispersed over a period of three days. The contents of the 
program fully matched the ideal suggested by IIASA, with plenary sessions during the 
first half day, group deliberations in two parallel sessions during the second day, and a 
plenary debriefing and general discussion session during the third half day. The total 
number of participants was limited, only amounting to 24 including the IIASA team. 
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Since the majority of this small group of participants were from outside the city of 
Murmansk and most of them therefore accommodated in the same hotel it was possible 
to keep the group together, something that seems to have stimulated informal 
discussions. Participants also expressed their gratitude for this opportunity to meet with 
other forest stakeholder groups. No such opportunity had previously been offered them. 
The workshop premises were adequate ― all sessions took place in the hotel conference 
area. The plenary hall was small but sufficient for the relatively small group of 
participants. It also allowed participants to be seated facing one another around tables 
arranged in a large rectangle thus facilitating discussions. Smaller rooms for group 
discussions were available. Since the workshop had been carefully prepared beforehand 
by the local organizers, the little that was needed in terms of office facilities during the 
actual meeting was available in the hotel conference area. Adequate sequential 
translation was also available. See Appendix B1 and B2 for the workshop program and 
list of participants.  
However, in terms of impact on the regional forest policy the Murmansk workshop 
could probably not be considered very significant. Primarily this has to do with the fact 
that the forest sector in Murmansk Oblast is very small and of minor significance for the 
regional economy (cf. Section 3.2.2). This state of affairs was manifested in the 
composition of the group of participants. Of the total 24 people present at the workshop 
five represented the organizers (four of whom were non-Russians), two represented the 
Murmansk Regional Administration, two were researchers (one of these specializing in 
forest sector economics), six represented forest management (one was the head of the 
Murmansk regional forest management, five were leskhoz chief foresters), five 
represented the regional forest enterprise sector, one was a foreign (Finnish) forest 
enterprise director, two were representatives of the Murmansk regional nature 
protection committee, and one participant represented a regional environmental NGO. It 
could be noted that almost half of the participants were women, six of them working as 
chief foresters of various leskhozy.  
On the second and third day of the workshop deliberations the number of participants 
present had dropped to a total of 15.  
Karelia 
The policy exercise workshop in the Republic of Karelia took place in Petrozavodsk, the 
capital of the Republic. Partly as a result of Sten Nilsson’s visit, the organization of the 
Petrozavodsk workshop received broad support from the following organizations apart 
from IIASA: the Government of the Republic of Karelia, the Holding Company 
Karellesprom, the Karelia Science Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the 
Petrozavodsk State University, the Karelian State Pedagogical University, and the 
University of Joensuu, Finland. The IIASA team arrived at Petrozavodsk in the evening 
of November 28 and the next day a planning meeting was organized with members of 
the local organizing committee and the five persons who had been suggested by the 
local organizers to serve as chairmen of the working groups. Here ideas came up on 
how to divide the participants between 4–5 working groups. A number of issues that 
might be expected to appear in the discussions of the meeting were also listed. It was 
felt that the various groups might be charged to approach specific topics, such as, for 
instance, legal issues (relations between the Republic and the Federation), forest 
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management issues, issues of restructuring of the forest industry, and personnel issues 
(education and training).  
The workshop took place in the conference area of the Banking School of the Russian 
Federal Bank in Petrozavodsk, some 15 minutes’ distance from the centrally located 
hotel where most participants from outside Petrozavodsk were accommodated. Plenary 
discussions were held in a medium-sized lecture hall, which barely roomed all 
participants who were present during the first day. (Later, when the number of 
participants slightly decreased, space allowed everyone to sit at the lined-up tables.) 
Four well-equipped small lecture rooms were available for the group sessions. Efficient 
simultaneous translation was available for all plenary sessions.  
The exercise was designed so that participants were not required to be absent from their 
jobs for more than two full days. The workshop program began in the morning of 
November 30, 2000, and it ended in the afternoon the next day (December 1). All in all 
there were 70 people participating in the exercise, including 10 foreign participants 
(seven of them belonging to the IIASA team, three other foreign experts). Five 
participants represented organizations at the Russian federal level, the remaining 51 
participants represented regional Karelian forest sector organizations (19 researchers, 18 
administrators and 7 businessmen) and environmental groups (2) or civic organizations, 
including the media (5). See Appendix C2 for the list of participants.  
Several prominent ministers of the Karelian republican government (Mr. Maslyakov, at 
the time First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of natural resources, Mr. Shlyamin, 
Minister of Foreign Relations, and Mr. Shurupov, Minister of the Economy) were 
present during the plenary session on the first day to greet everyone welcome and 
introduce the speakers. Most of the day was devoted to plenary presentations by 
members of the IIASA group and a number of Russian speakers representing forest and 
environmental organizations on both the federal and the regional level. See Appendix 
C1 for the workshop program. 
Towards the end of the first day and for most of the second day the workshop 
participants were engaged in group deliberations. Three local researchers and a 
businessman from the town Kem in northern Karelia chaired the four groups. Each one 
of the groups had between 6 and 11 Russian participants. (Thus, there was a drastic drop 
in participation during the working group sessions.) Members of the IIASA team were 
sitting in as observers in the groups. The discussion in the four groups differed a lot in 
style and temperament. In general, however, the discussions were lively and highly 
productive touching on substantial issues, where all participants were given an 
opportunity to state their meaning. The group chairmen, sometimes assisted by a 
member of their group, took notes and prepared for the presentation of the results of the 
group discussions to be made in the subsequent final plenary session.  
At the final plenary session, which took place in the afternoon of the second day 
(between 14.00–16.30) all group chairmen gave short summaries of the discussions in 
their respective groups. All together there were about 40–45 people present at this final 
session of the exercise. Two of the government ministers (Mr. Maslyakov and Mr. 
Shlyamin), who had been chairing the first plenary session, again appeared and actively 
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took part in the discussions following the group leaders’ presentations and in the closing 
of the exercise.  
On the day following the exercise (December 2) the IIASA team had a follow-up 
meeting with the chairmen of the working groups. The intention was to see if they 
believed that the exercise had been able to trigger a sufficient interest to generate a 
continued activity among the stakeholders of the Karelian forest sector with the purpose 
of developing a new regional forest policy. A lunch for the IIASA group and a few 
guests attended by Mr. Maslyakov and an aide formally marked the end of the policy 
exercise.  
Arkhangelsk 
The policy exercise workshop in Arkhangelsk took place on March 29–30, 2001. The 
main responsibility for the organization of the event was taken by IIASA in close 
collaboration with the Arkhangelsk State Technical University (AGTU). An organizing 
committee was named consisting of twelve people representing (apart from IIASA and 
AGTU) the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology, the 
Arkhangelsk Regional Administration, the Lesobank (Forest Bank) and the Arkhangelsk 
Union of Forest Industrialists and the board of directors of the company OAO 
Lesozavod No. 3.  
The workshop was convened on the premises of AGTU located on the embankment of 
the river Dvina running through the city of Arkhangelsk. A newly refurbished 
auditorium was used for the plenary sessions and smaller conference and lecture rooms 
were used for the two group sessions. Simultaneous translations were available for the 
plenary sessions.  
The final preparations for the workshop program were made during a meeting between 
the IIASA team and members of the organizing committee on the day before the start of 
the workshop. Discussions centered on possible themes to be discussed in three working 
group sessions. The final details concerning the workshop program were settled (see 
Appendix D1).  
All in all 60 people participated in the Arkhangelsk policy exercise workshop. Apart 
from the IIASA team consisting of five people, there were six representatives of 
Moscow based organizations (two environmental NGOs, two forest research, one 
foresters’ society, one development foundation supported by the World Bank), nine 
representing the Arkhangelsk Regional Administration (four of whom were primarily 
working with forest management issues), seven representatives of the forest enterprise 
sector, 23 representatives of various types of research (four research administrators in 
AGTU, 12 working in forest research organizations, primarily forest related 
departments in AGTU), and 10 other participants (representatives of the Arkhangelsk 
Customs, the Arkhangelsk Chamber of Commerce, the forest sector in Karelia, a 
Swedish and a Finnish company, a local newspaper, and AGTU post-graduate students). 
See Appendix D2 for the list of participants 
It could be noted that the Arkhangelsk Regional Administration was represented at the 
workshop by the acting chairman of the international relations department (for an 
opening speech) and by a young deputy director of the Department of Economics and 
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Development, who gave a short speech on the current state of the Arkhangelsk 
economy. More prominent officials of the Regional Administration were said to be 
prevented from participating in the workshop due to other obligations. The regional 
forest management organization (which at this time had already been merged into the 
Regional Administration) was represented by its chief forester (in the old organization), 
currently the head of the Department of State Control in the Committee for Natural 
Resources.  
The workshop started in the morning of March 29 with words of welcome by 
representatives of the AGTU and the Regional Administration. After the initial 
presentations of the results of the previous case studies performed by the IIASA team, 
there were nine other (brief) presentations by Arkhangelsk and Moscow based 
researchers and forest enterprise representatives. This meant that the discussion groups 
could not be established and start their work until fairly late in the afternoon. Two 
groups were formed and the group sessions continued for the better part of the second 
day. The workshop ended with a plenary session during which representatives of the 
two groups presented the results of their discussions. This was followed by a general 
discussion.  
During a brief meeting with the IIASA team and the organizing committee it was 
decided that an outline would be made of what was actually discussed and suggested 
during the workshop. It was agreed that a small working group would be formed to draft 
a document containing the understanding that was reached of the current situation and 
the problems hampering a further development of the Arkhangelsk forest sector. Ideas 
discussed during the workshop that should be of use in a future development of a 
regional forest policy should also be included in this document. A rough timetable for 
the preparation of this document was also agreed upon.  
Comparing the Workshop Design and Implementation in the Three Regions 
The comparison of the workshop design and its implementation in the three regions is 
summarized in Tables 9 and 10.  
Table 9: The workshop preparations and final format. 
 Murmansk Karelia Arkhangelsk 
Region object of previous IIASA study Yes Yes Yes 
IIASA had previous contacts with Regional 
Administration and/or forest officials to mobilize 
support for the exercise No Yes Yes 
Previous contacts included preparatory visit to the 
region by IIASA team leader No Yes No 
Regional coordinator(s) spent time at IIASA 
preparing for the exercise Yes Yes No 
Number of short plenary presentations by foreign 
participants (including IIASA presentations) 1 3 1 
Number of short plenary presentations by Russian 
participants from the region 1 2 7 
Number of short plenary presentations by Russian 
participants from outside the region 0 4 3 
Number of working groups 2 4 2 
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Table 10: Characterizing workshop participants.   
Murmansk Karelia ArkhangelskParticipants No. % No. % No. % 
Total number of participants (excluding the IIASA team) 19 100 64 100 55 100 
Approximate number of participants engaged in working 
group sessions 15 79 40 63 25 45 
Number of participants representing:       
 Regional administration (excluding forest 
management) 4 21 11 17 7 13 
 Forest management (including leskhozy) 6 32 3 5 4 7 
 Forest industry (including branch organizations) 5 26 12 19 8 15 
 Forest research 1 5 8 13 14 25 
 Other research 1 5 12 19 11 20 
 NGOs (including media) 1 5 7 11 1 2 
Share of participants from other Russian regions:  0  11  15 
 Forest (natural resource) administration 0  3  3  
 Forest (natural resource) research 0  2  3  
 Representing NGOs 0  2  2  
Share of participants from outside Russia (excluding the 
IIASA team):  5  6  4 
 Foreign business 1  0  2  
 Foreign administration 0  1  0  
 Foreign research 0  3  0  
4.3 Workshop Deliberations 
A brief look will be taken (in Section 4.3.1) at the recommendations for policy changes 
that were the outcome of the previous IIASA case studies of the institutional problems 
of the Russian forest sector. These recommendations were presented to the workshop 
participants in the initial plenary sessions to set the stage for the subsequent working 
group discussions. The substance of the discussions during the group deliberations is 
reviewed in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.  
4.3.1 Recommendations Made in IIASA’s Previous Research 
In the initial plenary sessions, which started each of the policy exercise workshops in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, the IIASA team gave an account of the previous 
case studies of the institutional problems hampering developments in the Russian 
regional forest sector.69 Here only a brief account will be given of the recommendations 
that were based on the previous IIASA analyses. (The overall results of the case study 
project were reported in Carlsson et al., 2001.) The presentations made by IIASA in the 
plenary sessions at the workshops were intended as “food for discussion” in the 
subsequent group sessions.  
Each of the reports from the previous IIASA case studies of the forest sector institutions 
in eight Russian regions were rounded off with a number of conclusions about the 
current situation and recommendations on how to achieve changes that would make the 
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 A brief account of the design of this series of IIASA case studies was given in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
The reports published by the project are listed in Appendix A.  
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forest sector function in a more market efficient way. Not unexpectedly, it was found 
that a large number of functional deficiencies among the forest enterprises were 
dependent on problems at various levels in society. Some problems typically belong to 
the constitutional level (e.g., ambiguities concerning property rights, contradictions 
between the constitution and the forest code, etc.), some problems must be handled on 
the collective choice level (e.g., taxation reforms, improved bankruptcy legislation, 
policy programs should be elaborated, entrepreneurship should be encouraged, 
education and training of personnel should be organized, etc.), while others could be 
attacked and solved by the actors in the forest sector themselves (these are problems at 
the operational choice level, such as improved product development, enterprise 
management should focus on economics rather than engineering, the education of the 
workforce should be improved, good market behavior rewarded, etc.). 
A number of recommendations could be seen as generally valid for all regions taking 
part in the case study project. Table 11 gives an overview of these general 
recommendations. 
Table 11: Overview of measures recommended in IIASA’s previous case studies of the 
institutional problems hampering the Russian regional forest sector. 
At the Constitutional Level 
• All ambiguities concerning property rights should be sorted out. 
• Collisions between the constitution and subsequent laws must be eliminated. 
• Different types of ownership should be allowed. 
• A number of political problems e.g., the role of the parliament versus the president, as well as many 
macro-economic questions, must be solved in order to establish a solid foundation for a vital forest sector.
At the Collective Choice Level 
• Federal and regional policy programs, which are in line with market economic principles should be 
worked out. No political, administrative coordination of business activities. 
• A thorough taxation reform should be enacted. The whole system of taxes and fees, not only the number 
of taxation rules, should be simplified. 
• Politicians and bureaucrats should withdraw from direct involvement in individual enterprises. 
• Banks and other credit institutes should encourage entrepreneurship, exports, and the establishment of 
joint ventures with foreign companies. 
• Forest enterprises should create their own independent branch organizations. 
• The infusion of cash to the forest sector from “prosperous” state monopolies should be stopped. 
• The bankruptcy system and the arbitration courts must be made more efficient. 
• Education and training for people to learn new tasks and technologies must be developed; democratic 
citizenship should be encouraged. 
• All democratic means should be utilized to create law and order. 
At the Operational/Enterprise Level 
• Learn from others; there are a number of good examples. 
• Increased efforts at product development. 
• Focus more on the economics and less on the engineering. 
• Educate and develop the workforce, e.g., in English, modern business accounting, quality management, 
etc. 
• Reward good behavior, work ethics should be held in high esteem, business leaders should act as moral 
vanguards. 
• For larger industries, vertical integration might prove profitable. 
• The coordination and integration process must be the result of the companies’ own decisions. It cannot be 
implemented if the old political structure intervenes in the forest sector. 
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Some more specific recommendations were also offered in the reports on individual 
regions taking part in IIASA’s previous study. The main thrust of the recommendations 
pertaining to Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk is outlined under separate headings 
below. 
Murmansk 
In their case study report on the institutional problems in the Murmansk forest sector 
Ivanova and Nygaard (1999) paint a rather bleak picture of the situation and future 
development possibilities for the regional forest sector. The sector was squeezed harder 
than in other regions by the changes brought about by the transition. The effects on 
society and for the population were nevertheless limited due to the insignificant size and 
importance of the sector in the regional economy. There used to be a regional demand 
for wood products from regional enterprises in, for instance, the mining and finishing 
industry. But since production volumes decreased dramatically in the 1990s, wood 
demand from these enterprises has also decreased and almost disappeared. Thus, a 
fundamental problem concerns the possibilities for wood demand to recover ― a 
problem that is intimately connected to a recovery of the whole regional economy. The 
question is how to turn economic stagnation into economic growth.  
When the economy recovers regional forest enterprises will again meet a certain 
demand for their products. Until the economy recovers forest sector enterprises will 
have serious problems, however. Ivanova and Nygaard (1999) found that forest sector 
enterprises in Murmansk could be divided into two groups depending on how they 
reacted on the difficulties facing them. One group of enterprises, mainly larger state 
owned companies, tended to do as little as possible to adapt to the prevailing situation, 
their strategy was to try to survive and maintain their workforce until better times 
arrived or until the state intervened to save them from bankruptcy. The other group, 
mainly consisting of smaller enterprises, many of them new privately owned, used a 
completely different coping strategy. They tried to adapt to the new situation, reduced 
their workforce if necessary, strived to improve their productivity, to find new markets 
for their products, develop new products for markets in which they had not previously 
been engaged, tried to attract foreign partners for funding investments, etc. Clearly, such 
a strategy of “restructure and develop” will make the latter group of enterprises stand a 
much better chance of survival in the emerging Russian market economy than the 
former group’s “wait and see” attitude.  
The authors of the IIASA case study recommended some specific measures that the 
forest sector enterprises in Murmansk should take to stimulate a positive development. 
They found that the regional forest sector enterprises should (a) intensify their efforts to 
find new markets for their products; (b) strive to make all their sales and purchase 
payments in cash; (c) organize good training of enterprise managers focusing on 
business economics rather than engineering; (d) establish a political lobby to make the 
Regional Administration take more interest in the needs of the forest sector (this should 
be done through the creation of branch associations or the like); (e) try to influence the 
regional taxation system to make it transparent and legitimate; and (f) work to improve 
the existing forest legislation.  
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Karelia 
In the report from IIASA’s study of the institutional problems hampering the 
development of the Karelian forest sector the author, Piipponen (1999), largely refrains 
from making explicit policy recommendations. Instead she seeks to identify the most 
serious problems disturbing the functioning of the regional forest enterprises as they 
were perceived and stated in the survey analysis made among 36 Karelian forest 
enterprise managers.  
As was the case with the forest enterprises in Murmansk, the survey among Karelian 
forest enterprise leaders also indicated the existence of two coping strategies. Piipponen 
(1999) calls them the strategy of survival and the strategy of restructuring or reform. 
However, the evidence found in the survey analysis for different enterprises belonging 
to one or the other category was not unambiguous. It rather seems to be the case that 
companies tend to behave like a “reformer” in certain respects while keeping to 
“survivor” strategies in other situations. In practice this could mean, for example, that a 
company might continue to engage in barter transactions with suppliers or customers,70 
while at the same time seeking to improve its performance by making investments to 
raise productivity. Foreign competition had also started to complicate life for many 
Karelian wood-processing enterprises, which could not obtain enough timber due to 
increased export sales at prices they were not able to pay. This development caused 
some enterprise managers to call for export regulations or price controls aimed at 
securing a sufficient amount of wood at affordable prices for the domestic wood 
processors. At the same time, these possibilities to export stimulated the development of 
regional forest harvesting companies.  
Based on Piipponen’s (1999) analysis of the survey data and her conclusions about what 
constituted, according to company managers, the most pertinent problems for the 
Karelian forest sector enterprises, the following urgent measures to be taken by the 
Karelian government and the forest sector organizations in the region could be imputed: 
(a) Efforts should be made to find solutions to the problem of investment funding 
involving the banking system.  
(b) Measures should be taken to decrease the disorder in society and in the economy 
that was brought about by the transition process. Rules instituted to govern 
economic agents should be developed in a way that ensures legitimacy; they should 
be transparent and carefully enforced.  
(c) Existing taxation rules should be revised to become conducive to lawful behavior 
on the part of the (forest) enterprises. 
(d) Efforts should be made to improve the Forest Code, to eliminate ambiguities 
concerning property rights. Rules pertaining to forest use (harvesting rules, leasing 
rules, etc.) should be revised to better suit the demands of the forest users.  
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 It was found that barter trade was practiced by 70 percent of the enterprises taking part in the survey. 
(However, barter was not the only means of trade used in these companies. Cash transactions were also 
common.) 
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(e) Efforts should be made to improve the coordination of the regional forest sector. In 
the current situation this might mean the establishment of vertically integrated 
structures, perhaps in the form of holding companies, which could help to secure 
raw materials for the wood processing industry while simultaneously facilitating its 
restructuring and modernization to make its output competitive in the new market 
environment.  
(f) Measures should be taken to expand and improve the transportation infrastructure 
to allow forest harvesting on lands with mature forests, which are nowadays mostly 
found in unavailable locations.  
Arkhangelsk 
In their report on the forest institutional problems of Arkhangelsk Oblast, Carlsson et al. 
(1999) concluded that the regional forest sector displayed many features typical of the 
so-called virtual economy (cf. Section 2.2). In effect, this means that only a rudimentary 
restructuring had taken place in Arkhangelsk by the latter half of the 1990s. Since one 
should assume that actors in the forest sector are rational human beings, the problem 
consists in explaining why they choose to remain in the virtual economy. The answer is, 
of course, that the virtual economy currently offers the most favorable circumstances in 
the eyes of a large share of the forest enterprise managers. If market competition were 
allowed to make its full impact it would probably show the large extent to which 
existing production processes and capital equipment are insufficient to allow an 
efficient production. In this situation to opt for rapid enterprise restructuring on a large 
scale would simply be unfeasible. The result would be devastating in terms of company 
closures withdrawing the economic foundation for life in the many municipalities that 
are entirely dependent upon the continued operation of a single large forest enterprise. 
Still, in the longer term, enterprise restructuring is necessary, since the market oriented 
transformation of the economy most likely will continue.  
Against this background Carlsson et al. (1999:79–80) made the following 
recommendations for measures to be taken by various actors in the Arkhangelsk forest 
sector:  
• Regional authorities and others should withdraw from most of their engagements in 
single firms. When such engagements are needed the reasons should be openly 
declared and justified. 
• The overall task of political authorities in Arkhangelsk should be to minimize or 
eliminate political risks in order to achieve economic growth. For example, all types 
of ad hoc regulations, such as retroactive rule-making, should be immediately 
stopped. Politicians and related officials should promote institutional stability and, 
thus, transparency of rules, which will subsequently increase predictability. 
• In order to stimulate, or increase the likelihood of, the evolvement of “real” branch 
organizations officials should withdraw from the type of corporative organizations 
that has been created. 
• The authorities should pay great attention to the task of making regulations simpler 
and contradictions between various rules should, if possible, be eliminated. 
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• Together with other actors regional authorities should develop programs in order to 
stop the deterioration of education and to increase management competence in the 
forest sector. 
• Activities of independent actors should be encouraged and supported, thereby 
counteracting a further bureaucratization of the forest sector. For example, 
programs deliberately aimed at stimulating the establishment and development of 
small and medium sized enterprises should be constructed, provision of economic 
guarantees should be considered as well as economic support of entrepreneurship. 
• All private actors in the forest sector as well as the regional authorities must find 
ways of releasing industries from their social commitments. For example, 
privatization of apartments should be increased and supported. 
• All concerned parties should try to find economic support for deliberate programs 
aimed at renovating apartment houses, repairing public buildings, roads, and other 
infrastructure facilities. As a side effect this might increase the regional demand of 
forest products. 
• More emphasis should be paid to develop the export sector, for example, by 
widening the current range of products. Political authorities as well as the authority 
of the police should be used to secure that exporting firms have the possibility to 
reinvest the income of their export thereby making their production more efficient. 
Export firms have no incentive to generate money that in the end will end up in a 
draconian tax system or in the hands of organized crime. 
Let us now turn to an examination of the format and procedures of the working group 
deliberations in the Murmansk, Karelian and Arkhangelsk policy exercise workshops.  
4.3.2 Group Sessions ― Format and Procedures 
In each of the policy exercise workshops in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk, the 
initial plenary sessions were followed by group discussion sessions. The group sessions 
were introduced by the workshop facilitator. The basic idea behind this mode of 
operation was briefly stated and a template outlining the tasks to be performed by the 
working groups were distributed to all participants (see Table 12). An extensive list of 
problems or issues touched upon in the previous plenary sessions was presented ― 
these lists were compiled by members of the IIASA team ― and participants were 
asked to add issues or topics that they found missing in the list. The procedure was 
similar in all three policy exercise workshops. 
The IIASA team and the local organizers also prepared a proposal for a possible 
division of the participants into various working groups. The decision on the number of 
working groups was entirely dependent upon the available number of people ready to 
participate in the group sessions. The procedure resulted in, respectively, two groups in 
the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk workshops and four groups in the Karelian workshop.  
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Table 12:  The IIASA template to guide policy exercise group work. 
Instructions for the Working Groups 
1.  Select a facilitator from among the participants in the working group. The 
facilitator's job is to make sure that (a) the discussions stay on topic and on time, and 
(b) that everyone at the table gets an equal chance to speak.  The facilitator 
frequently asks questions to move the discussion in the right direction.  It is best if 
someone with good experience doing this will volunteer.  
2.  Select a recorder/spokesperson from among the participants, too.  The 
spokesperson's job is to take notes of the main points in the discussions, and present 
these in the plenary session after lunch.  Here, too, it is best if a group participant 
with good recording and presentation skills will volunteer. 
3.  Discuss and provide ideas about the following questions.  Be as specific as possible 
in the answers.  For a specific problem area or theme: 
(a) THE REAL PROBLEM 
Make a short statement about what the problem really is.  Are there different 
ways of stating the problem?  Develop a group agreement on the best statement. 
(b) PRIORITY 
How critical is it for an effective and efficient transition of the regional forest 
sector to fix this problem quickly?  Is this high, low or medium priority? 
(c) LINKAGES  
Can action be taken on this problem independent of progress in resolving any 
other problems?  If not, which other problems must be solved first before 
progress can be made on the problem you are discussing? 
(d) KEY PLAYERS 
Who needs to take primary responsibility and a leadership role to resolve the 
problem?  Who else's participation is critical in resolving this problem? 
(e) REQUIRED ACTIONS 
What specific actions are required to begin solving the problem?  What needs to 
be done first, and how soon?  What resources are required to implement each of 
the identified actions? 
(f) OBSTACLES 
What obstacles are there to implementing the identified actions?  How can these 
obstacles be removed? 
Murmansk 
The discussion during the plenary session resulted in a long list of issues (all in all 38 
questions) that participants advanced as candidates for further discussion in the working 
group session. A loose clustering of the issues on this extensive list produced broad 
themes for discussion in two working groups, one focusing on “Financial, technical and 
ecological problems,” and the other on “Legal, personnel and social problems.” All 
participants present were then asked to sign up for one or the other of the established 
working groups. There were 7–8 participants in each of the two groups.  
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Two young men chaired the groups, one working as a researcher at the Russian 
Academy Kola Science Centre simultaneously representing an environmental NGO, and 
the other was the owner and director of a small forest trading company. Both chairmen 
very competently guided the discussion in their respective groups. The groups also 
elected a group member to take notes and prepare for the later plenary presentation of 
the group’s discussion.  
Immediately after the workshop the Russian participants gathered to decide about ways 
to proceed the work initiated during the workshop. As a first step the group asked the 
local workshop organizer (Lyudmila Ivanova, KSC) to make a draft summary of the 
results of the deliberations (see further comments on this document in Section 4.3.4). 
The draft was then to be disseminated to all participants and a follow-up meeting would 
be called within a few weeks.  
Karelia 
Four working groups were formed by assigning participants to each group in a random 
manner. The local organizer had found four very competent persons willing to act as 
group chairmen. Three of the group chairmen were affiliated with research, either in 
research institutes or at a university. One was the director of a forest enterprise in the 
northern part of Karelia.  
The groups were not assigned specific topics for discussion. Instead the IIASA team had 
collected (and structured) the issues that had been touched upon during the previous 
plenary session and issues that had been discussed at earlier IIASA policy exercises 
conducted in Russia. These issues were compiled into a long list from which 
participants in each of the groups were asked to select the questions they found most 
important. (This list of issues can be found in Appendix E.)  
The style of work in the different groups varied substantially due to the different style of 
chairmanship and the temperament of the group members. In some groups there was a 
seemingly unstructured and very lively discussion, while in others group members 
quietly waited their turn and then stood up to give more or less formal statements. (In 
one group there were even written statements presented.71)  
The group members adhered well to the procedure suggested by the organizers and 
selected certain problems for deeper analysis and paid less attention to things they did 
not find immediately important.  
The results of the group discussions were presented in the final plenary session. 
Members of the organizing committee drafted a document summarizing the most 
important problems and suggestions for solutions after the workshop. (More about this 
document in Section 4.3.4).  
                                                 
71
 In Group 3, Dr. Ilya R. Shegel’man, President of the Karelian Engineering Academy, introduced two 
documents on “Problems of improving the legislation” and “The Investment and Personnel Policy”.  
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Arkhangelsk 
Since a relatively large share of the participants attending the initial plenary session did 
not stay on to take part in the group discussions, only two working groups were found to 
be feasible with 11–12 participants in each. The same list of issues that was used in the 
Karelian policy exercise workshop was used here as well. Group participants were 
asked to select what they found to be the most interesting issues to discuss from among 
the many issues listed in the IIASA document (cf. Appendix E).  
As a lot of time was spent on the initial plenary presentations ―all in all there were nine 
of them apart from the presentation by the IIASA team ― the group sessions could only 
start in the late afternoon. They were continued on the second day after a brief plenary 
session in the early morning. After lunch the two working groups were merged into one 
group before the final plenary session that started at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon. 
The working groups were chaired by one prominent representative of the Arkhangelsk 
Forest Management and a researcher from an Arkhangelsk based forest consultancy 
firm. Deliberations in the two groups were lively and productive in the sense that many 
issues were brought up for discussion. The group chairmen took care of the presentation 
of the results of the group discussions in the final plenary session. The discussion in one 
group centered on natural resources and resource accessibility, land use and forest 
management, and social issues including the labor market. The other group focused 
more on issues related to the sustainable restructuring of the Arkhangelsk forest sector, 
on forest utilization, infrastructure, technological modernization, and product 
innovation.  
During the final plenary session an editorial group was selected from among the 
Russian workshop participants and charged with the task of drafting a final document 
(more about this document in Section 4.3.4).  
4.3.3 Summary Account of Discussions in the Working Groups 
and the Final Plenary Sessions 
This section provides an overview of the substance of the discussions in the working 
group sessions of the respective policy exercise workshops. The summary is based on 
the presentations made by group representatives during the final plenary session. 
Without keeping track of which arguments were discussed in the respective working 
groups the account primarily seeks to identify the problems participants found most 
severe, which priorities they found necessary, etc. It also seeks to capture the 
suggestions that were advanced for reaching solutions to the identified problems, how 
participants thought work should proceed to achieve improvements in the forest policies 
of the respective regions.  
Murmansk 
Deliberations in the working group sessions of the Murmansk policy exercise workshop 
focused on two broad themes, “Financial, technical and ecological problems” and 
“Legal, personnel and social problems.” The discussions in the introductory plenary 
session raised a large number of issues related to the current functioning of the 
Murmansk forest sector. The entire list of issues was given to both working groups and 
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group participants were free to pick out the issues they felt most in need of further 
deliberation. A lively and productive discussion ensued in both working groups.  
In the subsequent plenary debriefing session the outcome of the group discussions was 
summarized by the two group chairmen. The discussion reflected the fact that the forest 
sector actually is insignificant for the regional economy and it was understood that 
solutions to all problems that forest stakeholders encounter today would not be easily 
found. It was felt that a very important prerequisite for bringing about a positive 
development was to make various forest stakeholder groups come together and start 
learning more from one another about all aspects of the problems that have to be solved. 
This would also help to solve the problems with lack of information about the forest 
resources and their actual and potential use. The workshop discussions ended with 
participants agreeing that some kind of branch organization ought to be established. But 
before recapitulating the discussion about this suggestion some of the problems that 
participants found most in need of a solution should be mentioned. 
Participants ― many of whom worked in forest management units, leskhozy ― noted 
that forest management (still) was supposed to be a public authority entrusted with the 
task of managing the state owned forest lands of the country. However, due to 
insufficient funding via the state budget, today leskhozy were increasingly forced to 
engage in market transactions to generate money for their continued operation. This, in 
fact, threatened to transform the leskhozy to a kind of state enterprise, for which the 
forest management duties might become of secondary importance. It was felt that the 
juridical status of leskhozy should be clarified. If forest management were to remain a 
public authority with only control and protection functions it should be fully funded via 
the state budget.  
Several problems pertaining to forest legislation were discussed. Firstly, it was agreed 
that consistent regional rules should be elaborated for the sale of standing timber. This 
demand for improved regulations was caused by the problematic relations between 
leskhozy and forest harvesting enterprises. Harvesters found that forest managers did not 
understand the conditions and requirements of the new market environment. The 
problems concerned the allocation of harvesting plots, rules allocating the responsibility 
for reforestation, etc.  
Secondly, since the “Law on Northern territories” had still not been abolished, it should 
also be enforced. The extra wage bonuses guaranteed by the law for work in the Russian 
North should be paid from the Federal budget and not have to burden individual 
enterprises as is the case today. (Many seemed to believe, however, that this law would 
soon be abolished.) 
Thirdly, it was argued that the regional law on economic development zones offering 
exemption from some regional taxes should be extended to districts where the forest 
industry was being developed. Investors in the forest sector should be granted tax 
exemptions for the companies’ first years of operation. A related suggestion was that 
forest enterprises should be granted privileged loans for capital investments by the 
Regional Administration.  
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Fourthly, the issue of forest certification was also debated in the working group 
sessions. Certification definitely will be required if Russian timber should be possible to 
export. Since Russian foresters do not (yet) seem to understand that it would be best to 
have their timber (voluntarily) certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) it 
seems necessary that the State introduces and pays for obligatory certification.  
An issue that caused a lot of discussion both in the working group session and in the 
subsequent plenary session concerned the lack of well-trained personnel suitable for 
work in the regional forest industry. The problem seems to be acute for some harvesting 
companies (impossible to find operators for modern forest machines) and in the sawmill 
industry. Information that emerged during the workshop discussion indicated that a 
certain support for training of specialists for the forest industry might be obtained from 
the Committee on Labor and Employment of the Regional Administration, provided 
enterprises specified their needs in an application. 
It turned out that both working groups had been discussing the establishment of some 
form of forest stakeholder association, an organization drawing members from all types 
of forest sector activities in the region. The discussion about this organization, its goal, 
membership, mode of operation, etc., continued in the final plenary session. The 
representatives of the Regional Administration declared that they would also like to see 
some kind of forest stakeholder organization, which would give the officials in charge 
of economic development in the Regional Administration a partner for discussion about 
the state and the needs of the regional forest sector. One possible functional 
environment for such an organization was outlined in a figure presented in the final 
plenary session (cf. Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21: Possible organizational environment for a Murmansk association of forest 
stakeholders. 
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The issue was also raised whether the tasks of such a stakeholder organization might not 
be possible to incorporate into an already existing business organization (such as those 
mentioned in the circles to the left and right in the above figure). It was agreed that a 
number of issues must be carefully considered before a move towards the establishment 
of a forest stakeholder organization can be made. Thus, one has to consider who should 
be members of the organization, what should be the mission of the organization, who 
should take the initiative to establish the organization, should it be a new independent 
organization or should it rather be a part of an already existing organization, etc. 
Several participants found that a first important task for the proposed organization to 
work with might be the establishment of a regional information center for the forest 
sector. The goal of such an effort would be to create and maintain an open database with 
information about the Murmansk forest sector.  
Karelia 
The overarching question posed for discussion in the working group sessions was how 
to improve the competitiveness of the Karelian forest sector. Due to the many unsolved 
problems in the sector there is today an almost absurd situation with an insufficient 
wood supply in a region where there are huge timber reserves.  
A general answer to the question how this situation might be changed was also unani-
mously agreed upon. The lack of efficient structures for collaboration between public 
authorities, enterprises and households (civic society) is seen as being at the core of all 
problems. That is, solutions to the problems can in principle be (and often enough have 
been) envisaged, but the real difficulty is how to agree on the choice of particular 
solutions and how to implement the solutions, once selected. This problem is given 
different labels. Sometimes it is called a lack of coordination in the sector, at other times 
calls for stakeholder collaboration, the formation of efficiently working branch 
organizations (a “union”) can be heard. Related to such calls for cooperation is also the 
idea to identify a group of efficiently working forest enterprises and stimulate 
collaboration between these enterprises. This would boost efficiency in the sector and 
the group would function as a showcase from which other, less efficient companies 
might learn how to improve their performance.  
Thus, participants emphasized the need for a new consistent forest policy for the 
Republic of Karelia. Various activities in the forest sector must be coordinated and this 
coordination could not, as it used to be during Soviet times, come “from above”. That 
is, there is no public organization that could provide such an all-encompassing 
coordination today. On the contrary, coordination has to be developed “from below” in 
a bottom-up approach where various forest stakeholders voluntarily agree to form 
certain structures (from informal working groups to formal branch organizations) to 
help identify and further develop their interests.  
In this process of dividing the duties and obligations relating to forest sector 
development between the public authorities and private sector organizations the scope 
and specific forms of State interventions in the regional forest sector should be clearly 
defined. The State must refrain from interfering in all aspects of economic and social 
life. The State should mainly act through the provision of a consistent and transparent 
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legislation. It should also strive to enforce this legislation and fight crime and 
corruption. There is also a role for the State to sanction initiatives and behavior among 
actors in the forest sector that require public sanction in order to work well. Conversely, 
it is also the role of the State to counter such initiatives and behavior among actors that 
violate existing legislation and that might set back the development in the sector or in 
society.  
If necessary the State should also make sure that such public goods that are necessary 
for the safety and well-being of the population are actually provided. Of special 
relevance for the forest sector is the maintenance and development of the transport 
infrastructure (roads, railroads, water transports) and at least some of the variety of 
characteristics required for a good investment climate might be possible for the public 
authorities to affect. Many of the uncertainties due to the unstable political situation in 
Karelia cause foreign investors to refrain from investing, the risk of losing money is 
simply too high. In principle, the State (the government and public authorities both at 
the republican and the federal levels) can do much to reduce these uncertainties. 
Through legislation and special regulations (concerning taxation, banking, etc.) it might 
also affect the propensity of domestic investors to invest their money in forest sector 
enterprises.  
It was also noted that there is an urgent need for modernization of the old and 
sometimes obsolete capital of the Karelian forest enterprises. This issue is not only 
related to the investment climate, the taxation rules and banking. It is also affected by 
the legislation related to forest management and forest use. While there seems to be 
clear evidence that enterprises would prefer to change practices, for instance to use 
more selective harvesting rather than clearcutting, the existing system regulating forest 
operations stands in the way of such changes. There are also other rules concerning 
forest use that today are an obstacle for development of the sector. Thus, there is a 
clearly identified need for special regional harvesting rules.  
Investments must also be used to change the profile of the forest industry, from the 
current focus on primary processing (harvesting and sales of round timber) to an 
increased orientation towards further processing (value added) of the wood. Being a 
traditional “wood country” Karelia has a natural advantage in this respect. For instance, 
here it should be possible to develop wooden house construction, furniture production, 
and the like on the basis of traditional knowledge. Such changes are dependent on 
entrepreneurial skills and knowledge of existing market opportunities. In present-day 
Karelia such competence is in short supply.  
The issues of employment in the forest sector, of personnel and its qualifications, was 
also discussed in the group sessions. There is a need to upgrade training facilities for 
most categories of workers in the forest sector. Enterprises have trouble recruiting 
qualified personnel for operating modern harvesting or forest processing machinery. 
This may also be due to the fact that the wage level in the forest sector is uncompetitive 
so that qualified labor goes elsewhere to find employment. But one important reason 
seems to be that the opportunities for getting a good training in Karelia are currently 
very limited. (This is of course not equally true for all types of labor.)  
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One issue concerning the resource base was intensively discussed. This was the issue of 
a cadaster. Since forest lands are (still) state owned in Russia as they were earlier 
during the Soviet period, no market set prices exist for land as a commodity. But the use 
of forest lands has been privatized, enterprises have the right to acquire timber and use it 
for their own benefit. They can acquire this timber in a variety of ways, but today forest 
lease is getting widely used. A cadaster, entailing a forest inventory as well as an 
estimate of the economic value of the resource tied to a specific location, is therefore 
considered important as a basis for establishing the price of the timber (stumpage fees). 
It has become obvious for actors on the forest market in Russia that the values assigned 
the natural resources do not emanate from the interplay of supply and demand in a 
commercial market and this causes disputes concerning the “true value” of the resource. 
The calculation of this “true value” is not entirely simple, since it has to take all sorts of 
alternative uses of the resource into account. (This type of “calculation” is actually what 
the market is good at doing.) In fact, the stumpage fee is a tax and, as such, it can be 
manipulated to achieve specific goals, like raising public income, improving forest 
maintenance, to preserve the forests (decrease ― or entirely prohibit ― the use of the 
forest resource on a certain area), etc. But, still, in the absence of a market solution to 
the pricing problem, authorities have to come up with some sort of price calculation and 
this is why it is relevant to advocate a comprehensive cadaster.  
It was also pointed out that forest industrialists should take a more active interest in 
resource maintenance by taking part in and contributing to the cadaster. Such 
participation and the participation of the regional forest management would help solve 
the problem of the inadequacy and inaccessibility of information about the Karelian 
forest resources. Compiling information about the resource situation is of no benefit to 
anyone if it is not made freely accessible by all actors in the market. The information 
deficit (and the uncertainty relating to existing information) is just another factor 
hampering economic development. It is an especially negative factor influencing the 
interest of foreign investors and customers.  
The property rights issue also kept coming up in the group discussions. This is not only, 
or even mainly, a question of who owns the forest lands. There does not seem to be any 
serious movement in Russia today to change the ownership of forest lands. Forest lands 
are state owned. But the interesting aspects of property rights in forestry are rather the 
rights of access to the forest resource, that is, it concerns the question of who is entitled 
to use the forest and how it may be used. The discussion clearly indicated that while 
much has happened in Russia concerning various subjects’ rights of forest use, a lot still 
remains unclear and “floating.” Examples of areas where these rights have changed but 
where further changes can be expected are forest lease and concession. Disputes are 
common concerning the distribution of, and payment for, forest lease rights, etc.  
Another area where rights and obligations are “floating” concerns the handling of social 
problems in connection with major changes in enterprises. Such problems are of special 
importance in locations where a single forest enterprise constitutes the backbone of the 
entire local economy. Evidently, modernizing such companies, drastic reductions of 
personnel or even closedowns, requires a rule system that distributes the obligations of 
different actors in the game. Inevitably the State might have to assume a great deal of 
responsibility in such situations.  
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Environmental issues were also touched upon in the group discussions. The issue of 
certification was brought up already in the first plenary session and the existing rules 
were largely clarified. As might be expected, it is the environmental organizations that 
advocate the introduction of obligatory certification of all forests. This is not such an 
attractive goal for people working in forestry or the forest industry. However, the 
environmentalists are probably right in claiming that Karelia (and Russia) should put 
high priority on the certification issue (not necessarily obligatory certification though), 
since forest demand in the world market has become very sensitive to the origin of 
wood. This means that if nothing is done about the issue of certification in Karelia there 
may be sudden effects in the demand for Karelian wood. Companies in other countries 
have experienced the harsh consequences that might be the effect of being vague on the 
issue of certification. The common approach abroad is to agree on and use voluntary 
certification.  
But the environmental issues in forestry are more than just certification. In Karelia there 
are vast so-called old growth forests, which have been submitted to a harvest 
moratorium forced upon the industry by the environmental organizations with the 
support of forest companies in nearby Finland and Sweden. This issue was another “hot 
potato” in the group discussions. Positions seem to be largely locked with 
environmentalists advocating a prolonged moratorium and foresters and forest 
industrialists maintaining that no harm would come to the environment from alleviating 
the moratorium. Another venue of discussion concerned the allocation of land for 
various forms of preservation. Here, it was noted that one should not only look upon 
economically productive forest lands. Rather, what Karelia might offer are vast bogs 
and wetlands that might be set aside in biodiversity conserving nature preserves.  
Environmentalists also wanted to emphasize the so-called non-forest uses of forest 
lands. It was claimed that much could still be done in order to stimulate this use, and it 
was, furthermore, claimed that the use of forest lands for collection of mushrooms, 
berries, firewood, etc., might be much further developed from an economic point of 
view.  
Finally, again in a more general vein, participants in the group discussions displayed 
their awareness of the fact that all the present features of the Karelian (and Russian) 
economy are indeed interrelated and form a specific type of economic system, what was 
called in the IIASA study the virtual economy. As suspected, the realities behind the 
notion of the virtual economy are all too familiar for Russian citizens and they have a 
more or less well-developed knowledge of the workings of this system. Since it is a 
system perpetuating many of the “non-market” traits of the old Soviet economy it is not 
altogether obvious to everyone which features of the system are good and which are 
bad. However, there were participants in the exercise making clear reference to the 
system of the virtual economy and branding it as the root of many of the evils currently 
besetting Karelia. How to make society start moving out of this system is a difficult 
question to which participants at the meeting ventured no really good answers. It should 
be understood, however, that as soon as many of the problems discussed during the 
exercise are indeed solved, some features of the virtual economy would have evaporated 
as well.  
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In the final plenary session, during the discussion following the presentations by the 
group chairmen, the workshop facilitator (Sten Nilsson) invited all participants to state 
what they found to be the most important issues to raise in the final document that 
should come out of the exercise. Several participants took the floor and addressed 
questions that they thought had been the most important and interesting during the 
earlier discussions. They also sometimes added issues that they did not think had been 
given sufficient attention during the meeting.  
The low productivity of many Karelian forest enterprises was mentioned as a serious 
problem that would have to be attacked one way or another. Modern Scandinavian 
technology for selective cutting would be ideal, but difficult to obtain and use due to the 
lack of investment funds and due to specifics in the Russian forest legislation. This was 
seen as an illustration of the intricacies one has to disentangle if one is to come up with 
a solution that would improve the efficiency of forest use in Russia. How should one go 
about it then? Obviously, some kind of development program must be elaborated. 
Maybe it would be good to develop a scenario for the next 3–5 years, one under very 
favorable and one under very unfavorable conditions, illustrating a kind of maximally 
positive as well as a maximally negative future possible development of the Karelian 
forest sector. But who should develop this program? And who should implement 
policies built on this kind of scenario work? These issues will be even more pertinent 
with the increasing competition in the forest markets.  
Sten Nilsson emphasized the importance of finding out what people living in Karelia 
can actually do themselves to improve the situation in the forest sector.  
Mr. Shlyamin (the Karelian Minister of foreign affairs) noted that if there is a wish to 
make the forest complex more healthy then clearly people engaged in forestry issues 
will have to do something themselves. And this is essential and necessary, even if the 
forests are a federally owned resource. The forests are of such importance for the 
Republic of Karelia that solutions cannot be left waiting for the federal government to 
act.  
Mr. Maslyakov (the Karelian Minister of natural resources) gave a final statement 
before the plenary session and the entire exercise ended. He pointed out that the 
exercise had provided an opportunity for discussion among different members of the 
Karelian “forest family.” In this period when market relations are being formed nothing 
happens smoothly. Even if forest resources exist these resources might not be possible 
to use because of some other resource deficit, typically the lack of financial resources. 
Karelia is in a specific situation in the Russian forest sector. It is the “window towards 
Europe”. Here, there are a lot of forests that might simply be sold abroad. But there are 
also wood processing industries like saw mills and pulp and paper mills. A large hurdle 
for positive development is the lack of control, the bad management of enterprises. Of 
course there are some good companies, but there are many that do not work well. It has 
been enlightening to listen to the presentations during this policy exercise and especially 
interesting and thought provoking were the statements made about the necessity of a 
clear division of duties between the public and the private sector. Clearly the importance 
of initiatives at the “collective choice level” cannot be underestimated. In the 
declarations that hopefully will come out of this exercise it is important to clearly state 
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the division of responsibility for the implementation of various proposals between the 
federal, regional and the local levels, between public and private sector actors.   
Arkhangelsk 
On the most general level it was agreed that the problem currently facing the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector had to do with the low efficiency in the use of the region’s 
forest resources. Thus, the overarching task for the region’s forest stakeholders was to 
find ways of improving the socioeconomic efficiency of forest utilization. In the general 
discussion about how to solve this problem, participants first referred to the most 
pertinent causes of the current situation. In this connection three factors were 
mentioned. Mistakes were made in the forest policy of the 20th century (implicitly 
pointing to the inadequacies of Soviet time management of the forest resources and the 
forest industrial complex). The imperfections in the federal and regional legislation 
were also mentioned, as well as the underdeveloped infrastructure.  
More specifically, concerning the legislation it was argued that the problem basically 
has to do with the fact that there are no laws regulating the relations between public 
authorities at various levels and the (private) entrepreneurs working in the forest sector. 
This problem threatens to push the Arkhangelsk forest sector into a depression. Under 
these circumstances it seems useful to develop a common understanding about the 
situation in the forest sector and its future development options through a public 
discussion in the media.  
The summaries of the working group discussions that were presented during the final 
plenary session were largely outlining various stages of a policy initiative that would 
eventually make the appropriate authorities take actions with the purpose of solving the 
identified problems of the forest sector. It was agreed that this policy initiative 
comprised two main phases, the first of which was to convince the legislative and 
executive powers (the Regional Assembly72 and the Regional Administration) that the 
further development of the Arkhangelsk forest sector is in jeopardy and that actions 
must be taken in order to improve the situation. The second phase would consist of 
convincing the Regional Administration that Arkhangelsk Oblast needs a strategic 
program for the forest sector. (In the previous discussion it was repeatedly argued that 
the present regional administration did not care for the forest sector, that other sectors in 
the economy were given higher priority.)  
Participants envisaged a number of measures that they believed had to be taken in order 
to push the policy process in the desired direction. It was felt that the main role in 
solving these problems should be played by the regional legislative and the executive 
powers engaging also civic organizations. The first step in the process would be to 
properly develop the idea (kontseptsia) for the formulation of a forest policy for the 
Arkhangelsk Oblast in the 21st century. The decision to elaborate such a document 
should be taken by the Regional Administration. The drafting of the document should 
be handled by a group of scientists and forest specialists after hearing all of the 
suggestions for measures that ought to be proposed in this conceptual document. On the 
                                                 
72
 In many regions the regional parliament is called the regional Duma. In Arkhangelsk it is called the 
Regional Assembly.  
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basis of the guidelines specified in this document a regional forest policy could then be 
elaborated that would include well-prepared suggestions for a regional forest legislation, 
a regional development program, including construction plans for improving the 
transport infrastructure and plans for developing research and technology in the regional 
forest sector. The specific goals for the forest sector that should (ideally) be reached 
with the help of the resulting forest policy include: 
• An increased productivity and improvement of the structure of the forest resource; 
• An increased profitability in forest utilization; 
• Improved location of industrial plants and a development of the transport network;  
• Development of a multi-purpose forest utilization; and 
• Ensuring environmental safety. 
To get this policy process started, in the first instance to make the political and 
administrative organs realize the importance of developing a regional forest policy, it 
was suggested that the outcome of the IIASA policy exercise workshop should be 
communicated to the administration and to the Regional Assembly. It was also 
suggested that a discussion about these problems be initiated with deputies of the 
Regional Assembly and that forest specialists, researchers, and entrepreneurs should be 
asked to make their views known and take part in discussions on specific plans of 
action. It was considered imperative to begin these activities immediately, resource 
requirements are minimal (funding of seminars). The only obstacle is a lack of a 
coherent public opinion on the problem and the “technocratic” thinking dominating 
enterprise top-management.  
The specific administrative organ that could best initiate a process to solve this problem 
may be the coordinating-analytical council in the office of the Head of administration. 
The leading organizations in developing such a policy program should be the 
Department of the forest industrial complex in the Regional Administration in 
collaboration with the Department of natural resources, the Arkhangelsk State Technical 
University, the Institute of environmental problems of the North and various research 
institutes (such as TsNIIMOD, SevNIILKh). A decision of the Regional Administration 
is required to develop the program. Funding is also required (an estimate of 6–700 
thousand rubles was mentioned). A group of 8–10 representatives of research institutes 
and universities should be formed under the auspices of the Regional Administration to 
start working on the problems.  
The ideas expressed in the working group sessions were further discussed in a short 
final plenary session before the formal closing of the policy exercise workshop. Several 
questions were raised. For instance, it was emphasized that a regional forest policy must 
include a strong implementation mechanism. It was decided that a small group should 
be formed to draft a document ― a Declaration ― in which the main lines of the 
discussion during the policy exercise workshop should be stated. Some discussion 
followed on who should be members of this group. The IIASA team was invited to 
make comments on the draft of the Declaration.  
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4.4 Tangible Outcomes of Workshop Deliberations 
Three kinds of tangible outcomes of the policy exercise workshops conducted in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk could be distinguished. Each of the workshops 
produced a final document in which the main conclusions of the discussions were stated. 
The events were also reported in local and regional news media. But the question that 
must ultimately be posed is whether or not the workshops produced any noticeable 
impact on regional forest policy making. In this section the tangible outcomes of the 
workshops in the respective regions are reviewed.  
4.4.1 Final Documents 
The workshop deliberations in the three regions were eventually summarized in a final 
document. Decisions on who should draft these documents were taken during or 
immediately following the final plenary sessions of the respective workshops. 
Workshop participants elected representatives to form a small editorial group to produce 
the first drafts of these documents. The IIASA team was not involved in the authoring 
of the first drafts. The drafts were, however, sent to IIASA for review. In some cases 
this was an iterative process with the drafts being sent back and forth several times. 
After each iteration the text had to be approved anew by each member of the editorial 
group. This was of course a time consuming activity and agreement on the wording of 
the final documents was reached only several months after the date of the workshops.  
The character and style of the resulting final documents varied between the regions as 
did their intended purpose and use. These variations are outlined below.  
Murmansk 
Participants in the Murmansk workshop gathered to an informal meeting right after the 
closing of the workshop to decide how the workshop discussions could be followed up. 
The IIASA team did not initiate or take part in this meeting. The Russian co-coordinator 
of the workshop (Lyudmila Ivanova) was elected the organizer of a follow-up meeting 
to be held about a month later. Dr. Ivanova was also asked to draft a summary of the 
workshop discussion. This summary was subsequently approved by the two working 
group chairmen and was later sent to the Murmansk Regional Administration as 
information about the event. (The document is reproduced in Appendix B3.)  
The character of the final document resembles that of a press release. It gives a short 
and straightforward account of the workshop deliberations and it ends by stating that 
one of the fundamental problems of the Murmansk forest sector was found to be the 
“lack of coordination at the regional level”. The remedy suggested entails the “creation 
of a co-coordinating organ”. It must be presumed that this “organ” would be some kind 
of department or section in the Regional Administration. (Unlike the situation in Karelia 
and Arkhangelsk, there is no formal unit within the Murmansk Regional Administration 
with the task to coordinate activities in the regional forest sector.) But the wording of 
the continued text, where it is stated that workshop participants agreed to “create a 
regional organization (an association) of forest users in Murmansk Oblast,” also allows 
the interpretation that this kind of voluntary stakeholder organization might be of help 
in achieving the coordination that is found lacking today. The document ends by 
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asserting that workshop participants will “continue their work to create a regional 
association” and that it was agreed that in this process it would be necessary to have 
regular meetings to further discuss the issues raised during the workshop.  
Karelia 
On the day following the Karelian policy exercise workshop the IIASA group had a 
follow-up meeting with members of the organizing committee and the working group 
leaders. During the meeting it was discussed how the results of the deliberations during 
the exercise might be continued and be brought to bear on the development of the 
regional forest policy.  
There was a general consensus that it would be expedient to produce two documents 
reflecting the outcome of the policy exercise. A first declaration should be fairly short 
and recapitulate the general conclusions of the meeting, stating the main outcome of the 
discussions and suggesting how the forest sector problems identified should be 
approached in work to come. This first document should be finished and made public 
within a couple of weeks in order to be used as an input for the working group that the 
government had set up in order to generate ideas for the development of the Karelian 
forest sector.  
A second document should then be elaborated within the next 3–4 months. This 
document should state more in detail what problems were identified in the policy 
exercise workshop and what specific measures were discussed and found necessary in 
order to come to grips with these problems.  
It was eventually decided to delegate the work of drafting these documents to two 
different working groups, the first document should be drafted by a group led by a 
sawmill director (who had also served as the chairman of one of the working groups) 
and the second document should be elaborated by a group chaired by the head of an 
institute belonging to the Karelian Science Centre (who had served as the chairman of 
another working group). The draft of the first document should be ready within a couple 
of weeks, while a first draft of the second document should be produced and distributed 
to all present at the follow-up meeting in about two months’ time. Based on comments 
received a final version of the document should then be prepared and made public. 
Ideally, this document should become the basis for continued work among stakeholder 
groups in Karelia to further develop measures to improve the workings of the forest 
sector.  
As it turned out, a draft of the first document (the Declaration) was ready in two weeks 
and used to introduce the ideas from the policy exercise to the members of the new 
governmental working group on forest policy. The final version of the Declaration, 
signed by all participants of the organizing committee, was received by the IIASA team 
by the beginning of March 2001, i.e., roughly three months after the workshop. (A copy 
of the declaration is attached in Appendix C3.) 
The Declaration does not specify any particular problems hampering the development 
of the regional forest sector, nor does it indicate any specific measures that should be 
taken to improve the situation. Rather it outlines some general problems of concern for 
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the actors in the sector and it calls for joint action by all forest stakeholders in the 
republic to enable and stimulate a restructuring of the sector to make it better suited to 
achieve social welfare for the regional population, an efficient production and 
competitive products, and preservation of the forests for future generations. It is 
emphasized that the efforts of all stakeholders are required in order to “effectively 
achieve the goal of reforming the forest sector of Karelia”. Bearing in mind that most of 
the signatories of this document were top-level politicians, officials of forest 
management, forest enterprise leaders or forest researchers the wording of the document 
(inviting broad stakeholder participation) might indicate that the “establishment” now 
has realized that solving the problems of the forest sector will require the support and 
engagement not only from people belonging to the traditional “forest family”, but from 
a wider range of stakeholders, including environmental NGOs and interested citizens.  
However, it should be noted that work on the second document that was announced in 
the Declaration was slow to materialize. Some of the signatories of the Declaration 
(mainly those who served as working group chairmen during the workshop) did in fact 
put together a first draft of the second document with the title “Recommendations of the 
international seminar Institutional Problems of the Forest Sector of the Republic of 
Karelia”. After several iterations, through which the IIASA team was given an 
opportunity to make comments and suggestions, a version of this document was finally 
elaborated. But by the end of March 2002 (15 months after the workshop) the workshop 
main organizer, who did most of the work of compiling this document, had not been 
able to obtain signatures from all members of the organizing committee. The status of 
this document is therefore not quite clear. The four people serving as working group 
chairmen during the workshop did, however, agree on the contents of the document. 
Since stakeholder participation in the process of forest policy formulation was called for 
during the workshop, this document might perhaps be seen as an example of such an 
initiative. (The document is reproduced in Appendix C4.) Still, however, the document 
can only be seen as a first outline of a goal formulation in such a policy process. A 
number of more or less specific goals that Karelian forest stakeholders should strive for 
are listed, but nothing is said about how these goals should be prioritized, about what 
measures would be required in order to reach the goals or about the implementation 
mechanism (who should take action, who should fund the activities, etc.). 
Arkhangelsk 
Towards the end of the final plenary session in the Arkhangelsk policy exercise 
workshop participants proposed an editorial group for the drafting of a final document, a 
Declaration. The group consisted of nine people representing the departments of the 
forest industry and forest management in the Regional Administration, the forest 
industry and various institutes conducting forestry related research. (It might be noted 
that no representatives of any environmental or other stakeholder groups were elected to 
the editorial group.) A first draft of the Declaration already reached the IIASA team 
about one month after the workshop. A second version (very similar to the first) 
appeared a few weeks later. This time the IIASA team made several comments and 
suggestions for minor changes in the text. In late December 2001 (almost nine months 
after the workshop) the workshop coordinator, who had had the difficult task of 
communicating the various versions of the Declaration to the editorial group, informed 
the IIASA team that all members of the group were now satisfied with the opinions 
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stated in the Declaration. The document would then be forwarded to the Regional 
Assembly for its consideration. It was also said that the document had been taken into 
account in the elaboration of a regional law on forest utilization (No. 145-20 OZ) 
adopted by the Regional Assembly on 13 November 2002.  
The Arkhangelsk Declaration is the most elaborated of our final documents. It sets out 
with a historical overview emphasizing the importance of the forest sector for the entire 
regional development. This also provides an opportunity to declare that many of the 
problems currently facing the forest sector are in fact consequences of mismanagement 
during the Soviet era. The most pertinent problems are then listed. The Declaration ends 
with an outline of the procedure to elaborate a regional forest policy for the 
Arkhangelsk Oblast in the 21st century. To initiate such a process the first stage would 
be to explicitly formulate the task in a kind of conceptual document (kontseptsia). The 
Declaration ends with a fairly detailed listing of directives for the work with the 
formulation of this document. Twelve provisions are stated that ought to be included in 
this kontseptsia as directives for (i.e., problems that should be dealt with in) the 
subsequent elaboration of a regional forest policy. (The Declaration is reproduced in 
Appendix D3.) 
4.4.2 Media Coverage 
In order to attract local media to cover the event the organizers sent out information 
about the policy exercise workshops to various newspapers and the regional TV stations 
well before the dates of the meetings. This information produced varied responses in the 
three regions. What can be reported here is entirely based on the information provided 
by the regional coordinators of the policy exercise workshops in the respective regions. 
(All newspaper articles and TV features relating to the three workshops that were 
reported to IIASA are listed in Appendix F.) 
In Murmansk there were notes in two local newspapers during the workshop days, and 
one longer article appearing some days after the end of the meeting. The regional 
television taped parts of the plenary sessions and a short sequence was broadcast in the 
evening of the first day of the workshop.  
In the Republic of Karelia there was a somewhat more intensive media coverage of the 
workshop discussions. The workshop deliberations were reviewed in three local 
newspapers. The results of the IIASA study of the Karelian forest sector were outlined 
at some length and it was noted that a large number of the regional forest officials 
actively took part in the discussions. The workshop also provided the “topic of the 
week” of a regular half-hour TV program on social and environmental issues relating to 
the development of the Republic of Karelia.  
In Arkhangelsk the media did not take much note of the workshop, despite the 
information distributed to newspapers and television beforehand. All that appeared 
about the event was a note in the newsletter of the Arkhangelsk State Technical 
University and a brief announcement in a regional TV news broadcast.  
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4.4.3 Impacts on Policy Formation 
As indicated in Section 4.1, the workshops organized by IIASA in Murmansk, Karelia, 
and Arkhangelsk were, in principle, intended as a first event in the longer process of a 
policy exercise (which might last for several months up to one or a few years), during 
which groups of regional forest stakeholders regularly were to convene and discuss the 
problems hampering developments in the regional forest sector and, ultimately, to 
elaborate well-founded regional forest policies. Clearly, a single meeting cannot achieve 
much more than a start of a real policy formulation process. In embarking upon the 
series of policy exercises the IIASA team had nourished a hope that this initiative would 
trigger a continued orderly activity in the respective regions engaging a good 
representation of the regional forest stakeholders in a participatory policy formulation 
process. However, such a continued policy formulation activity seems not to have been 
triggered in any one of the three regions. (More is said about possible reasons for this 
fact in Section 5.) 
However, even if these workshops were one-time events they did nevertheless produce 
some interesting impacts of relevance for the regional policy formulation process. The 
information about such impacts that was reported to the IIASA team is summarized 
below.  
Murmansk 
The final document of the Murmansk workshop (cf. Appendix B3) was eventually 
brought to the attention of the governor, but it seems not to have provoked any reaction 
from the head of the Murmansk administration. According to recent information from 
the local workshop coordinator not much substantial happened after the workshop. 
There were some early attempts to push the process further. A businessman, who had 
also served as the chairman of one of the working groups, brought some secretarial help 
to the local organizer, who was selected to draft the final document, the intention being 
to form a small “initiative group” to work for establishing a “forest section” in the 
Murmansk Chamber of Commerce. It is not clear if these efforts have produced any 
results.  
In the opinion of the local workshop coordinator the major impact of the policy exercise 
workshop was that it brought people together, people from different sections of the 
forest sector who had not previously had any opportunity to meet and discuss common 
problems. In the situation that the Murmansk forest sector is currently experiencing, 
where everybody is occupied with solving everyday problems, no one has time to think 
about the “larger picture”. The workshop offered a possibility for various regional forest 
stakeholders to establish new contacts, which might eventually produce some results of 
relevance for the goals stated in the final document of the workshop.  
Karelia 
The policy exercise workshop in Petrozavodsk took place at a time when awareness 
seemed to be growing in Karelia of the necessity to unite forces in society to analyze 
and solve the forest sector problems. Shortly before our workshop the Karelian 
government had formed a working group on the initiative of forest stakeholders with an 
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interest in restructuring the forest enterprise sector. Many of the participants of this 
working group also took part in the IIASA workshop. The workshop is said to have 
exerted a certain influence on the work of this group. (The final document ― the 
Declaration ― from the workshop was submitted to the government working group.)  
At the beginning of February 2001, a new independent Center for Social Analysis and 
Reconstruction was established in Petrozavodsk with financial support from the 
Moscow Science Fund (which is funded by US AID). One of the goals of this center is 
to support institutional restructuring in society. The majority of the researchers engaged 
in the center also participated in the IIASA workshop.  
Through the opportunity that the IIASA workshop provided for regional forest 
researchers and forest officials to meet with foreign experts and discuss pertinent 
problems in the Karelian forest sector a significant contribution was made towards the 
development of a sustainable forest policy for the republic. The local workshop 
organizer also reported that a group of Karelian forest sector stakeholders might be 
established (several possible organizational “homes” for such a group were mentioned) 
to further elaborate the suggestions made during the workshop. A requirement for the 
implementation of this scheme would, however, be that financial support could be 
obtained for the work, either via the Karelian governmental or forest authorities, IIASA 
or a Nordic country.  
Arkhangelsk 
The Declaration from the Arkhangelsk policy exercise workshop was brought to the 
attention of the forest officials in the Regional Administration. When all the signatures 
finally had been gathered the document was submitted to the Regional Assembly for its 
consideration. This was supposed to have happened in January 2002. No information 
about the fate of the Declaration has reached the IIASA team. Ideas expressed in the 
Declaration and discussed during the workshop were brought to bear in the drafting of a 
regional law on forest utilization adopted by the Regional Assembly on 13 November 
2002.  
5 Conclusions 
This report has discussed various aspects on the series of policy exercise workshops that 
IIASA conducted in the Russian regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk in the 
period October 2000–March 2001. The background of the endeavor was outlined and 
some reflections were made on the theoretical underpinning of the study of the Russian 
transition and participatory policy processes. A review was made of the previous IIASA 
case studies of the institutional problems hampering the forest sector development in the 
three regions. A detailed analysis was then presented of the policy exercise workshops, 
their preparation and implementation, the plenary presentations, the working group 
deliberations and the final outcome of the meetings. It is now time for a final assessment 
of the value of these events. What was the expected outcome of the workshops, to what 
extent did expectations correspond with actual outcomes, what are the crucial 
prerequisites for a successful policy exercise with Russian forest stakeholders? These 
and similar issues are discussed in the three final sections of the report. 
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5.1 Assessing IIASA’s Approach to Systemic Intervention 
in the Russian Forest Policy Process  
The policy exercise workshops that were organized by IIASA in the regions of 
Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk can be seen as examples of systemic interventions 
(cf., for instance, Flood and Jackson, 1991; Midgley, 2000). Systemic intervention 
refers to the interaction of an individual or a group of policy analysts with the actors of 
a specific system with the purpose of achieving improvements on an identified problem 
situation. In our context the policy exercise is seen as a tool that might be used in a 
systemic intervention. Implicit in these distinctions is the notion that a systemic 
intervention is a process that continues until the actors in the system have managed to 
improve upon the perceived problem situation. In this process it is crucial to engage 
those actors in the system (stakeholders) who are negatively affected by the existing 
problem situation and who are capable of elaborating and implementing improvements 
on that situation.  
In this perspective the workshops that IIASA organized in the three Russian regions 
should be seen as an initiating event of a process ― a systemic intervention in the form 
of a policy exercise ― that would be continued by the actors in the system themselves 
until adequate solutions had been found and an implementation mechanism had been 
worked out.  
When assessing the efficacy of the IIASA policy exercise workshops it is essential to be 
clear about the premises under which the activity was undertaken. In this particular 
context this meant that it was important for the intervening policy analysts (the IIASA 
team) to have a realistic understanding of the environment (the workings of the Russian 
socioeconomic system) in which the identified problem situation is embedded. The 
greater the accuracy of this understanding, the more realistic expectations might be 
formed of what would be possible to achieve.  
Thus, the dilemma in an assessment of the efficacy of IIASA’s policy exercise 
workshops lies in the fact that different actors (members of the group of policy analysts 
and members of the group of stakeholders) probably had different understandings of the 
limitations imposed by the existing situation on the possibilities to achieve the goals for 
the intervention. This is also the reason for basing a systemic intervention on a careful 
analysis of the system in which the problem situations are embedded. In this case the 
interventions were preceded by case studies of the institutional problems hampering the 
development of the forest sector in the respective regions. It was hoped that the results 
of the case studies would provide a common understanding of the current problem 
situation on the basis of which a discussion about possible improvements could start.  
The presentations of the case study results that were made during the initial plenary 
sessions in the respective policy exercise workshops never caused any serious 
objections from the regional forest stakeholders participating in the meetings. This can 
be seen as a sign that the continued discussions during the workshops were indeed based 
on a common understanding of the existing problem situation. 
There also seems to be a slight ambiguity in the expectations of the IIASA team 
regarding the possible consequences of organizing this series of policy exercise 
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workshops. It was clearly seen as a high-risk endeavor, the main problem concerned the 
realism of assuming that the regional forest stakeholders themselves would indeed 
continue the policy process that started through these initial workshops. Since IIASA 
was not in a position (due to lack of funds) to offer continued support for a long-term 
policy exercise process, the institute took on the task of organizing the first workshop 
deliberately hoping that the regional stakeholders themselves would be able to mobilize 
the support necessary for continuation. As has been reported above such an organized 
continuation of these first policy exercise workshops did not take place in any of our 
three regions. This failure was, however, not entirely unexpected. On the contrary, it 
would rather have been surprising if continuation had in fact materialized.  
The expectations of what the IIASA policy exercise workshops might achieve were 
probably rather moderate among the forest sector stakeholders in the three regions. The 
IIASA team was not the first group of external experts to appear loaded with good 
advice on how to improve the dismally functioning Russian economy. But even if no 
one expected to learn anything previously unknown about the forest sector in their 
respective regions, workshop participants acknowledged having been attracted to the 
event by the opportunity it might offer for an independent analysis of the existing 
problems (“a view from the outside”) and for the opportunity it offered for a dialogue 
with other regional stakeholder groups.  
Thus, with regard to the moderate prior expectations for the workshops to succeed in 
generating continued activity in the form of long-term policy exercises, neither the 
IIASA team nor the regional forest stakeholders were really disappointed with the 
outcome.  
But even if IIASA could not hope to achieve a fully-fledged policy exercise in 
Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, it must have hoped to achieve something else by 
engaging in this series of workshops. The motives for IIASA to engage in this activity 
were partly scientific and partly policy oriented. Transitional Russia offers an arena for 
assessing various hypotheses concerning the way in which a market economy can 
emerge or be constructed. Modern forest policy analysts advocate participatory policy 
formulation procedures to generate efficient and implementable forest policies (cf. 
Section 1.1). Thus, the IIASA team saw the conducting of policy exercise workshops as 
interesting “policy experiments” through which it might be possible to assess to what 
extent participatory policy formulation methods work in the Russian setting (Russia 
being a “new democracy” with an underdeveloped civil society), while simultaneously 
stimulating the democratic development by engaging broad stakeholder groups in policy 
deliberations thereby also fostering the development of civil society.  
Through the policy exercise workshops the IIASA team also hoped that hitherto largely 
neglected institutional issues would receive increased attention by the Russian regional 
policy makers and forest sector stakeholders. The previous IIASA case studies had 
clearly shown that actors in the Russian forest sector put an unduly large emphasis on 
the “technical” side of forest management and wood processing at the expense of 
socioeconomic qualities and requirements. This probably has to do with the fact that 
discussions and decisions about the “rules of the game” during Soviet times used to 
belong to the political sphere. In fact, such decisions were entirely in the hands of 
members of the communist party and citizens’ participation in the decision process was 
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very limited. Assuming, as is done in the IIASA case studies, that a significant path-
dependence characterizes the development of the currently emerging market based 
forest sector operations, it could also be expected that Russian forest sector 
stakeholders, who are not members of the regional “forest establishment”, still do not 
take a very active part in public decisions concerning the development of the regional 
forest sector. Contributing to the change of the existing “rules of the game” that prevent 
a broad stakeholder participation in the decisions about the Russian regional forest 
sector development, while in the process creating a foundation for the elaboration of 
better policy decisions, should also be seen as a motive for IIASA’s engagement in the 
policy exercise workshops in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk.  
It seems that all three workshops illustrated that allowing broad stakeholder 
participation in the development of regional forest policies is nothing that comes 
naturally to the regional “forest establishment”. Still the behavior of the actors in the 
Russian forest sector is governed by provisions made and decisions taken by the state. 
Sector governance is largely centralized, with strong decision power concentrated in the 
hands of state forest sector officials. At the same time, there are indications that the 
traditional “forest family” is increasingly becoming aware of its inability to find good 
solutions to the problems hampering developments in the sector. In this situation, 
IIASA’s initiative to organize policy exercise workshops was welcomed by both the 
forest sector establishment and by other stakeholder groups. It can be assumed, 
therefore, that the participatory policy formulation model demonstrated through the 
policy exercise workshops left some positive impressions with regional forest officials 
and forest stakeholders alike.  
The crucial factor determining the fate of this kind of participatory policy formulation 
procedure is the legitimacy that can be established for the procedure among everyone 
with a stake in the process. 
5.2 Legitimacy Is Crucial for the Success of the Intervention 
An important aspect of the preparation of an efficient systemic intervention ― for 
making the intervention stand a chance of success ― is to make sure to the extent 
possible that the effort is seen as trustworthy and just in the eyes of those who are 
affected by it. If the intervention can find such legitimacy all stakeholders will support it 
and, hopefully, be willing to engage in the process. The idea being that a legitimate 
intervention in which broad stakeholder groups are engaged will stand a better chance 
of producing sustainable results in the sense that the identification of issues for 
discussion as well as the suggestions for problem solutions will not be biased in favor of 
any particular stakeholder group but can be trusted to serve a positive development for 
society at large.  
Since the initiative to study forest sector institutions in Russia was taken by researchers 
at IIASA without explicit invitations from the regions that were made the objects of 
study, there were of course no formal demands from the forest sector representatives or 
the public authorities in these regions for IIASA to undertake any further dissemination 
or policy formulation activities. However, when IIASA suggested to the forest officials 
and representatives of the regional administrations in the case study regions to visit the 
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regional capitals and organize workshops with the purpose of disseminating the results 
of the previous studies and initiate a discussion among the regional forest stakeholders 
about improvements in the regional forest policies ― all arrangements financed by 
IIASA ― the endeavor rapidly found official sanction from the Russian side.  
In order to secure the support that seemed possible to obtain from the regional 
authorities and the forest sector organizations in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, 
IIASA hastened to take two initiatives: (a) local coordinators were identified and asked 
to immediately start working with the practical arrangements related to the policy 
exercises, and (b) it was decided that the leader of IIASA’s Forestry Project should visit 
the three regions to explore the possibilities to make formal agreements with the 
regional authorities and the forest sector organizations about official sanction of the 
planned exercises.  
As it turned out, the leader of IIASA’s Forestry Project (Sten Nilsson) was only able to 
make a brief visit to Petrozavodsk in seeking official support for the planned policy 
exercise in the Republic of Karelia. The visit resulted in official sanction from the 
Karelian government. Formal contacts between Sten Nilsson and the Arkhangelsk 
Regional Administration paved the way for official support for the Arkhangelsk policy 
exercise workshop. The exercise in Murmansk, however, was organized without any 
formal support or sanction from the regional authorities. (A kind of “informal support” 
for the event was expressed through the participation in the workshop of representatives 
of the Murmansk Regional Administration.) 
While in countries with more firmly established democratic traditions the adoption of 
policies is the privilege of the legislative power (parliaments on the national, regional or 
the local level), in Russia such precedence has not (yet) been firmly established. Here, 
policy formulation is still largely in the hands of the executive and the bureaucracy, in 
our case the Regional Administrations and the organizations governing the forest sector. 
In all fairness, however, it should be noted that also in countries like Sweden policy 
reforms may be suggested by forest sector organizations and the elaboration of policy 
programs is often delegated by the governments or parliaments to branch organizations 
and stakeholder groups. But still, at the time of IIASA’s preparations for the policy 
exercises in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk, it was not considered necessary or 
expedient to consult and engage the political sphere in this policy initiative.73 This fact 
might be said to illustrate another institutional path-dependence maintaining the 
established order of policy change on its more traditional track.  
To secure the legitimacy of a participatory policy formulation procedure with the 
purpose of improving the Russian regional forest policy the procedure has to appeal 
both to the regional “forest establishment” and to a wider group of regional forest 
stakeholders. Obtaining support from one of these groups may, however, compromise 
the procedure in the eyes of the other group. The fact that IIASA managed to find 
                                                 
73
 It might be added, however, that only half a year later when IIASA wanted to organize a policy 
exercise in Moscow for forest stakeholders on the Russian federal level the strongest support for the 
initiative came from the political sphere (the Economic Committee of the Russian State Duma). For 
various reasons ― mainly related to the ongoing reform of the Russian forest sector ― an IIASA led 
policy exercise in Moscow never materialized.  
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support for the policy exercise workshops from both these stakeholder categories might 
be interpreted as a sign of the fact that traditional ways of handling the problems of the 
forest sector no longer worked and that this fact was obvious for the regional forest 
officials as well as for other regional forest stakeholders.  
5.3 Participatory Policy Formulation in the Russian 
Forest Sector ― Feasibility and Requirements 
The changes that have taken place in the Russian society after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union are profound. Since the whole earlier sociopolitical system has been 
overthrown we can characterize the Soviet transformation into a market-type system as 
a revolutionary change. In fact, what we have witnessed during the last decade has been 
called a “revolution from above” (cf. Kotz and Weir, 1997), in which certain circles in 
the Soviet elite have pushed for reforms that eventually caused a systemic change and 
resulted in a huge redistribution of resources and wealth in society, a redistribution, 
furthermore, that have concentrated wealth and economic power in the hands of a small 
elite minority (the so-called “oligarchs”).  
A profound systemic change, like the one we have witnessed in Russia, requires a major 
transformation of the institutional framework in society. In fact, such a systemic change 
consists of a series of fundamental institutional changes. The literature on the 
transformation of the former “socialist countries” largely deals with institutional 
change.  
At the start of the “transition period” by the end of the 1980s, many actors and 
observers believed that the transformation from the old command economy to the new 
(capitalist) market economic system would be a fast process once the fundamental 
institutions were in place. Basically, it was expected that once the price system had been 
liberalized and hard budget constraints introduced for all enterprises in the economy the 
rest would quickly follow. As it turned out, these expectations were ill founded. The 
post-socialist transformation has clearly demonstrated that such fundamental changes in 
a society’s institutional set-up cannot, in fact, be swift and free of conflict. The 
transition experience shows that institutional change is path-dependent. Existing 
institutions entrenched in an existing organizational structure cannot easily be removed 
or modified. At the same time, designing and introducing new institutions is also not 
easily accomplished.  
If we assume, as we have done in this report and in the earlier research conducted at 
IIASA ― and, as many outside observers and, for that matter, many (probably most) 
citizens in the European transition countries seem to do ― that the goal of the transition 
is to convert the former socialist countries into western-type market democracies, it is 
quite obvious that a lot remains to be done before the institutional framework of the 
transition countries has become fully conducive to an efficient functioning of a modern 
social and economic life. Thus, while many institutional changes have taken place, 
many more remain. This conclusion is valid for the Russian socioeconomic system at 
large and, as hopefully has been shown earlier in this report, it is a highly valid 
conclusion for the Russian regional forest sector.  
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As our study of the institutional problems hampering the performance of the forest 
sector in eight Russian regions has shown, further institutional changes are needed in 
order to improve the functioning of the sector, to make it more competitive in the new 
market economic context. The question is which institutional changes are needed and 
how such changes can be initiated. And, on a more fundamental level, is it at all 
possible to accomplish purposeful institutional change, can institutional change be 
designed?  
As we have tried to argue above (cf. Section 2.3) we believe that institutions can 
change, that they actually do change and that “directed” changes can, under specific 
conditions, indeed be designed, decided, and implemented by intentional collective 
action. While the process through which formal institutions change is rather more 
manageable than that through which informal institutions change, both types of 
institutions are in principle amenable to intentional change by human action and 
interaction.  
As the IIASA case study of the forest sector problems illustrated (cf. Section 3.2) it was 
certainly possible for an outside observer to identify a number of deficiencies in the 
institutional framework of the Russian regional forest sector. Several suggestions for 
improving the institutional framework embedding the Russian regional forest sector 
were also presented in the case studies. However, it was concluded that a fundamental 
problem with the various suggestions for institutional change that were proposed had to 
do with the high degree of interdependence between various measures. Consequently, 
many of the measures that were suggested for improving the dismal situation in the 
Russian regional forest sector actually presupposed the existence of an already well 
functioning institutional framework. This is a crucial problem with institutional change. 
So, in a situation where the need for institutional change has been established and where 
a set of necessary or relevant institutional changes have in fact been suggested, what can 
be done to implement these suggestions? To answer this question we can no longer 
ignore the position of the observer/analyst. It is important to realize the significance of 
the fact that the IIASA study of the regional forest sector institutions in Russia was 
made by an observer/analyst who is not himself a part of the system that was studied. It 
would seem that the only thing such an external “actor” can do is to finish his analysis 
and inform the ones most concerned with the investigated problems about the results. If, 
on the other hand, the study had been conducted by someone inside the studied system, 
or by someone outside the system serving as consultant to someone inside, then the 
results of the study might have triggered another kind of response. While IIASA’s case 
studies of Russian regional forest sector institutions were initiated from “the outside” 
(by IIASA as an external observer/analyst), they were always conducted in collabo-
ration with representatives of the regional forest sector stakeholders and often with the 
formal consent and sanction by the regional forest sector authorities. This was taken by 
the IIASA research team to mean that IIASA, at the end of a regional case study, was in 
fact in a legitimate position to take a more advanced step towards the realization of the 
proposals elaborated in the studies. The question that remained, though, was: which 
specific “advanced steps” could IIASA actually take to implement the suggestions 
elaborated in its previous research?  
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For reasons briefly elaborated in Sections 4 and 4.1, the manner in which IIASA tried to 
promote the implementation of the suggestions for institutional change, elaborated in its 
studies of current forest sector problems in eight Russian regions, was to initiate and 
arrange policy exercises with the forest stakeholders in the regions where case studies 
had been conducted.  
This actually brings us to the issues raised in the introduction to this report about the 
prerequisites of participatory policy processes. We will therefore finish with some 
conclusions and comments on these issues. 
• What are the general prerequisites for participatory policy processes and for 
initiating such processes?  
In general the prerequisite for a workable participatory policy process is of course that a 
specific problem (or a set of problems) exists in a community that have not been (and 
are likely never to be) satisfactorily attended to by the structures in society that normally 
would manage this type of problem. These may be entirely new problems in an existing 
context, problems that are not noticed or acknowledged by the “normal structures” or 
for which these structures cannot find any solutions. It may also be more long-standing 
problems that have never been definitely solved or for which the “normal structures” 
have not been able to find sufficiently good solutions.  
In order to initiate a participatory policy process with the purpose of finding solutions 
(and perhaps even implement these solutions) a number of general prerequisites must be 
at hand. First of all, to make it possible to get such a process going, there must be a 
sufficiently large number of actors who have become aware of the problem and who 
think the problem possible to solve and who believe that no one else is going to solve it. 
How strong (in terms of numbers and composition) this group of actors has to be must 
be determined with a view to the complexity and the “quantitative aspects” of the 
problem at hand. Secondly, the political environment in which this initiative is going to 
be taken must allow this kind of participatory action. Thirdly, to really succeed in 
initiating such a participatory policy process (and, even more, to make this process 
successful) it is important to get capable actors to participate. Modern societies, where 
levels of civic organization are high, are likely to be favored in this respect. Thus, the 
more advanced civil society, the better the chances are of finding successful 
participatory policy processes.  
• What are the specific prerequisites for the successful establishment of a 
participatory policy process in the Russian forest sector? Are such prerequisites in 
place in Russia today?  
In this general perspective we have to acknowledge that the specific prerequisites 
existing for a successful participatory policy process in the Russian forest sector present 
a mixed picture. In some respects favorable conditions for such a process exist. In other 
respects conditions are less favorable. For instance, most forest stakeholders know that 
severe problems beset the Russian forest sector in its new social and economic context. 
Many also know much about these problems and have ideas about how the problems 
might be solved and they realize that the present power structures (both in society at 
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large and in the forest sector) might never be able to cope with the problems that are 
facing the sector or might not even bother to try to find any solutions. They also suspect 
that if the authorities indeed would try to solve (some of) the forest sector problems they 
might well come up with suggestions for solutions that would not work at all or that 
would not be the best under the circumstances. Thus, there are regional forest 
stakeholders in Russia who are capable in the sense that they know much about the 
regional (and often also the federal) forest sector and its problems and who may have 
ideas about how these problems could be solved.  
However, it is not quite clear to what extent the current Russian sociopolitical system 
can accommodate participatory policy processes. In general, the Russian political 
system is still rather primitive, with an underdeveloped formal political system ― a 
multiparty system exists, but its capacity for channeling citizens’ political opinions still 
seems rather bleak. While there are many political parties in Russia, most are very small 
in terms of membership and efficient ways of working have not yet been established. In 
this situation much power has been gathered in the hands of the executive, the 
presidency, and, on the regional level, in the hands of regional heads of administration, 
the governors. Even if there has been a strengthening of the presidency under Putin and 
even if governors have huge powers in many regions, the general impression is that the 
state is still weak in Russia. This does not, however, mean that the state would welcome 
popular interventions in public affairs, especially interventions that are not even 
channeled through the existing official political structures. On the contrary, such 
“unauthorized” popular movements are easily seen as a threat to central authority and 
something that should rather be quenched than stimulated. So, initiating participatory 
policy processes would at least require some careful preparations in order to be allowed 
and seen by the “authorities” as something that might help rather than harm 
development.  
Even if participatory policy processes are in principle possible in Russia, and sometimes 
even welcomed and encouraged by public authorities, there still remains a problem with 
the people’s attitude toward this kind of political action. This has very much to do with 
the weak traditions of civil society in Russia. People are simply not used to taking 
action outside their work or their work-related organization, such as the trade unions. 
For several reasons Russians are hesitant when it comes to taking action as a private 
citizen in civic organizations. This is especially so when the action is related to 
something for which an established political, bureaucratic or (nowadays) private 
enterprise organization (as indeed is the case in the forest sector) already exists. 
What then, in a final count, could we say about the possibilities for participatory policy 
processes in the Russian (regional) forest sector? First, if such a process really got 
established (with the sanction of the authorities) and engaged many stakeholders, their 
knowledge and initiative might lead to useful applications that would improve the 
situation in the forest sector. This fact is probably also realized by the “authorities”. The 
difficult question, then, concerns the possibilities to get such a process going in the 
existing political environment and with stakeholders having such a limited “civic 
experience”. The conclusion drawn by IIASA was that trying to initiate a participatory 
policy process among the regional Russian forest stakeholders was valuable both for the 
substantive contributions it might make to the solution of actual problems hampering 
the development of the forest sector, but also for the “educational” merits of the project, 
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through which some of the “democratic deficit” in Russia might be made slightly 
smaller.  
• To what extent can the necessary prerequisites for a successful participatory 
policy process in Russia be created, imposed or “fostered” from “the outside”?  
The experience gained by IIASA from the policy exercises in Murmansk, Karelia and 
Arkhangelsk, which have been reviewed and discussed in this report, should be taken to 
indicate that participatory policy processes are indeed possible to initiate and stimulate 
from “the outside”. And, taking the current level of the Russian democratic maturity 
into account, it seems all the more relevant actually to take such initiatives as a way of 
fostering the development of Russian civil society.  
However, to succeed (in the sense that the process works as intended and that it 
becomes a continuous activity) such an initiative should be backed up with substantial 
(financial) resources. It would also be good if further external support could be 
generated to be released in case some of the solutions to the problems discussed in the 
policy exercise actually would be elaborated to the point when it might be implemented. 
The issue of resources (financial support) also bears upon the legitimacy of the 
initiative. Obviously, if an initiative to a participatory policy process does not succeed 
― or it cannot be made plausible that it will eventually succeed ― in securing sufficient 
financial support to make it realistically possible to sustain it, such a process will have 
severe difficulties of finding support among stakeholders. Such a process would simply 
not be considered legitimate in the eyes of its (potential) participants. This problem may 
be even more acute when a participatory policy process is initiated from “the outside”. 
It seems highly unlikely that such initiatives would be able to generate local Russian 
resources sufficient to sustain an active and long-term process. Therefore, today, 
external initiatives to organize participatory policy processes should be backed up with 
external funding.  
In light of the above, our policy exercises in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk might 
be said to have been a moderate success. It did in fact generate some useful activity, but 
an activity that was mainly related to the policy exercise workshop itself. Since the 
process was not backed by sufficient external funding we can only notice that it turned 
out to be a one-time event. As far as we are aware it did not lead to any organized 
longer-term activity among the regional forest stakeholders. It did, however, have a 
certain impact on already on-going work with reforming regional forest sector 
management (Karelia) and the development of a regional forest legislation 
(Arkhangelsk).  
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• What lessons can be learned from IIASA’s efforts to initiate policy exercises and 
the preceding case studies of forest sector institutions in the regions of 
Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk for initiating a successful policy process in 
the Russian forest sector (and elsewhere)?  
As already indicated above, the crucial problem with employing participatory models of 
forest sector development in Russia is intimately linked to the fact that civil society 
(including the political party system) is still very weak in the country. In a society with 
more experience of civic organization the IIASA policy exercise initiative might indeed 
have produced more long-lasting effects, even without the backing of external funding. 
In the present context, however, one must conclude that an important lesson to be 
learned is precisely this: if it is possible to initiate a policy exercise under the present 
Russian circumstances, the initiator must be prepared (i.e., have sufficient resources at 
his disposal) to follow the activity through to the point when it becomes self-
sustainable. This way it will have a chance to “mature” and start producing the intended 
outcomes. 
But there are also some strategic issues that might be even more important for an 
external policy interventionist to consider when deciding how to go about the task of 
initiating a participatory process with the aim of improving the Russian regional forest 
policy.  
Based on the study presented here and in previous reports from the IIASA institutional 
framework project, we can conclude that the most important lesson to be learned for 
improving the possibilities of an external interventionist of having at least a chance of 
success with initiating a participatory policy formulation process in the Russian forest 
sector has to do with the crucial importance of legitimacy and trust as well as the 
importance of finding the right stakeholders to work with. These two issues are, 
furthermore, intimately linked. The choice of stakeholders to take part in the 
participatory process can be decisive for the degree of legitimacy the process will have 
in the eyes of the citizens and the trust with which they can look upon the whole 
endeavor. In the present context we can distinguish at least three options for an external 
policy interventionist when choosing a “dancing partner” for initiating a fruitful policy 
process in the Russian forest sector.  
1. If time is a priority and if one could be certain of a wholehearted and honest 
commitment from the regional top political leadership (the top state executive ― the 
regional administration ― including the regional “forest establishment”) to support 
a genuine participatory policy formulation process engaging a broad circle of 
regional forest stakeholders (i.e., allowing also others than only members of the 
traditional “forest family” a fair influence) a process design like the one envisaged 
by IIASA in the policy interventions performed in Murmansk, Karelia, and 
Arkhangelsk would probably produce the fastest “pay-off” in terms of a vitalized 
and implementable regional forest policy. However, the question is if this set-up 
would produce the best possible forest policy, the policy best adapted or suited to 
the new emerging market conditions. The problem with this approach is that it is 
difficult ― if not impossible ― for an external interventionist to know if the 
members of the traditional “forest family” really are acting with the primary aim of 
furthering an efficient functioning of the forest sector, rather than acting with the 
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ultimate goal of improving their own pay-offs in terms of personal wealth and 
continued power.  
2. In a radically different approach the external interventionist might base the initiation 
and organization of a participatory policy formulation process on forest stakeholders 
outside the established regional top bureaucracy and the traditional “forest family,” 
engaging instead various civil society organizations. This approach would offer an 
opportunity to get those individuals and organizations engaged, who are firmly in 
favor of Russia’s transition to a market type economy. Ideally, it would engage 
those individuals in a region who understand something, or who have ideas, about 
what measures are required to stimulate the regional forest sector to produce the best 
results from a market efficiency point of view. With such participants engaged in the 
policy formulation process, the policy goals and measures proposed might be more 
far-reaching and radical than if the views of the old forest establishment were 
allowed to dominate, in which case policy proposals would probably be hampered 
by “traditional thinking” and a concern for the unfavorable effects that the policy 
might have for members of the “forest family”. A positive “external effect” of using 
this approach would be the stimulus it might give for people’s engagement in the 
emerging, but still rather weak, Russian civil society. (Developing civil society in 
Russia is, in fact, crucial for the continued democratization of the entire Russian 
society.) The great problem with this approach lies in the resistance that can be 
expected both from the regional state executive (the bureaucracy) and the “forest 
family”. In particular, an external interventionist (like IIASA) choosing this mode of 
operation would have to expect such opposition and would be wise to also secure 
the support of the legislative power (the regional parliaments and various political 
parties).  
3. A third avenue may also be available for an external interventionist (like IIASA) 
wanting to engage in participatory policy formulation processes in the Russian 
regional forest sector. This approach would entail seeking the support of the top 
federal political power, the Russian presidency and/or some of the reform-oriented 
ministries. Obtaining such support would (possibly) endow the interventionist with a 
measure of authority that might be used to curtail hostile resistance to the process 
put up by the regional bureaucracy and the forest establishment. It might also help 
the interventionist gaining support from various regional civil society organizations. 
The primary problem with the approach concerns the possibility of actually 
obtaining the necessary support from the Russian federal administration. However, 
prospects for finding this support might not be entirely discouraging. It seems clear 
that the Putin administration, already since its inception, has sought to distance itself 
from the traditional Russian forest industrial and forest management circles. Already 
the abolition of the Federal Forest Service (FFS) and the inclusion of its duties into 
the Ministry of Natural Resources in May 2000 can be seen as a step in this 
direction. The currently intensive debate (in the early spring of 2004) about the first 
drafts of a new Federal Forest Code, where the elaboration of the proposals have 
been assigned to German Gref’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 
also points in the same direction. This whole mode of operation on the part of the 
federal administration might be interpreted as a sign that the government does not 
expect any really creative and efficient market oriented forest policy proposals from 
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the old existing, too heavy and rigid, Russian forest sector management 
organization.  
In Russia, where the central political power is still comparatively weak and where the 
political system and civil society are underdeveloped ― a situation only offering a very 
frail foundation for the kind of interaction that actually constitutes participatory policy 
formulation processes ― it must be expected that, whatever approach an external 
interventionist adopts, the initiated policy formulation process will be “invaded” by 
various groups in society fighting for influence and (most likely) personal material 
benefits. Such detrimental behavior is likely to improve only with continued 
development of Russian civil society and further reformation of the country’s market 
governing institutions.  
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Appendix B1: Murmansk: Workshop Program of  
IIASA Policy Exercise, 23–25 October 2000 
International Policy Exercise 
“Institutional Changes in the Murmansk Forest Sector” 
Murmansk, Russia, 23–25 October 2000 
Monday, 23 October 
13:00–13:30 Hotel “Polyarnye Zory”, Murmansk ― Registration 
13:30–15:00 Welcoming speech 
1. Vladimir Selin, IEP 
2. Mats-Olov Olsson, IIASA forest project, speaks about IIASA and its research on forestry (30 
min.) 
3. Peter Duinker, main facilitator of the meeting, explains the goals and means of the exercise (20 
min.) 
15:00–15:30 Alexander Alimov, Murmansk Regional Administration, speaks about the socioeconomic situation 
in the region 
15:30–16:00 Coffee, tea 
16:00–17:00 The IIASA study on the institutional embedding of the Russian forest sector is presented by Lars 
Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson, IIASA research team 
17:00–18:00 The IIASA study on the institutional embedding of the Murmansk forest sector is presented by the 
researchers Lyudmila Ivanova, IEP and Vigdis Nygaard, NIBR 
20:00 Dinner at hotel restaurant 
Tuesday 24, October 
09:00–11:00 Plenary session lead by Peter Duinker  
1.  Short summary of first day. 
2.  Discussion. The purpose is to identify what the Russian participants see as the main problems 
besetting the forest sector in Murmansk 
3.  Peter Duinker presents a synthesis of the problem set and establishes working groups in witch the 
Russian participants will discuss the problems. 
11:00–11:30 Coffee, tea 
11:30–13:00 Group work/discussions among the Russian participants 
13:00–14:30 Lunch 
14:30–16:00 Group work/discussions among the Russian participants continues 
16:00–16:30 Coffee, tea 
16:30–18:00 Group work/discussions among the Russian participants continues  
20:00 Dinner at Restaurant «Inari» 
Wednesday 25, October 
09:00–11:00 Plenary. Representatives of the groups inform about the outcome of the discussions in their respective 
groups (“debriefing”). Discussion. 
11:00–11:30 Coffee, tea 
11:30–12:30 Closing of the policy exercise. Forming of working groups for continued work on solving identified 
issues 
12:30–13:00 The IIASA team meets with representatives of the various working groups (one at a time) to discuss 
the plans for their work, working out final document 
13:00–14:30 Lunch 
15:00 Excursion to Kolskiy leskhoz 
Thursday, 26 October 
09:00–11:30 The IIASA team meets with the Regional Administration to sum up the experiences of the policy 
exercise. 
 142
Appendix B2: Murmansk: Workshop Participants of  
IIASA Policy Exercise, 23–25 October 2000 
International Policy Exercise 
“Institutional Changes in the Murmansk Forest Sector” 
Murmansk, Russia, 23–25 October 2000 
Participant name Company/Organization Position Location 
Lars Carlsson Lulea University of Technology Associate Professor Sweden 
Peter Duinker School for Resource and Environmental Studies 
Director, 
Professor Canada 
Vigdis Nygaard Norwegian Institute for Urban 
and Regional Research Researcher Norway 
Mats-Olov Olsson International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Researcher Austria 
Alexander Alimov Murmansk Regional Administration 
Head of 
Department Murmansk 
Nadezhda Zimina Murmansk Regional Administration  Murmansk 
Nikolay Pekush Murmansk Forest Management Head Murmansk 
Yevgeny Olesik Committee of Nature Protection Deputy Chairman Murmansk  
Valeriy Sokolov Committee of Nature Protection Head of Department Murmansk 
Vladimir Selin  Institute for Economic Problems Director Apatity 
Lyudmila Ivanova Institute for Economic Problems Researcher Apatity 
Tamara Malkova Institute for Economic Problems Researcher Apatity 
Dennis Smirnov Kola Nature Protection Centre/INEP Researcher Apatity 
Svetlana Chukareva Kolskiy leskhoz Chef Forester Kola 
Yekaterina Krasilnikova Murmanskiy leskhoz Chief Forester Murmansk 
Valentina Nekhaeva Lovozerskiy leskhoz Chief Forester Revda 
Alexander Pavlov Kovdozerskiy leskhoz Director Zasheek 
Tamara Serebrovskaya Monchegorskiy leskhoz Chief Forester Monchegorsk 
Igor Biryukov Private company  Murmansk 
Alexander Dvoryankin SC «Priroda» Director Verkhnetulomskiy 
Igor Ivaniv  Municipal enterprise 
«Belomorles» Chief Engineer Umba 
Kari Tahtinen SC «Eurotiivi» Director Kola 
Alexander Tesalovskiy Kovdorskiy lespromkhoz Director Kovdor 
Margarita Tilikova Kovda-timber Head of Department Zelenoborskiy 
Interpreters: Zinaida Nechmir and Nadezhda Nikolaeva 
Secretary: Anna Garbuz 
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Appendix B3:  Murmansk: Final Document 
SUMMARY FROM THE SEMINAR 
“INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE MURMANSK FOREST SECTOR” 
On 23–25 October 2000, the Institute of Economic Problems of the Kola Science 
Centre, RAS, in co-operation with the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) and the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) 
conducted a seminar for representatives of enterprises and organisations related to the 
forest sector of Murmansk Oblast and stakeholders in sustainable regional forest use.  
Representatives of the Murmansk Oblast Administration, the forest and forest 
processing industry ― heads of enterprises and owners of private business companies, 
forest management, non-governmental environmental organisations and scientists from 
the Kola Science Centre, RAS, took part in the seminar from the Russian side.  
In the plenary session, to which the first day of the seminar was devoted, participants 
were given a lecture by a representative of the Murmansk Oblast Administration (A.N. 
Alimov) on ways to achieve economic development in the Murmansk region. Then 
participants were given information (by Mats-Olov Olsson) about the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Representatives of the research project 
on sustainable forest use in the North conducted at IIASA (Lars Carlsson and Mats-
Olov Olsson) made a presentation of their research. A study of the forest sector in 
Murmansk Oblast has also been conducted within the framework of this comprehensive 
project. The researchers responsible for this study, representatives of IEP and NIBR 
(Lyudmila Ivanova and Vigdis Nygaard) reported on the results of their work.  
Peter Duinker, Director of the School for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Dalhousie University, Halifax (Canada), who chaired the general discussion, suggested 
that participants should identify what they believed were the main problems for the 
Murmansk forest sector. In order to have a structured discussion of the identified 
problems and a search for possible ways to solve them all problems were grouped in the 
following way: financial, personnel, juridical, social, technical, and environmental. The 
further discussion was conducted in two working groups. The first group discussed 
financial, technical and environmental problems. The discussion in the second group 
concentrated on juridical, personnel, and social problems. Participants were divided 
between the two groups in accordance with their interests.  
The first group made the following suggestions resulting from the discussions. 
Concerning financial and technical problems: 
1. The status of leskhozy should be carefully determined. If this is a state service it 
should not be allowed to conduct business activities with the purpose to obtain 
profit. To be able to fulfil its planned work the entire funding (100%) should be 
provided via the federal budget.  
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2. The regional law on zones of economic development should have a wider 
applicability entailing taxation privileges in those districts of Murmansk Oblast 
where the forest industry is well developed.  
3. The Law on Northern Territories should be followed, as it applies to payments of 
northern wage bonuses from the federal budget.  
4. Possibilities should be investigated to allow taxation privileges for investors during 
the period when an enterprise is being established.  
5. Credit privileges for forest enterprises should be given by the Regional 
Administration from non-budget sources for investments in production capital.  
Concerning environmental problems: 
1. A transfer to compulsory forest product certification by independent state 
organisations should be introduced. Here it should be noted that, according to the 
forest management and forest industry representatives, this process entails certain 
difficulties, for which many enterprises are not ready.  
The second group had the following suggestions: 
2. An appeal should be sent to the employment agency of the Murmansk Oblast 
Administration containing a listing of special professional qualifications that are in 
demand on the labour market.  
3. An appeal should be sent to the Centre of Scientific-Technical Information asking 
for help to develop a program for the compilation and distribution of information on 
the situation in the forest sector (summoned through SMI, and subsequently through 
Internet). This would mean the creation of a database for the forest sector.  
Common for both groups was the proposal to develop and introduce changes in the rules 
for harvesting standing forest, taking regional characteristics into account, engaging in 
this process the Oblast administration and scientific organisations.  
The participants of the seminar reached the conclusion that one of the fundamental 
problems of the forest industry is the lack of co-ordination at the regional level. The 
creation of a co-ordinating organ might facilitate the solution of many problems that are 
shared by enterprises.  
The main result of the seminar was that an agreement was reached by the participants to 
create a regional organisation (an association) of forest users in Murmansk Oblast, in 
which forest industrialists, representatives of forest management and environmental 
organisations would take part. Such an association should be a voluntary union of 
enterprises and organisations. Within the framework of this organisation a closer 
collaboration between members is assumed to be established, here common problems 
should be discussed and solved, members’ interests should be defended, and it should 
lead to interactions with the Regional Administration and other organs.  
Seminar participants agreed to continue their work to create a regional association and 
they agreed that it would be necessary to have regular meetings to discuss the issues that 
were raised. The next meeting is planned for the end of November 2000.  
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Appendix C1:  Karelia: Workshop Program of IIASA Policy 
Exercise, 30 November–1 December 2000 
“Institutional Problems of the Forest Sector in the Republic of Karelia” 
International Policy Exercise, Petrozavodsk  
November 30–December 1, 2000 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, November 28-30, 2000 
Arrival and accommodation of foreign and non-resident participants of the exercise at Hotel 
“Severnaya” (Petrozavodsk, Lenin Prospect 21) 
Wednesday, November 29, 2000 
13:00–15:00 Representatives of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
meet with the chairmen of the working groups 
Thursday, November 30, 2000 
8:30–9:00 Breakfast 
9:00 Bus from Hotel “Severnaya” to the Banking School 
9:00–9:30 Registration for the exercise 
9:30–15:30 Plenary session, Chairman: V.N. Maslyakov 
9:30–9:45 Opening words. V.N. Maslyakov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Karelia 
9:45–10:00 Research on Forestry at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). Professor Sten Nilsson, Counselor to the Director of IIASA, Leader of the 
Forestry Project, Laxenburg, Austria 
10:00–10:30 The IIASA Study on the Institutional Embedding of the Russian Forest Sector. Lars 
Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria 
10:30–11:00 Main results of the Study “Transition in the Forest Sector of the Republic of Karelia”. 
Researcher Minna Piipponen, Karelian Institute, University of Joensuu, Finland 
11:00–11:15 Coffee Break 
11:15–11:45 Current Institutional Development in the Forestry Complex at the Federal Level. N.А. 
Burdin, JSC “NIPIEIlesprom”, Moscow 
11:45–12:00 Comments on the presentations. A.M. Tsypuk, Petrozavodsk State University, V.G. 
Matrosov, OAO “Kemskii LDZ” 
12:00–12:20 Perspectives of the Forestry Complex in the Republic of Karelia. A.I. Drobakha, Vice-
president of the State Committee for the Forest Industrial Complex of the Republic of 
Karelia 
12:20–12:35 The Latest Changes of the Forest Policy of Arkhangelsk, Leningrad Oblast and the 
Republic of Komi and Its Potential Influence on the Forest Sector of Karelia. A. 
Ptichnikov, Moscow Representative of the WWF  
12:35–12:55 Perspectives of the Structural Development of Forest Management in Russia and forest 
certification in Russia A.V. Panfilov, Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian 
Federation, Moscow 
12:55–13:15 On the state of the forest fund, forest use and forest management in the Republic of 
Karelia. J.V. Skadorva, Committee of Natural Resources of the Republic of Karelia 
13:15–14:15 Lunch 
14:15–14:40 Perspectives of the Swedish Forest Sector Development. K.-G. Edstedt, Vaesterbotten 
County Administrative Board, Trade and Industry Division 
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14:40–15:00 The World Bank and the Development of the Regional Forest Sector. World Bank 
Representative S.E. Pitovranov, Fund for Restructuring of Enterprises (FRP), Moscow 
15:00–15:15 Coffee Break 
15:15–15:35 The Northern Region and the Barents Region Forest Sector Initiative.  
Olli Saastamoinen, University of Joensuu, Finland.  
15:35–15:50 Comments on the Presentations 
15:50–16:30 Goals and Means of the Policy Exercise. Sten Nilsson,  
The purpose is to identify what the Russian participants see as the main problems of the 
forest sector in Karelia 
16:30–16:45 Establishing working groups 
16:45–18:00 Group work 
18:00 Dinner 
20:00 Bus from the Banking School to Hotel “Severnaya” 
Friday, December 1, 2000  
8:00–8:30 Breakfast 
8:30 Bus from Hotel “Severnaya” to the Banking School 
9:15–9:30 Briefing 
9:30–10:45 Group work continues 
10:45–11:00 Coffee Break 
11:00–13:10 Group work continues. 
13:10–14:00 Lunch 
14:00–15:00 Plenary 
15:00–15:30 Coffee Break 
15:30–16:00 Continued Plenary 
16:00–16:30 Preparation of Declaration 
16:30 Bus to restaurant for dinner 
19:00 Departure from Petrozavodsk by train № 17 (Petrozavodsk–Moscow) 
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Appendix C2:  Karelia: Workshop Participants of IIASA Policy 
Exercise, 30 November–1 December 2000 
RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
BURDIN, N.A., General director, OAO “NIPIEIlesprom”, Moscow 
PANFILOV, A.V., Deputy Head, Department of science and information systems, Ministry of Natural 
Resources of the Russian Federation, Moscow 
PISARENKO, A.I., President, The Russian Society of Foresters, Moscow 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KARELIAN REPUBLIC 
ANAN’EV, V.A., “Vodlozero” National Park 
BARBALYUK, B.A., Director, OAO “Muezerskii LPKh” 
DENISOVA, M.I., GTRK “Karelian Radio” 
DROBAKHA, A.I., Vice-president, State Committee for the Forest Industrial Complex of the Republic of 
Karelia 
DRUZHININ, P.V., Head of department, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
FEDCHIK, I.N., Director, OAO “Pyaozerskii LPKh” 
FROLOV, V.I., Researcher, “KARELNIILP”, Design of new technology 
GERASIMOV, Yu.Yu., Head of the StoraEnso representation in Petrozavodsk, proffessor at the forest 
engineering faculty of the Petrozavodsk State University 
GRIGOR’EV, V.V., Head of the Suojarvi municipal administration 
GROMTSEV, A.N., Head of laboratory, Forest Institute, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
GROMTSEV, M.A., Senior scientific associate, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
GROSHEVA, O.V., Senior specialist, State Committee of the Forest Industrial Complex 
GUDYM, V.M., “Vodlozero” National Park 
GUROVA, S.A., Research scholar, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
IESHKO, E.P., Vice-President of the Presidium, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences 
KHOTEEV, S.V., Senior management specialist of regional business, Branch office of ZAO “Menatep 
St. Peterburg” Bank 
KIR’YANOV, N.N., Vice-president of the Union of Forest Industrialists and Forest Exporters 
KIRYASOV, V.N., Special correspondent of the “Lesnaya Gazeta” (“The Forest Gazette”) in 
Petrozavodsk 
KOZYREVA, G.V., Researcher, Economics Department, Karelian State Pedagogical University 
KRUTOV, V.I., Director, Forest Institute, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences 
MAKAROV, A.A., Newspaper “Nablyudatel’” (“The Spectator”) 
MALIKOV, V.I., Head of the Pudozha municipal administration 
MARKOVSKII, A., Ph.D. student, President of the student environmental organization 
MASLYAKOV, V.N., First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Natural Resources, Government of the 
Republic of Karelia 
MATROSOV, V.G., Director of OAO “Kem LDZ” 
MIKHALEVA, G.M., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Karelia 
MOROZOVA, T.V., Head of department, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
NEMKOVICH, E.G., Deputy director, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
PANKRATOV, A.A., President, Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Karelia 
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PLADOV, V.A., General Director, Holding company “Karellesprom” 
POLEVSHCHIKOVA, N.B., Head of the Laboratory for regional socio-economic geography, Karelian 
State Pedagogical University 
ROZHANSKII, I.B., Administration of the President, Government of the Republic of Karelia 
RYBAKOV, D.S., Co-president of MSOES, Coordinator of ROO “Zelenykh” (“The Greens”) 
SABUROV, N.I., “Lesnaya gazeta” (“The Forest Gazette”) 
SACHUK, T.V., Head of the Economics Department, Karelian State Pedagogical University 
SAKOVETS, V.I., Forest Institute, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences 
SANKIN, I.N., Assistant to the President, Government of the Republic of Karelia  
SHEGEL’MAN, I.R., Petrozavodsk State University, President of the Karelian Engineering Academy 
SHEVCHUK, I.I., Representative of the Government of the Republic of Karelia 
SHISHKIN, A.I., Director, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
SHLYAMIN, V.A., Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Karelia 
SHURUPOV, I.M., Minister of Economics of the Republic of Karelia 
SKADORVA, I.V., Head, the Regional Forest Management of the Russian Federation, Petrozavodsk 
SUKHAREV, M.V., Research associate, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
TIGUSHKIN, Yu.A., Coordinator of the Regional Program for Forest Certification “Karelia” 
TITOV, A.F., President of the Presidium, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences.  
TSYPUK, A.M., Professor, Forest Engineering Faculty, Petrozavodsk State University 
VASHCHUK, OAO “Pudozhpromles” 
VEIKKOLAINEN, I.I., Newspaper “Karjala sannomat” 
VISTBAKA, A.V., Consultant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
VOLKOV, A.D., Deputy director of science, Forest Institute, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy 
of Sciences 
YAKOVLEV, P.V., Director, OAO “Il’inskii lesozavod” (“Il’in Forest Factory”) 
ZHUKOV, N.N., President, State Committee for the Forest Industrial Complex of the Republic of Karelia  
FOREIGN EXPERTS AND SCIENTISTS 
Group from the Forest Project at the International Insitute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
CARLSSON, L., Researcher, Austria/Sweden 
FESTIN, C., Administrative assistant, Austria/USA 
NILSSON, S., Councellor to the Director of IIASA, Leader of the Forest Project, Austria 
OLSSON, M.-O., Researcher, Austria/Sweden 
SHVIDENKO, A., Researcher, Austria/Russia 
Others 
KOL’TSOV, S.B., Representation of WWF in St. Petersburg 
PTICHNIKOV, A.V., Moscow representation of the WWF 
PITOVRANOV, S.E., Head of Forest Sector Program, Noncommercial Foundation for Enterprise 
Restructuring and Financial Institutions Development (FER), Moscow  
VARAKIN, M.Yu., Docent, Institute of Economics, Finance and Business Management, Arkhangelsk 
State Technical University 
Sweden 
EDSTEDT, K.-G., Trade and industry division, Västerbotten County Administrative Board, Sweden 
USA 
VASENDA, S., Researcher, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, 
Indiana University, Bloomington 
Finland 
PIIPPONEN, M., Researcher, University of Joensuu 
SAASTAMOINEN, O., Professor, University of Joensuu 
HYTTYNEN, M., Finnish Forest Research Institute (METLA), Helsinki 
 149
Appendix C3: Karelia: Final Document, Declaration 
30.11.–1.12.2000 
SEMINAR  
“INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOREST SECTOR  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KARELIA” 
Organized by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)  
with the support of the Government of the Republic of Karelia 
Petrozavodsk 
DECLARATION 
The successful development of the Republic of Karelia is determined by the results of the 
activities in the forest sector enterprises. The change in a number of external conditions during 
1998–2000 has allowed enterprises to improve their efficiency. But the absence of a stable 
legislative base, uncoordinated activities and a constant rise in internal production costs have 
held back the increased efficiency in the use of the republic’s forest resources. It should be 
acknowledged that on the whole the forest complex of Karelia has not been able to reach 
decisions on a number of strategic issues that would facilitate a long term stable development of 
enterprises and allow a more efficient use of Karelia’s rich forest resources in the short as well 
as in the long term.  
Participants of the seminar expressed their readiness to become the initiators in a process of 
collaboration between all institutions in the Karelian society to create and implement an 
integrated policy for the development of the forest sector.  
Taking into account: 
– the importance and availability of the forest resources of Karelia; 
– the necessity of stable legislative foundations for enterprises’ activity; 
– the strongly increased competition and our limitations in competing for customers on the 
sales markets; 
– the importance and necessity of collaboration between production enterprises and research; 
– the necessity of taking into account the opinion of all stakeholders interested in the 
successful development of the forest sector; 
– the importance to solve the task of developing the forest sector in the shortest possible time, 
we believe that the forest resources could and should become the basis for the creation of 
favorable socio-economic conditions in the Republic of Karelia.  
It is necessary to consolidate the efforts of all forest sector stakeholders to achieve a 
restructuring of the Karelian forest sector. The main goals of such a restructuring should be to 
achieve: 
– social welfare for the people;  
– a high efficiency in the production of the enterprises and competitive products;  
– preservation of the forests as a resource for future generations.  
A strategy for the sustainable development of the forest sector of the Republic of Karelia should 
be elaborated. This strategy should be based on the complex development of forest 
management, forest industry and other related sectors taking the interests of the national 
economy and society into account. It can be envisaged that in working towards this goal a 
number of new horizontal and vertical structures in the forest sector will emerge within the 
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framework of the existing legislation of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Karelia. 
These structures will be able to channel various institutions’ interests and engagement in the 
development of a modern regional forest policy for the Republic of Karelia. Naturally, this 
policy should also be developed in collaboration with other subjects of the Russian Federation, 
who are concerned about the successful development of the country’s forest sector. Today, 
enterprise leaders understand and accept the idea of converting the activity of their enterprises to 
meet existing international standards.  
Collaboration between all social institutions is absolutely essential to effectively achieve 
the goal of reforming the forest sector of Karelia. A result of such joint efforts will also be 
the possibility to provide competent solutions of the economic, environmental and social 
problems related to the sustainable management of the forests in the Republic of Karelia 
to the benefit of society.  
This declaration was formulated by the undersigned on the basis of the discussions held at the 
seminar. As the next step in the process of establishing the forms of activity of all social 
institutions a second document will be elaborated which also will be based on the discussions 
during the seminar. In this document a clear formulation will be given of the problems besetting 
the Karelian forest sector and various possible solutions to these problems will be proposed.  
The seminar was initiated by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria, and was sponsored by the Government of the Republic of Karelia as well as 
by Västerbotten County Administrative Board and the Kempe Foundations, Sweden.  
On behalf of the seminar participants:  
  Signatures 
Members of the organizing committee and chairmen of the discussion groups: 
VISTBAKA, A.V., Consultant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Karelia 
ZHUKOV, N.N., President, State Committee of the Forest Industrial Complex of the Republic 
of Karelia  
IESHKO, E.P., Vice-President of the Presidium, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
MATROSOV, V.G., Director of OAO “Kem LDZ” 
MASLYAKOV, V.N., First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Natural Resources, 
Government of the Republic of Karelia 
SKADORVA, I.V., acting head of the Committee on natural resources in the Republic of 
Karelia 
PLADOV, V.A., General Director, Holding company “Karellesprom” 
POLEVSHCHIKOVA, N.B., Head of the Laboratory for regional socio-economic geography, 
Karelian State Pedagogical University 
SACHUK, T.V., Head of the Economics Department, Karelian State Pedagogical University 
SHISHKIN, A.I., Director, Institute of Economics, Karelian Science Centre, Russian Academy 
of Sciences 
SHLYAMIN, V.A., Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Karelia 
SHURUPOV, I.M., Minister of Economics of the Republic of Karelia 
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Appendix C4: Karelia: Final Document, Recommendations 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR 
“INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOREST SECTOR  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KARELIA” 
30 November–1 December 2000 
PETROZAVODSK 
The process to establish a forest policy depends on many factors, i.a., on the existence of 
institutional relations (formal and informal rules and norms), regulating the behavior of the 
actors in the forest sector.  
The seminar, jointly organized by the Government of the Republic of Karelia and the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), facilitated a discussion of the 
most important strategic tasks facing the forest sector of the economy.  
The participants of the seminar, representatives of the federal and Karelian governments, 
science, economic actors, public organizations, and foreign experts, noted the necessity to 
consolidate the efforts of society, business and government in order to achieve a transformation 
in various spheres related to the forest sector.  
The basis for the discussion during the seminar were: ? The published results of research on institutional problems in Russian regions and 
Karelia performed by IIASA: “Institutions and the emergence of markets ― transition 
in the Russian forest sector,” reflecting general and specific institutional problems of 
the forest sector; ? Papers dealing with the most recent changes in the forest sector at the Russian and the 
regional levels, presented by specialists from forest management, forest industry and 
public organizations. 
In the course of the discussion topical questions were raised and the following recommendations 
were elaborated taking into account the current situation:  
I. Forest resources and the environment:  
To accommodate ecological and biodiversity issues in the forest complex in accordance with 
international requirements. 
To conduct an inventory (cadastre) of forest resources taking wood and other forest functions 
and values into account.  
To introduce a procedure for obligatory and voluntary certification of forest products for 
exports.  
II. The future orientation of the sector:  
To increase the harvesting and processing of wood through increased construction works, 
production of furniture. 
To raise the level of qualification of the workers in the forest sector. To develop a program for 
training of personnel. 
To facilitate for citizens to improve the condition in the forest sector themselves through public 
institutions and organizations.  
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To develop a strategy for long-term development of the Karelian forest sector.  
III. Legislation:  
To clarify property rights of the forest resources at federal and local levels.  
To introduce detailed rules with regard to ownership of forest resources during the period of 
transformation to market conditions. 
To improve legislation concerning forest utilization, especially with regard to taxes and tariffs.  
To use legislative measures to remove corruption in the forest sector.  
To elaborate and adopt local rules for forest use.  
To clarify the structure of the forest sector at federal and local levels. 
IV. The management of forest enterprises:  
To separate the functions of business from the functions of politics.  
To promote various forms of integration between enterprises in the forest sector.  
V. The modernization of forest enterprises:  
To create a mechanism for investment and innovation, for example, through a public investment 
policy. 
To renew the capital equipment of the forest enterprises.  
To stimulate the development of forest business through various measures like, for example, 
new forms of public communication about the situation in the forest sector.  
VI. Government support:  
To develop forms and methods for state collaboration and support of forest sector enterprises.   
To increase the investment attractiveness of Karelia through the creation of more efficient 
infrastructure (roads, railroads, water transport, bank services) and political stability.  
To find a mechanism for cooperation between the forest sector enterprises, the municipal 
administrations where they are located and the state structures.  
VII. Civic institutions:  
To create public organizations in Karelia and allow them to deal with the issues of institutional 
reforms in order to facilitate interaction in the forest sector between representatives of business, 
government and society.  
These recommendations have been elaborated by the representatives of the working groups 
based on the discussions in the summary plenary session of the seminar on November 30 
December 1, 2000.  
 153
Appendix D1: Arkhangelsk: Workshop Program of 
IIASA Policy Exercise, 29–30 March 2001 
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOREST SECTOR  
IN ARKHANGELSK OBLAST 
International Policy Exercise, Arkhangelsk, March 29–30, 2001 
Monday, Tuesday, March 26–27, 2001  
Arrival of foreign and out-of-town seminar participants. Accommodation in hotel “Pur-Navolok” (Nab. 
Severnoi Dviny 88, Arkhangelsk)  
Wednesday, March 28, 2001 
10:00–12:00 Meetings with representatives of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis and the chairmen of the discussion groups 
Thursday, March 29, 2001 
08:30–09:00 Breakfast 
09:00 Bus from hotel “Pur-Navolok” 
09:00–09:30 Registration of participants 
09:30–15:30 Plenary session chaired by O.M. Sokolov 
09:30–09:40 Opening of the seminar. Words of welcome by the rector of the AGTU, Acad. O.M. 
Sokolov, and by the Acting Chairman of the Committee for International Relations of 
the Arkhangelsk Regional Administration, Mr. V.F. Eremeev 
09:40–10:00 The development strategy of Arkhangelsk region ― A.V. Poludnitsin, Deputy General 
Director of the Department of Economics and Development of the Arkhangelsk Region, 
Arkhangelsk Regional Administration 
10:00–10:30 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the forest project ― 
Sten Nilsson, Counselor to the director, leader of the Forest Project, IIASA. 
10:30–11:15 Research on the institutional embedding of the Russian forest sector ― Lars Carlsson 
and Mats-Olov Olsson, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria 
11:15–11:30 Coffee 
11:30–11:50 The organization of forest management ― D.V. Trubin, Committee on natural 
resources of Arkhangelsk Oblast 
11:50–12:10 Structural changes in the production of sawn wood in the Arkhangelsk region since 
1998 until the present ― A.M. Kopeikin, JSC “Nauchdrevprom–TsNIIMOD” 
12:10–12:30 Assessment of the situation and the prospects of forest exports in Arkhangelsk Oblast – 
E.G. Tsarev, General director, AO “Severolesoeksport” 
12:30–14:00 Lunch 
14:00–14:20 The experience of creating vertically integrated structures on the basis of a pulp and 
paper combine ― A.V. Plastinin, president of the board of directors, JSC “Solombala 
Pulp and Paper Mill”, head of the management department, ASTU 
14:20–14:40 Assessment and ways of implementation of the IIASA forest project ― A.A. Kalinin, 
Chairman of the Council of the Union of Forest Industrialists of the Arkhangelsk 
region, Director of Commercial Bank “Lesobank” 
14:40–15:00 Economic assessment of forest resources and forst land of the North and North-West of 
Russia in the market conditions ― Nikolay P. Chuprov, Head of laboratory of the 
Director on Scientific Work of Northern Scientific-research Institute of Forestry 
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15:00-15:10 Current activity of the world Bank connected with the development of the forest sector 
in Russia ― S.E. Pitovranov, Non-commercial fund for reconstruction of enterprises 
and development of financial institutions 
15:10-15:20 The Russian programme of WWF and development problems of the forest sector in the 
North-West of Russia ― V.V. Dmitriev, coordinator, Russian representative of WWF, 
Moscow 
15:20-15:30 Legal and economic foundation for the implementation of property rights of forest 
resources ― A.E. Kleinhof, Prof. Moscow University of Forestry  
15:30–15:50 Coffee 
15:50–16:10 Organization of group work 
16:10–17:50 Group work 
18:00 Dinner 
20:00 Bus to hotel “Pur-Navolok” 
Friday, March 20, 2001 
08:00–08:30 Breakfast 
08:30 Bus from hotel “Pur-Navolok” 
09:15–11:00 Group work continued 
11:00–11:20 Coffee 
11:20–12:30 Group work continued 
12:30–14:00 Lunch 
14:00–15:40 Joint work of Group 1 and 2 
15:40–16:00 Coffee 
16:00–17:00 Plenary session. Presentation of results of the discussion in the groups and general 
discussion. Concluding results of the work.  
18:00 Dinner at restaurant 
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Appendix D2: Arkhangelsk: Workshop Participants 
of IIASA Policy Exercise, 29–30 March 2001 
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOREST SECTOR  
IN ARKHANGELSK OBLAST 
International Policy Exercise, Arkhangelsk, March 29–30, 2001 
Moscow 
Belyakova, Eugenia ― Assistant project coordinator, Voluntary forest certification and sustainable 
development, “Greenpeace Russia”, Moscow, p.b.27, 125040 
Tel: (8-095) 257 41 16; Fax: (8-095) 257 41 10 
Dmitriev, Vladimir Viktorovich ― Coordinator, Russian Office of the WWF (World Wildlife Fund)  
Nikolaemskaya 19, Building 3, Moscow, 109240 
Tel: +7 (095) 727 09 39; Fax +7 (095) 727 09 38; E-mail: vdmitriev@wwf.ru  
Egornov, Viktor Alekseevich – Deputy General Director, JSC “NIPIElesprom”  
Tel. +7 (095) 456 13 03, 232 04 93; E-mail: nipi@dialup.ppt.ru 
Kleinhoff, Andris E. ― Professor, Moscow State Forestry University, Moscow 
E-mail: vniilm@chat.ru 
Pisarenko, Anatoly Ivanovich ― President, Russian Forester’s Society 
59/19, Pyatnitskaya Street, Moscow, 113184  
Tel: +7 (095) 953 57 61; Fax: +7 (095) 953 09 52 
Pitovranov, Sergey Eugenevich ― Project Management Specialist, Non-commercial Foundation for 
Enterprise Restructuring and Financial Institute Development 
3/5, Smolenskij Boulevard, Moscow, 119121  
Tel: +7 (095) 792 30 10; fax: +7 (095) 792 30 11; E-mail: sergeyP@fer.ru 
Administration of the Arkhangelsk Region 
Isakov, Nickolai Alekseevich ― Vice-chairman of the Regional Parliament  
Eremeev, Vadim Flegonevich ― Acting chairman of the Committee on International Relations, 
Arkhangelsk Regional Administration, 49, Troitskii Avenue, Arkhangelsk 
Fax: +7 (8182) 26 92 03 / +7 (8182) 43 46 38 
Ozhegov, Nickolai Antoninovich ― Deputy Head, Committee on Land Resources and Land 
Management, Arkhangelsk Regional Administration, 18, Vyucheiskii Street, Arkhangelsk, 163061  
Tel: +7 (8182) 64 68 49; Fax: +7 (8182) 64 68 89; E-mail: aroblzem@atnet.ru 
Polydnitsyn, Aleksandr Valentinovich ― Deputy General Director, Department of Economics and 
Development, Arkhangelsk Regional Administration, 49, Troitskii Avenue, Arkhangelsk 
Trubin, Dmitrii Vladimirovich ― Head of the Department, State Control Organization of the 
Committee for Natural Resources, Arkhangelsk Regional Administration 
94, Troitskii Avenue, Arkhangelsk, 163061  
Tel. +7 (8182) 43 23 18   
Forest-industrial complex of the Arkhangelsk Region 
Beloglazov, Vladimir Ivanovich ― General Director, JSC “Arkhangelsk PPM” 
1, Melnikova Street, Novodvinsk, 163901 
Vorobjov, Valerii Vasilevich ― Director for Wood, JSC “Arkhangelsk PPM” 
1, Melnikov Street, Novodvinsk, 163901 
Tel: +7 (818-252) 4 66 73 
Erdyakov, Sergey Vasilevich ― Head of Arkhangelsk Forest Organization Expedition 
13, Nikitova Street, Arkhangelsk, 163062 
Tel/Fax: +7 (8182) 62 80 50 
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Kalinin, Alexandr Anatolevich ― Director of Lesobank, Chairman of the Union of Wood-industrialists 
and Employers of the Arkhangelsk Region, 2, K.Liebnecht, Arkhangelsk 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 13 22; Fax: +7 (8182) 65 14 07; E-mail: info@lesobank.ru 
Kozykin, Alexandr Vladimirovich ― Chief Forester, Kenozersky National Park 
Tel: +7 (818241) 271 38 
Medunitsyn, Yurii Borisovich ― Chairman of the Board of Directors, JSC “Sawmill № 3”, Co-
chairman of the “Pomor Industrialists” Association, 163, Leningradsky Avenue, Arkhangelsk, 163015 
Tel: +7 (8182) 41 22 14 
Morozov, Victor Nickolaevich ― Director, Kargopol Forestry Enterprise (leskhoz) 
9a, Pionerskaya Street, Kargopol, Arkhangelsk Region, 164600 
E-mail: karples@atnet.ru 
Pankratov, Anatoly Alexandrovich ― Deputy General Director, JSC “Solombala Sawmill” 
1a, Dobrolyubova Street, Arkhangelsk, 163012 
Tel: +7 (8182) 29 43 58 
Plastinin, Alexandr Victorovich ― Chairman of the Board of Directors, JSC “Solombala PPM”, Head 
of the Management Department, Arkhangelsk State Technical University 
17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (818241) 44 93 92 
Shumilov, Vladimir Valentinovich ― Committee for Natural Resources 
Tsarev, Eugenii Grigorjevich ― General Director, JSC “Severolesoexport”,  
2, K.Liebnecht, Arkhangelsk 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 13 63 
Scientific-research and Educational Institutions of Arkhangelsk 
Bakhtin, Alexander Alexandovich ― Dean of the Forestry Faculty at Arkhangelsk State Technical 
University 
Tel: (8-8182) 44 91 36 
Varakin, Mikhail Yurevich ― Docent, Institute of Economics, Finance and Business, Arkhanagelsk 
State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44  93 81 
E-mail: varakin@mail.sts.ru 
Gusakov, Leonid Vyacheslavovich ― Head of Scientific-research Sector, Arkhanagelsk State 
Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002. 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 10 44 
Demidova, Natalia Anatolevna ― Deputy Director of Scientific Work, Northern Scientific-research 
Institute of Forestry, 13, Nikitova Street, Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 41 62 46; Fax: +7 (8182) 41 25 87; E-mail: root@forestry.sts.ru 
Derbin, Vasily Mikhailovich ― Head of department, Arkhangelsk State Technical University 
17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44  93 93 
Ezhov, Oleg Nikolaevich ― Senior researcher, Institute of Ecological Problems, the North of the Ural 
Department of RANS 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 11 63 
Komarova, Galina Vladimirovna ― Vice-rector for International Affairs, Arkhangelsk State Technical 
University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002  
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 91 60; E-mail: komarova@agtu.ru 
Koptev, Sergey Victorovich ― Docent, Department of Inventory and Forest Management, 
Arkhangelsk State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: (8-8182) 44 91 73; E-mail: koptev@agtu.ru 
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Kopeikin, Adolf Mikhailovich ― Deputy General Director, JSC “Nauchdrevprom–TSNIIMOD” on 
Scientific Work, 112/1, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk 163061 
Tel: +7 (8182) 43 66 97 
Melekhov, Vladimir Ivanovich ― Professor, Head of the Department of Wood Science and Heat 
Treatment of Wood, Arkhangelsk State Technical University 
17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 91 49 
Mitrofanov, Alexander Alexandrovich ― Head of the Department of Water Transport, Arkhangelsk 
State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 91 50 
Naborshchikov, Alexander Vasilevich ― Laboratory of Economics, Northern Scientific-research 
Institute of Industry 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 35 25 
Saburov, Eduard Nickolaevich ― Vice-rector for Scientific Work, Arkhangelsk State Technical 
University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhanagelsk, 163002 
Sergeeva, Elena Borisovna ― Junior Scientist, JSC “Nauchdrevprom-TSNIIMOD” 
112/1, Severnaya Dvina Emb., 163061 
Sokolov, Oleg Mikhailovich ― Rector, Arkhangelsk State Technical University 
17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhanagelsk, 163002 
Fax: +7 (8182) 44 11 46 
Stakhiev, Yurii Mikhailovich ― Head of Laboratory, JSC “Nauchdrevprom-TSNIIMOD” 
112/1, Severnaya Dvina Emb., 163061 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 26 45, add. 1-35 / +7 (8182) 64 72 95; E-mail: stakhiev@sanet.ru 
Stukova, Tatiana Petrovna ― Professor, Dean of the Department of Mechanical Wood Technology, 
Arkhangelsk State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44  91 22 
Tarakanov, Anatoly Mikhailovich ― Head of Laboratory of the Director on Scientific Work, Northern 
Scientific-research Institute of Forestry, 13, Nikitova Street, Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Fax: +7 (8182) 41 25 87; E-mail: root@forestry.sts.ru 
Turushev, Valentin Gurianovich ― Professor, Head of Log-processing and Production Planning, 
Arkhangelsk State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44  93 66 
Tsvetkov, Vasilii Frolovich ― Professor, Head of the Department of Silviculture and Soil Science, 
Arkhangelsk State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44  91 74 
Chuprov, Nikolai Prokopevich ― Head of the laboratory of the Director on Scientific Work of 
Northern Scientific-research Institute of Forestry, 13, Nikitova Street, Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Fax: +7 (8182) 41 25 87; E-mail: root@forestry.sts.ru 
Other Organizations 
Vysokikh, Georgii Alexandrovich ― Head of the Arkhangelsk Custom-house 
138, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163045 
Tel: +7 (8182) 22 45 90 
Zhdanova, Elena ― Acting director of company “Runa”  
Tel/Fax: (8-8182) 26 17 88 
Nurgaliev, Gumar Khaphizovich ― President, Arkhangelsk Chamber of Commerce 
2, Pomorskaya, Arkhangelsk 
Tel: +7 (8182) 64 01 73; Fax: +7 (8182) 49 21 80 
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Polevshchikova, Nadezhda Borisovna ― Head of the laboratory of the regional social-and-economic 
geography of KSPU, 17, Pushkinskaya Street, Petrozavodsk, Karelia, 185610 
Tel/Fax: (8-8142) 783029; E-mail: polev.nadezda@onego.ru 
Grosheva, Olga Vasilevna ― Chief Specialist, State Committee of Forest-industrial Complex of the 
Republic of Karelia, 1, Andropova, Petrozavodsk, 185035, Russia 
Fax: +7 (8142) 76 81 63; E-mail: forest@karelia.ru 
IIASA group 
Carlsson, Lars ― Professor, Researcher, Forestry Project, IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, Laxenburg, 
Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 492; Fax: +43 2236 807 599; E-mail: carlsson@iiasa.ac.at  
Festin, Cynthia ― Administrative Assistant, Forestry Project, IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 492; Fax: +43 2236 807 599; E-mail: festin@iiasa.ac.at   
Nilsson, Sten ― Deputy Director of IIASA, Professor, Leader of the Forestry Project, IIASA, 
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 492; Fax: +43 2236 807 599; E-mail: nilsson@iiasa.ac.at  
Olsson, Mats-Olov ― Researcher, Forestry Project, IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, Laxenburg, 
Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 346; Fax: +43 2236 807 599; E-mail: olsson@iiasa.ac.at   
Shvidenko, Anatoly Z. ― Professor, Researcher, Forestry Project, IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 497; Fax: +43 2236 807 599; E-mail: shvidenk@iiasa.ac.at  
Other Particiapants 
Olson, Åke ― Swedesurvey Company, Moscow 
E-mail: akeolson@hotmail.com  
Poikonen, Pasi ― Project Manager, Indufor Oy, Toolonkatu 15 E, FIN 00100 Helsinki 
Tel: +358 9 6840 1125; Fax: +358 9 135 2552; E-mail: pasi.poikonen@indufor.fi  
Bulygina, Natalia Nikolaevna ― Senior Teacher, Department of Management, Arkhangelsk State 
Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 93 92 
Fedorov, Sergey ― correspondent of the local newspaper “Volna” 
Dybtsyna, Elena Yur’evna ― Post-graduate student, Department of Management, Arkhangelsk State 
Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk 
Tel: +7 (8182) 44 93 27; E-mail: ed@agtu.ru 
Pachtusova, Marina Yur’evna ― Post-graduate student, Department of Management, Arkhangelsk 
State Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7 (8182) 65 14 58 
Podrazhanskaya, Natalia Teodorovna – Manager, International Department, Arkhangelsk State 
Technical University, 17, Severnaya Dvina Emb., Arkhangelsk, 163002 
Tel: +7(8182) 44 93 27; E-mail: pn@agtu.ru 
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Appendix D3: Arkhangelsk: Final Document 
DECLARATION 
from the International Seminar  
“Institutional Problems of the Arkhangelsk Forest Sector” 
On 29–30 March 2001 an international seminar “Institutional Problems of the Arkhangelsk Forest 
Sector” was conducted at the Arkhangelsk State Technical University. The seminar was organized 
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) together with the Arkhangelsk 
State Technical University and the administration of Arkhangelsk Oblast. The funding was provided 
by the Kempe Foundation (Sweden), the World Bank and the World Wildlife Foundation 
(WB/WWF Alliance). The main objective of the seminar was to discuss and develop possible 
directions for improving the institutional policy of the Arkhangelsk forest sector and to present the 
results to enterprise managers, the regional and federal organs of power. People with a direct interest 
in the reformation of the forest sector took part in the meeting: enterprise managers, representatives 
of the Regional Administration, Russian and foreign financial organizations, professionals, 
nongovernmental institutions, scientists.  
The forest sector of Arkhangelsk Oblast is the main sector in the region’s economy and it has deep 
historical roots and professional traditions. The best years in the development of the region are 
connected with the achievements of the forest industry. When, at the beginning of the century, 
Arkhangelsk industrialists developed the sawmill industry, built the best forest factories in Europe, 
and reached out on the world markets with high quality products, the city of Arkhangelsk became 
one of the most modern and beautiful cities in Russia. Here, electricity, tram lines, a telephone net, 
running water, and beautiful architectural constructions appeared well ahead of other provincial 
cities. The rural population was given the opportunity to engage in business undertakings or receive 
additional earnings.  
The establishment of the modern, well-equipped cities Novodvinsk and Koriazhma is related to the 
development of large pulp and paper combines. 
But in the great history of the forest sector there were also hard times, and this was immediately 
reflected in the well-being of the population in the region.  
Such a period has currently started, when the problems of the forest sector that have accumulated 
over the last decade were added to the difficulties of the transition period.  
The main problem is that the economic and social efficiency in the use and processing of forest 
resources into products has turned out to be significantly below the world level. It is necessary to 
take immediate actions to reduce this lag.  
In a historical perspective the main causes of the inefficient forest sector is an ecologically and 
economically unwise forest policy, more specifically: 
1. Insufficient funding of reforestation and the rational use of forest resources, the technological and 
technical refurbishing of forest management and forest processing.  
2. An extremely awkward distribution of the exploitable forest fund, resulting from poor logistic 
plans for the exploitation of forest lands and the idea of a “extensive” forest use. 
3. The extreme concentration of forest processing facilities oriented to the production and export of 
intermediary products. The lack of further wood processing.  
4. The artificial isolation from the world progress in science and technology.  
5. The orientation of the region’s fuel-energy demand towards imported energy carriers and the 
underestimation of the energy potential of wood.  
6. The lack of a general policy of sustainable development of the forest industrial sector in the 
region, taking the economic structure and the trend towards tighter international environmental 
restrictions into account.  
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The above mentioned factors have the following consequences: 
1. Low rates of technical and technological modernization of enterprises in all branches of the 
forest sector due to limited investments. 
2. A decrease in the competitiveness of products of forest processing due to the uncontrolled tariff 
increases on electricity and freight by all modes of transport.  
3. the insufficient funding and lag in scientific and technical support of monitoring of the forest 
resources and forest inventory.  
4. The deficient legislative foundation for implementing harmonic forest relations, in particular: 
- the complicated procedures for assigning forest resources to be used by forest sector 
enterprises; 
- the conflicting interests of forest sector stakeholders; 
- the mistakes in reforming forest management, leading to a weakening of the federal 
forest service.  
5. Underestimation of the role of small and middle-sized forest businesses in the solution of 
economic and social problems in rural settlements during the transition period. Weak incentives 
for legal honest business conduct due to the extremely rigid fiscal functions of the taxation 
authorities and the state in general, as well as the development of a falsely attractive shadow 
market for forest products. 
6. The loss of some good traditions and habits of the local population, the decline of the 
environmental awareness, the deteriorating status of forest professions. 
7. The complicated environmental situation, being one of the factors behind the reduced 
investment attractiveness of the region. 
On the whole, all of these causes (and their consequences) have a long term creeping character. They 
appeared because of the lack of a stable forest strategy in the last century that should have been 
oriented towards specific socio-economic perspectives and free from short-sighted selfish interests 
of individual groups. Coping with these consequences will require time. This is all the more so when 
the object to be changed is the slow-growing forest and the expensive, widely diversified production 
infrastructure.  
Directions of efforts to solve the main problem: 
1. To elaborate an Outline of a forest policy for the 21st century in Arkhangelsk Oblast.  
According to this outline the forest should be regarded as the basis of the region’s economy in 
the long-term perspective. The principles of sustainable forest development should be 
determined (continuity, inexhaustibility, and complex use at efficient reproduction, conservation 
and maintenance of the biological diversity and ecosphere function of the forests). 
It will be expedient to assign the task of developing the outline to the Department of Economics 
and Development and the Department of the Forest Sector in the Arkhangelsk Regional 
Administration. The working group of the seminar is ready to take part in the development of 
the document.  
2. To take the following basic factors into account in the outline:  
- an increased profitability in forest use through the full production cycle due to a sound 
management and marketing, a proper selection of sustainable strategic investors and forest 
users, and technical modernization. The increased profitability should serve the interests of 
all participants of the forest arena: forest users and processors; the regional budget; the 
municipal formations, representing the interests of the local population; the forest 
management organs.  
- an increase in the investment attractiveness of the regional forest sector and measures to 
decrease investment risks; 
- a strategic zoning of the territory in accordance with the quality of the forest resources, their 
predestination and final state (model forests). The orientation towards multiple forest use, 
including commercial tourism and the preservation of the natural inheritance; 
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- improving forest cultivation through an increase of efficiency in forest exploitation, an 
intensification of intermediate use in zones bordering on stable forest processing settlements. 
Increasing the future wood harvesting in such zones to reach 3–5 m3 per ha and year. 
- to increase the level of reforestation in the activity zones of large enterprise complexes, i.a., 
on the basis of using front-line forest cultural technology and plantation type forest 
cultivation. 
- a gradual “dismantling” of the Arkhangelsk forest industrial junction to municipalities in the 
region with good future prospects, the establishment of a strategic plan for the distribution of 
production forces and transport routes, the selection of optimal production structures 
according to final products, taking forecasts of the business fluctuations in the world forest 
market into account; 
- a long term forecast of the political, economic, and demographic development of the country 
at large and the region in particular, the development of mutual relations between the 
regional government circles and regional and national corporations; 
- establishing an order of priority for the scientific-technical and informational guidance for 
management decisions, a maximal transparency of the forest sector information field; 
- the region’s responsibility for the preservation and increase of forest resources in the period 
between planting and harvesting; 
- preservation of the traditional rural population, fostering of good traditions and habits among 
the local inhabitants, development of their traditional way of life; 
- joint action of the regional organs of power with federal organs and their territorial organs, 
municipal structures and industrial companies for the implementation of the forest policy; 
- a forecast of the results of an implementation of the forest policy in terms of increased well-
being. 
3. Provided the outline is approved, to develop a comprehensive program for the solution of the 
identified problems, the composition of participants and the time assigned for performing the 
task.  
4. To publish the program through the mass media with the purpose to make it known to potential 
investors, entrepreneurs and the citizens of the regions.  
5. To continue legislation work in agreement with the Outline to create a regional legislative 
platform for the regulation of forest relations. 
6. To use the Outline for the development of regional programs for specific sections of the forest 
sector. 
The working group on behalf of the seminar participants:  
General director of the Department of the Forest Industrial Complex  
of the Arkhangelsk regional administration A.F. Pavlov 
Consultant to the department of the forest industrial complex at the  
Arkhangelsk regional Administration D.V. Trubin 
Prorector for international relations of the Arkhangelsk State  
Technical University G.V. Komarova 
President of the Board of directors of AO “Solombal’skii TsBK”,  
deputy head of the Department of Management AGTU, Prof.  A.V. Plastinin 
Head of the Department of Forest Management and Land Use at AGTU, Prof.  V.F. Tsvetkov 
Director of the Northern Scientific Research Institute of Forest Management R.V. Sungurov 
Dept. General director for scientific work of the OAO  
“Nauchdrevprom–TsNIIMOD” A.M. Kopeikin 
Head of laboratory, Northern Scientific Research Institute of  
Forest Management N.P. Chuprov 
Ass. Prof., Institute of economics, finance and business, Arkhangelsk  
StateTechnical University M. Yu. Varakin 
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Appendix E: List of Issues for Discussion 
in the Working Groups 
1. Legal issues ? Collisions between the constitution and subsequent laws must be eliminated.  ? What kind of enterprises are the most viable and what kind of enterprises are the most unviable in the 
regional forest sector business? On which basis can you make this division? How should these 
different types of enterprises be handled by the authorities? ? The property rights and usufructs concerning the resource base are still not clear: collisions between 
the constitution and subsequent laws in forest use, the financial foundation of the forest management 
and monitoring of forest use, forest lease, forest payments, cumbersome bureaucracy in the daily 
activities of forest management, differences in the composition of the forest fund of different areas. ? All ambiguities concerning property rights should be sorted out. ? Different types of ownership should be allowed. ? A thorough taxation reform should be enacted. The whole system of taxes and fees, not only the 
number of taxation rules, should be simplified ? All democratic means should be utilized to create law and order. ? Defense of the rights of shareholders?  ? Law on land? ? Implications of international agreements? ? How to handle certification issues? 
2. Restructuring of the forest sector ? What kind of investments are most urgently needed? Who should the investors be? How can 
appropriate investors be drawn to the sector? What are the main ingredients of a favorable Karelian 
investment climate? ? What are the consequences of timber export for the different stakeholders of the sector? ? Without proper circulation of money and a monetary based economy there is no development. What 
are the means to develop a cash economy? ? Joint enterprise structures, merging of firms and branches of the forest industrial sector, and a better 
coordinated management of the sector are needed. What kind of joint structures? Based on whose 
decisions? ? Federal and regional policy programs, which are in line with market economic principles should be 
worked out. No political, administrative coordination of business activities. ? Banks and other credit institutes should encourage entrepreneurship, exports, and the establishment of 
joint ventures with foreign companies. ? Increased efforts at product development. ? The most unviable firms should be shut down! ― Who are they and how can unintended effects be 
eliminated or mitigated? ? Without a cash economy, no development! ― What are the hurdles for establishing a monetized forest 
sector?  ? It is not self-evident that Karelia is actually suited for the current type of forest production! ― Who 
are the competitors, why should customers choose the Republic of Karelia? ? For larger industries, vertical integration might prove profitable. 
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? How to support small business? ? How to establish a nucleus of good-working enterprises? ? Renewal of technology (e.g., for intermediate cutting). 
3. Personnel, education, training ? Focus more on economics and less on engineering. ? Education and training for people to learn new tasks and technologies must be developed; democratic 
citizenship should be encouraged. ? Educate and develop the workforce, e.g., in English, modern business accounting (cost awareness), 
quality management, etc.  
4. Role of public authorities ? What is the appropriate interrelation between enterprises and local communities? How deeply could 
― and should ― enterprises be involved in the local decision making processes? ? A number of political problems, e.g., the role of the parliament versus the president, as well as many 
macro-economic questions, must be solved in order to establish a solid foundation for a vital forest 
sector. ? Politicians and bureaucrats should withdraw from direct involvement in individual enterprises. ? The bankruptcy system and the arbitration courts must be made more efficient. ? The coordination and integration process must be the result of the companies’ own decisions. It cannot 
be implemented if the old political structure intervenes in the forest sector. ? Politicians and administrators should know their role and not make things worse! ― What are the 
consequences of such a statement in the Republic of Karelia?  
5. Business/Management culture ? Reward good behavior, work ethics should be held in high esteem, business leaders should act as 
moral vanguards. ? Establishing trust is the key to the solution! ― What steps must and can be taken in the Republic of 
Karelia in this direction? ? How to establish a nucleus of good-working enterprises? 
6. Information distribution ? There is always something that can be learned from other enterprises and from other stakeholders. 
What are the suitable channels for this learning process between different stakeholders of the sector? 
• Between the industrial enterprises. 
• Between the industrial enterprises and forest management. 
• Between enterprises and representatives of the administration at different levels. 
• Between enterprises and the educational establishments. 
• Between enterprises and associations of civic society.  
• Between domestic and foreign enterprises. 
• Between domestic and foreign administrations relevant to the sector. ? Forest enterprises should create their own independent branch organizations.  ? Learn from others; there are a number of good examples. 
 164
Appendix F: List of Newspaper Articles and TV Features 
Relating to the Policy Exercise Workshops 
in the Three Regions 
Murmansk 
1. Natalia Grechina: “The forest sector: a view towards the future”, Murmanskii 
Vestnik, 25 October 2000.  
2. Adel’ Alekseeva: Seminar “I look at you, as in a mirror”, Poliarnaia Pravda, 26 
October 2000. 
3. Natalia Grechina: “The forest sector has nowhere to fall ― it has to grow”, 
Murmanskii vestnik, 1 November 2000.  
Karelia 
1. Sergei Nikonov: “Illusions of the virtual market”, Molodezhnaya Gazeta, No. 51 
(9935), 14–20 December 2000.  
2. Viktor Kiriasov: “Do it yourself if you want something done ― Notes from an 
international seminar on ‘institutional problems of the forest sector in Karelia’”, 
Severnyi Kur’er, No. 232 (23798), 5 December 2000.  
3. Veniamin Sokolov: “Access to the European table ― Karelia has a chance to 
participate in the process of economic globalization”, Guberniya, No. 49 (234), 7–
13 December 2000.  
4. “Problems of the forest complex of the Republic of Karelia”, a Karelian regional TV 
broadcast.  
Arkhangelsk 
A brief note in the Arkhangelsk State Technical University newsletter and a short 
announcement in a regional TV news broadcast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
